Roberto Redaelli

Riassunto : Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento che rende possibile un accesso diretto all’oggetto trascendente. Ma come si realizza questo accesso? Qual è lo statuto di ciò che il filosofo nomina “dedizione”? L’insufficiente risposta a tali quesiti conduce il pensiero laskiano ad un esito aporetico, ossia alla riduzione della dedizione a momento ideale e alla conseguente riattivazione, in ambito conoscitivo, dell’inaggirabile distanza tra soggetto e oggetto. Ma, se in tale aporia è riconosciuto il limite del modello della conoscenza elaborato da Lask nel suo sistema maturo, non è comunque possibile occultare il decisivo contributo offerto dalla sua riflessione al problema gnoseologico: il superamento del coscienzialismo attraverso l’elaborazione di un soggetto concreto-ricettivo e, accanto a esso, di un peculiare realismo. Parole chiave : Emil Lask; Soggettività; Ricettività; Coscienza; Concreto/astratto Emil Lask. Subjectivity and Receptiveness: This paper intends to illuminate the problematic outcome of Lask’s redefinition of the concept of subjectivity. The main result of this operation is the elaboration of the notion of receptive subject. With this concept, strictly linked to the notion of Hingabe, Lask identifies the original element of every cognitive process in simple intuitive receptivity. Intuitive receptivity alone provides direct access to the transcendent object. But how is this access possible? What is the relation between the receptive-intuitive element of knowledge and predicative activity? What is the status of Hingabe? The insufficient answers to these questions lead the Lask’s thought to an aporetic outcome, namely, the reduction of Hingabe to an exclusively abstract and ideal receptivity, and consequently to the reactivation, in the theory of knowledge, of the distance between subject and object. However, while this distance marks the limit of the model of knowledge developed by Lask, the main contribuition of his thought remains valid: the overcoming of trascendental subjectivism through the elaboration of a concrete-receptive subject and of an original form of realism. Keywords : Emil Lask; Subjectivity; Receptivity; Consciousness; Concreteness/Abstractness

The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith’s objection of solipsism and S. Crowell’s problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard’s identification of the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called ‘mindless coping’. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge.

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between living body and artefacts in the perspective of Helmuth Plessner’s aesthesiology. According to the outcomes of Plessner’s aesthesiology, I present two main theses: 1) artefacts are not created, but rather discovered and expressed by human agency, and 2) the bodily dimension of the human being is the condition of the “discovery” of material and symbolic artefacts. To argue these theses I highlight a) the process of “somatisation” that engages the Kantian transcendental model of subject in Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, b) Plessner’s rejection of the Kantian profile of Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt as an application of this transcendental model of subjectivity in the biological field, and c) the development in Plessner of a type of transcendental aesthetics, which can be linked with S. Crowell’s recent theory of perception.

Riassunto: Il presente contributo intende vagliare l’attualità della riflessione antropologica proposta da Heinrich Rickert, comparandone gli esiti ultimi con i risultati più fecondi ottenuti dalle recenti ricerche condotte nel campo dell’antropologia evolutiva e filosofica. A tale scopo sono presentate nel testo due tesi rickertiane di notevole interesse teoretico: il profilo sociale-comunitario quale cifra dell’essere umano e la capitale funzione svolta dalla dimensione corporea nel processo di costituzione del mondo culturale. La prima tesi, sviluppata da Rickert in campo assiologico, si connette alla definizione di uomo declinata da Michael Tomasello nei termini di ultra-social animal, mentre la seconda tesi contribuisce, in modo originale, a quella rivalutazione della sfera corporea dell’uomo, che riveste, a partire dal secolo scorso, un ruolo centrale in alcuni ambiti di ricerca del frastagliato scenario filosofico. Parole chiave: Antropologia Filosofica; Antropologia Evolutiva; Neokantismo; Teoria dei valori; Heinrich Rickert Sociality, Corporeity, and Values. The Current Significance of Rickertian Axiological Anthropology: This paper aims at assessing the current significance of the anthropological reflections of Heinrich Rickert, comparing his most important contributions to recent results in the fields of evolutionary and philosophical anthropology. With this aim in mind, we examine two Rickertian theses of considerable theoretical interest: the fundamental value of sociality in being human and the foundation role of the corporeal in the cultural world. The first thesis, developed by Rickert in the field of axiology, closely relates to Michael Tomasello’s definition of man as an ultra-social animal. The second thesis represents an original contribution to the re-evaluation of the corporeal basis of human experience, which has continued to play a central role in some areas of philosophical research since the last century. Keywords: Philosophical Anthropology; Evolutionary Anthropology; Neo-Kantianism; Theory of Value; Heinrich Rickert

This paper examines the two different modalities of finitude identified by Heidegger, i.e. perishing and dying, respectively attributed to animals and to human beings. The first goal of the paper is to bring to light the structural link in Heideggerian philosophy between death and language, by virtue of which Dasein dies properly only within the symbolic space originated by the word. The second goal is to assess the extent to which the Heideggerian distinction between perishing and dying has held up in the environment of contemporary philosophy: despite some unavoidable limitations, recent scientific outcomes seem provide its validation.