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Procreative Justice Reconceived: Shifting the Moral GazeJournal of the American Philosophical Association (First View): 1-23. 2024.This paper reconsiders Tommie Shelby's (2016) analysis of procreation in poor black communities. I identify three conceptual frames within which Shelby situates his analysis—feminization, choice-as-control, and moralization. I argue that these frames should be rejected on conceptual, empirical, and moral grounds. As I show, this framing engenders a flawed understanding of poor black women's procreative lives. I propose an alternative framework for reconceiving the relationship between poverty an…Read more
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Challenging the Pursuit of NoveltyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4): 773-792. 2023.
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“What Are You?”: Addressing Racial AmbiguityCritical Philosophy of Race 8 (1-2): 292-307. 2020."What are you?" This question, whether explicitly raised by another or implied in his gaze, is one with which many persons perceived to be racially ambiguous struggle. This article centers on encounters with this question. Its aim is twofold: first, to describe the phenomenology of a particular type of racializing encounter, one in which one of the parties is perceived to be racially ambiguous; second, to investigate how these often alienating encounters can be better negotiated. In the course o…Read more
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Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3): 581-596. 2022.What is sexual orientation? The contemporary consensus among philosophers is that it is a disposition. Unsurprisingly, recent debates about the metaphysics of sexual orientation are almost entirely intramural. Behavioral dispositionalists argue that sexual orientation is a disposition to behave sexually. Desire dispositionalists argue that it is a disposition to desire sexually. We argue that sexual orientation is not best understood in terms of dispositions to behave or dispositions to desire b…Read more
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On Epistemic AppropriationEthics 128 (4): 702-727. 2018.In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, b…Read more
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
Alumnus
New Haven, CT, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |
Metaphysics |
Feminist Philosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |