Robyn Bluhm

This chapter examines the implications of clinical research for philosophical discussions of inductive risk, focusing on three methodological debates: (1) the necessity of randomization, (2) the distinction between explanatory and pragmatic trials, and (3) the use of placebo versus active controls. All of these debates can usefully be recast in terms of inductive risk, which raises several important implications for philosophical discussion. They show that consideration of inductive risk, first, need not involve a straightforward trade-off between the consequences of false positive versus false negative results, and, second, should address what kind of evidence is needed before accepting a hypothesis, in addition to how much evidence is needed. Moreover, they show that evidence itself is shaped by non-epistemic values, which complicates the issue of distinguishing between direct and indirect roles for values.

Philosophy of medicine encompasses a broad range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives—from the uses of statistical reasoning and probability theory in epidemiology and evidence-based medicine to questions about how to recognize the uniqueness of individual patients in medical humanities, person-centered care, and values-based practice; and from debates about causal ontology to questions of how to cultivate epistemic and moral virtue in practice. Apart from being different ways of thinking about medical practices, do (and should) these different philosophical approaches have anything in common? Are they committed to incompatible assumptions about the nature of science and its relationship to experience, value, and the art of medicine, or are different approaches nonetheless complementary? The chapter examines the questions these different approaches and perspectives raise and considers why so many theorists of medicine seek to find a “base” or “center” for medicine—as though there is, or should be, some general conceptual thread linking the things we call “usual clinical practice” in the real world. It further considers whether there are alternative approaches to the philosophy of medicine, which do not embody this philosophical assumption; and it suggests that a key tool for evaluating approaches must be their ability to contribute something of genuine value to clinical medicine.

Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) use electrical or magnetic stimulation to treat psychiatric conditions. For depression therapy, PEIs include both approved treatment modalities, such as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), and experimental neurotechnologies, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive brain implants (ABIs). We present results from a survey-based experiment in which members of four relevant stakeholder groups (psychiatrists, patients with depression, caregivers of adults with depression, and the general public) assessed whether treatment with one of four PEIs (ECT, rTMS, DBS, or ABIs) was better or worse than living with treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and then provided a narrative explanation for their assessment. Overall, the prevalence of many narrative themes differed substantially by stakeholder group—with psychiatrists typically offering different reasons for their assessment than non-clinicians—but much less so by PEI modality. A large majority of all participants viewed their assigned PEI as better than living with TRD, with their reasons being a mix of positive views about the treatment and negative views about TRD. The minority of all participants who viewed their assigned PEI as worse than living with TRD tended to express negative affect toward it as well as emphasize its riskiness, negative side effects, and, to a lesser extent, its invasiveness. The richness of these narrative explanations enabled us to put in context and add depth to key patterns seen in recent survey-based research on PEIs.

When the editorial to the first philosophy thematic edition of this journal was published in 2010, critical questioning of underlying assumptions, regarding such crucial issues as clinical decision making, practical reasoning, and the nature of evidence in health care, was still derided by some prominent contributors to the literature on medical practice. Things have changed dramatically. Far from being derided or dismissed as a distraction from practical concerns, the discussion of such fundamental questions, and their implications for matters of practical import, is currently the preoccupation of some of the most influential and insightful contributors to the on‐going evidence‐based medicine debate. Discussions focus on practical wisdom, evidence, and value and the relationship between rationality and context. In the debate about clinical practice, we are going to have to be more explicit and rigorous in future in developing and defending our views about what is valuable in human life.

Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) use electrical or magnetic stimulation to treat psychiatric conditions. For depression therapy, PEIs include both approved treatment modalities, such as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), and experimental neurotechnologies, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive brain implants (ABIs). We present results from a survey-based experiment in which members of four relevant stakeholder groups (psychiatrists, patients with depression, caregivers of adults with depression, and the general public) assessed whether treatment with one of four PEIs (ECT, rTMS, DBS, or ABIs) was better or worse than living with treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and then provided a narrative explanation for their assessment. Overall, the prevalence of many narrative themes differed substantially by stakeholder group—with psychiatrists typically offering different reasons for their assessment than non-clinicians—but much less so by PEI modality. A large majority of all participants viewed their assigned PEI as better than living with TRD, with their reasons being a mix of positive views about the treatment and negative views about TRD. The minority of all participants who viewed their assigned PEI as worse than living with TRD tended to express negative affect toward it as well as emphasize its riskiness, negative side effects, and, to a lesser extent, its invasiveness. The richness of these narrative explanations enabled us to put in context and add depth to key patterns seen in recent survey-based research on PEIs.

Background Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) use electrical or magnetic stimulation to treat mental disorders and may raise different ethical concerns than other therapies such as medications or talk therapy. Yet little is known about stakeholders’ perceptions of, and ethical concerns related to, these interventions. We aimed to better understand the ethical concerns of a variety of stakeholder groups (patients with depression, caregivers of patients, members of the public, and psychiatrists) regarding four PEIs: electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), deep brain stimulation (DBS), and adaptive brain implants (ABI). Methods We conducted a national survey of these four stakeholder groups, using an embedded video vignette experiment depicting a patient with treatment-resistant depression and her psychiatrist discussing the possibility of treatment with one of the four PEIs. Results Participants’ ethical concerns varied by stakeholder group, by PEI, and by the interaction of the two. The three non-clinician groups tended to have similar ethical concerns, but to differ from psychiatrists. Similar concerns were raised with regard to the two implantable technologies, DBS and ABI. Overall, there was relatively little concern about the involuntary use of PEIs, though some expressed concern about the adequacy of information provided during the consent process. There was also significant concern that patients may not receive helpful therapies. Conclusions To our knowledge, this is the first national survey that includes multiple stakeholder groups and multiple PEI modalities. A better understanding of the ethical concerns of stakeholders can help to shape clinical practice and health care policy regarding PEIs.

Philosophy of medicine encompasses a broad range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives—from the uses of statistical reasoning and probability theory in epidemiology and evidence-based medicine to questions about how to recognize the uniqueness of individual patients in medical humanities, person-centered care, and values-based practice; and from debates about causal ontology to questions of how to cultivate epistemic and moral virtue in practice. Apart from being different ways of thinking about medical practices, do these different philosophical approaches have anything in common? Are they committed to incompatible assumptions about the nature of science and its relationship to experience, value, and the art of medicine, or are different approaches nonetheless complementary? The chapter examines the questions these different approaches and perspectives raise and considers why so many theorists of medicine seek to find a “base” or “center” for medicine—as though there is, or should be, some general conceptual thread linking the things we call “usual clinical practice” in the real world. It further considers whether there are alternative approaches to the philosophy of medicine, which do not embody this philosophical assumption; and it suggests that a key tool for evaluating approaches must be their ability to contribute something of genuine value to clinical medicine.

Medical interventions are usually categorized as “invasive” when they involve piercing the skin or inserting an object into the body. Beyond this standard definition, however, there is little discussion of the concept of invasiveness in the medical literature, despite evidence that the term is used in ways that do not reflect the standard definition of medical invasiveness. We interviewed psychiatrists, patients with depression, and members of the public without depression to better understand their views on the invasiveness of several psychiatric electroceutical interventions (treatments that involve electrical or magnetic stimulation of the brain) for the treatment of depression. Our study shows that people recognize several kinds of invasiveness: physical, emotional, and lifestyle. In addition, several characteristics of therapies influence how invasive they are perceived to be; these include the perceived capacity of an intervention to result in harm; how localized the effects of the intervention are; the amount of control retained by the person receiving the intervention; how permanent its effects are perceived as being; and how familiar it seemed to participants. Our findings contribute to a small literature on the concept of invasiveness, which emphasizes that categorizing an intervention as invasive, or as noninvasive, evokes a variety of other normative considerations, including the potential harm it poses and how it compares to other potential therapies. It may also draw attention away from other salient features of the intervention.

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) uses electrodes implanted in the brain to modulate dysregulated brain activity related to a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. A number of people who use DBS have reported changes that affect their sense of self. In the neuroethics literature, there has been significant debate over the exact nature of these changes. More recently, there have been suggestions that this debate is overblown and detracts from clinically-relevant ways of understanding these effects of DBS. In this paper, we offer an alternative approach to understanding the effects of DBS on the self, drawing on John Sadler’s work on self-illness ambiguity. We argue that self-illness ambiguity is a complex concept, with at least three different aspects, and that each of the three aspects we identify also characterizes one kind of DBS-related change. Our analysis also suggests ways of helping patients to adjust to life as a DBS user.

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) uses electrodes implanted in the brain to modulate dysregulated brain activity related to a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. A number of people who use DBS have reported changes that affect their sense of self. In the neuroethics literature, there has been significant debate over the exact nature of these changes. More recently, there have been suggestions that this debate is overblown and detracts from clinically-relevant ways of understanding these effects of DBS. In this paper, we offer an alternative approach to understanding the effects of DBS on the self, drawing on John Sadler’s work on self-illness ambiguity. We argue that self-illness ambiguity is a complex concept, with at least three different aspects, and that each of the three aspects we identify also characterizes one kind of DBS-related change. Our analysis also suggests ways of helping patients to adjust to life as a DBS user.

This section of the journal consists of reflections on the COVID-19 pandemic by feminist bioethicists. We wanted to have a record in IJFAB of the ways in which feminist bioethicists/feminist bioethics were and are affected by the pandemic and also record how our community sees feminist approaches to bioethics as providing resources for understanding and addressing ethical themes raised by the pandemic. The contributions we received cover a wide range of personal, professional, and theoretical issues and approach them in different ways. We are deeply grateful to the authors for sharing their experiences, and hope that our readers find their contributions engaging and...

Philosophy of medicine encompasses a broad range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives—from the uses of statistical reasoning and probability theory in epidemiology and evidence-based medicine to questions about how to recognize the uniqueness of individual patients in medical humanities, person-centered care, and values-based practice; and from debates about causal ontology to questions of how to cultivate epistemic and moral virtue in practice. Apart from being different ways of thinking about medical practices, do (and should) these different philosophical approaches have anything in common? Are they committed to incompatible assumptions about the nature of science and its relationship to experience, value, and the art of medicine, or are different approaches nonetheless complementary? The chapter examines the questions these different approaches and perspectives raise and considers why so many theorists of medicine seek to find a “base” or “center” for medicine—as though there is, or should be, some general conceptual thread linking the things we call “usual clinical practice” in the real world. It further considers whether there are alternative approaches to the philosophy of medicine, which do not embody this philosophical assumption; and it suggests that a key tool for evaluating approaches must be their ability to contribute something of genuine value to clinical medicine.

COVID-19 has meant that the past year has been difficult for everybody and terrifying and heartbreaking for many. We here at IJFAB found ourselves, for the first time, separated by physical distances and pandemic-era planning that precluded those necessary in-person meetings and less formal interactions during conferences and other social occasions that connect so much of the feminist bioethics community. The editorial team has been variously in lockdown, shielding because of health vulnerabilities, or ill, in our different cities and continents. Alongside so many of our readers, contributors, and reviewers, Zoom became the space where we tried to continue to bring you what we consider...

Timothy Brown invites us to think about the ways in which people who are being treated with deep brain stimulation might come to interact with their devices. He suggests that a framework of relational agency can help us to understand both the benefits and the challenges of DBS because DBS systems are, while not full fellow agents, more than mere props; users must sometimes "negotiate and collaborate with their stimulators". We agree that it is important to develop conceptual frameworks that both do justice to the ways that individuals respond to using DBS and give them new ways to think about the device, their relationship to it, and its role in their lives. In this commentary, we consider three...

A number of reports have suggested that patients who undergo deep brain stimulation may experience changes to their personality or sense of self. These reports have attracted great philosophical interest. This paper surveys the philosophical literature on personal identity and DBS and draws on an emerging empirical literature on the experiences of patients who have undergone this therapy to argue that the existing philosophical discussion of DBS and personal identity frames the problem too narrowly. Much of the discussion by neuroethicists centers on the nature of the threat posed by DBS, asking whether it is best understood as a threat to personal identity, autonomy, agency, or authenticity, or as putting patients at risk of self-estrangement. Our aim in this paper is to use the empirical literature on patients’ experiences post-DBS to open up a broader range of questions - both philosophical and practical, and to suggest that attention to these questions will help to provide better support to patients, both before and after treatment.

This book explores the central questions and themes lying at the heart of a vibrant area of philosophical inquiry. Aligning core issues in psychiatry with traditional philosophical areas, it presents a focused overview of the historical and contemporary problems dominating the philosophy of psychiatry. Beginning with an introduction to research issues, it addresses what psychiatry is and distinguishes it from other areas of medical practice, other health care professions and psychology. With each section of the companion corresponding to a philosophical subject, contributors systematically relate themes in philosophy of psychiatry to topics in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, philosophy of science, ethics, social and political philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of medicine. Looking ahead to new research directions, chapters address recent issues including the metaphysics of mental disorders, gender and race in psychiatry and psychiatric ethics. Featuring discussion questions, suggestions for further reading and an annotated bibliography, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry is an accessible survey of the debates and developments in the field suitable for undergraduates in philosophy and professional philosophers new to philosophy of psychiatry.

Arguments in favor of greater research-practice integration in medicine have tended to be ethical, political, or pragmatic. There are good epistemic reasons to pursue greater integration, and it is important to think through these reasons in order to avoid inadvertently designing new systems in ways that replicate the epistemic elitism common within current systems. Meaningful transformation within health care is possible with close attention to all reasons in favor of greater research-practice integration, including epistemic reasons.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe what we see as several important new directions for philosophy of medicine. This recent work (i) takes existing discussions in important and promising new directions, (ii) identifies areas that have not received sufficient and deserved attention to date, and/or (iii) brings together philosophy of medicine with other areas of philosophy (including bioethics, philosophy of psychiatry, and social epistemology). To this end, the next part focuses on what we call the “epistemological turn” in recent work in the philosophy of medicine; the third part addresses new developments in medical research that raise interesting questions for philosophy of medicine; the fourth part is a discussion of philosophical issues within the practice of diagnosis; the fifth part focuses on the recent developments in psychiatric classification and scientific and ethical issues therein, and the final part focuses on the objectivity of medical research.