Rocío Cázares-Blanco

In this paper I propose to conceive of forgiveness as a process of eliminating punitive reactive attitudes, which makes up part of the offended person’s willingness to reestablish a certain type of reciprocal relationship with the offender. Distinguishing among types of reciprocity allows us to realize that forgiveness is a more varied phenomenon than is usually assumed in the philosophical literature, as well as to understand why the dispute concerning the gratuitousnessconditionality of forgiveness is meaningless.

Aristotelian conceptions of the good life are often criticized from several ethical positions, like G.E. Moore’s anti-naturalism or emotivism and prescriptivism. Aristotelians are accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy when they make a moral evaluation of features, actions, intentions and faculties of human beings. In this paper, I examine and refute AlfonsoGómez-Lobo’s strategy to reject that accusation; then, I propose another strategy and I argue that inclusivist Aristotelian conceptions of the good life could be freed from such criticism if they appeal to the concept of “brute facts relative to” as proposed by G.E. Anscombe.