Rod Jenks

The elenchus, Socrates' method in Plato's 'early' dialogues, consists of Socrates' eliciting a definition of some moral term from the interlocutor, then proceeding to demonstrate that that definition has consequences at odds with other things the interlocutor believes. Socrates' goal is standardly to force the interlocutor to abandon his definition. But this relies on the secondary beliefs' having some special status, for otherwise, it would be open to the interlocutor to cling to his definition and abandon his secondary beliefs. Another problem lies in the fact that, in a few cases where the elenchus is featured, Socrates actually claims to have proved his position true. One problem, then, is to account for the special status of the secondary beliefs; the other is to explain how a method which, on the face of it, is capable only of delivering the verdict that a particular definition, $\delta$, either is or is not consistent with a particular set of secondary beliefs, $\Sigma$, can also serve to render a verdict on the truth of $\delta$. I argue that neither of these problems is soluble unless consistency can be shown to be sufficient for truth. ;Consistency is sufficient for truth only on a Coherence Theory of Truth. I argue that Socrates presupposes, and Plato subscribes to, just such a theory; this explains why they both think that there is only one fully consistent set of beliefs, and that truth consists in membership in that set. The Coherence Theory, I argue, is a central part of Platonic metaphysics, and is reasonably near the surface in some of the 'middle' and 'late' dialogues. Hints of the Coherence Theory of Truth are present even in some of the 'early' dialogues. I try to show how attributing such a theory to Plato illuminates Socrates' practice. In conclusion, I suggest that recognizing the role this theory plays in Plato's metaphysics helps to solve ancillary but related problems in Plato scholarship, such as what to make of Socratic ignorance and how to construe Plato's resolution of Meno's paradox

I link together the nuptial number, that ‘whole geometric number', represented as the areas of two distinct figures -- a square and a rectangle -- with the ‘triangles in ascending order'. I locate an indeterminancy in the conditions for the production of the ‘divine creature', which I take to be a philosopher , and suggest a new interpretation of the breakdown of the eugenics programme. I try to show how and why that breakdown is metaphysically necessary. I argue that Plato uses mathematical indeterminancy not only to suggest that the decline is necessary, but also to issue an epistemic warning to us, to the effect that we should avoid trying to come to a philosophical understanding of forms by focusing on even very fine particulars

Moral expertise in the Laches -- The Laches -- Socratic ignorance and socratic wisdom -- Vituperation -- Virtue and craft -- Expertise in the Charmides -- Ironies -- The definitions -- Quietness -- Modesty -- Doing or making one's own -- Doing, not making, one's own -- Doing good things -- Knowing oneself -- Knowledge of itself and all other knowledges -- Good, evil, and temperance -- Expertise in republic -- Preliminaries -- Republic viii -- The text -- Mathematical indeterminacy -- Metaphysical necessity -- Justice "writ large" -- The most formidable question -- Preliminaries -- The context of the argument -- The most formidable argument itself -- The image -- Not knowing the things we know -- Attending to words -- Larger issues -- The third man argument.

This work is an introduction to logic, covering what is most commonly taught in the first term of a two-term sequence in logic at four-year colleges and universities. It is designed for use by community college students who plan to transfer credits to four-year institutions. The material covered seeks to maintain logic's place in philosophical thought systems, and avoids political examples in order to appeal to reason and study rather than ill-conceived jokes that often offend students' varying policitcal beliefs. This work concludes with studies in proof constructions and rules and provides explanations of various grading decisions commonly made in logic courses, a unique feature helpful to students and teachers alike