Rodolpho Venturini

“After Freedom" (Depois da liberdade) examines the reconfiguration of the classical problem of social domination within the scope of critical theory, starting from the recent privilege granted to the generic notion of “power” in current debates. From a historical and social situation to be politically overcome, domination came to be understood, ontologically, as something “inscribed at the level of being.” How did this transformation take place? What are its theoretical reasons? What are its political consequences? Above all, what is its material ground? These are the questions that the book intends to answer. Starting from the incorporation of the thought of Foucault and Butler by authors linked to the tradition of German critical theory dissatisfied with the models of their predecessors (Habermas and Honneth in particular), the book lays out the commitments and the bets that are behind this process. The key point is that, in the new framework, social and subjective transformation is assumed as always possible, whatever the situation, and this very possibility is taken in itself as the locus of a freedom that is the condition of critique. In short, one no longer transforms (and critiques) in order to be free, but because one is free. With this movement, the possibility of freedom ceases to be an empirical, historical, and sociological question, and comes to be assumed, independently of questions of fact, as an independent variable that is never itself taken as a direct object of investigation. The ultimate objective of the book is to put this framework to the test. This is done by pointing to the incongruities of its presuppositions, but, above all, by the introduction of a theoretical hypothesis by which, from within them, it is demonstrated that this freedom could very well be eliminated from the moment that transformation comes to become impossible due to historical and material factors, configuring a kind of “iron cage.” The historical and sociological plausibility of a situation like this resides in the “objective constraints” imposed, at a global level, by a particular technical artifact: nuclear weapons. Their capacity for destruction and the extent of their effects—which stand beyond effective use—create important limitations to the idea that an alternative reality would be possible at all. What must be taken as a result, however, is less the fatalistic conclusion that freedom does not exist, than the theoretical demand that the possibility of freedom be investigated materially and radically, and not simply assumed a priori. For this, however, that framework examined here needs to be abandoned.

Since the 1980s, the work of Michel Foucault has become an obligatory reference in the tradition of German Critical Theory. Habermas and Fraser attacked the “normative confusions” of genealogy, Honneth situated it as a “reflexive stage” of critical theory and, more recently, Amy Allen and Martin Saar sought to appropriate it in order to try to respond to the theoretical impasses of the tradition itself. This book identifies the guiding thread that runs through these apparently divergent interpretations. The central hypothesis is that this debate is centered on a methodological question: can genealogy function as a coherent model of critical theory? Having this question as a guiding thread, the book proposes to examine it from three axes: critique, power, and rationality. In the first place, it reinterprets genealogy from its “positive” dimension, as cognitive activity and effort of knowledge. It sustains that its critical character resides above all in the gain of knowledge about the logic of functioning of social practices, and not in the simple delegitimation. In the second place, it suggests that the “genealogy of power” of Foucault should be read as a critique of political technology. Its objective would be that of elaborating a model of intelligibility whose object is the techniques of power that structure social reality. Finally, it examines the relation between history and reason to sustain that, after launching its objects onto a “plane of immanence” governed by contingency, the genealogical critique would need to extract them from there if it assumes that a “courageous critique of the existing state of affairs” depends on the “exposition of a better understanding” of reality (Kant) and vice versa. // Desde os anos 1980, a obra de Michel Foucault tornou-se referência obrigatória na tradição da Teoria Crítica alemã. Habermas e Fraser atacaram as “confusões normativas” da genealogia, Honneth a situou como “estágio reflexivo” da teoria crítica e, mais recentemente, Amy Allen e Martin Saar buscaram dela se apropriar para tentar responder aos impasses teóricos da própria tradição. Este livro identifica o fio condutor que atravessa essas interpretações aparentemente divergentes. A hipótese central é a de que esse debate é centrado em uma questão metodológica: pode a genealogia funcionar como um modelo coerente de teoria crítica? Tendo essa questão por fio condutor, o livro se propõe a examiná-la a partir de três eixos: crítica, poder e racionalidade. Em primeiro lugar, reinterpreta a genealogia a partir de sua dimensão “positiva”, como atividade cognitiva e esforço de conhecimento. Sustenta que seu caráter crítico reside sobretudo no ganho de conhecimento sobre a lógica de funcionamento das práticas sociais, e não na simples deslegitimação. Em segundo lugar, sugere que a “genealogia do poder” de Foucault deveria ser lida como uma crítica da tecnologia política. Seu objetivo seria o de elaborar um modelo de inteligibilidade cujo objeto são as técnicas de poder que estruturam a realidade social. Por fim, examina a relação entre história e razão para sustentar que, após lançar seu objetos em um “plano de imanência” governado pela contingência, a crítica genealógica precisaria daí arrancá-los caso assuma que uma “crítica corajosa do estado de coisas existente” depende da “exposição de uma melhor compreensão” da realidade (Kant) e vice-versa.

ABSTRACT: In this article, I make the case that the reception of Foucault’s politicpal thought by different authors linked to the Frankfurt School tradition (J. Habermas, N. Fraser, A. Honneth, A. Allen and M. Saar) allows us to discern a series of transformations within the tradition itself. In general terms, it is argued that the fundamental change concerns the gradual abandonment of the problem of social rationalization in favor of a perspective focused on the question of processes of subjectivation, a change that calls into question the very meaning of the tradition.