Rodrigo Borges

The Gettier Problem, when properly understood, has a straightforward solution. My main thesis—my ‘Gettier conjecture’—is that gettierized subjects fail to know in virtue of their justified true belief depending causally and evidentially on something they fail to know. Inferential knowledge (i.e., knowledge of a conclusion) requires knowledge of all the premises on which one’s conclusion depends causally and evidentially. This chapter is a first effort in trying to support this thesis. Section 2 discusses the Gettier conjecture, the notions of evidential and causal dependence, and applies the conjecture to the original Gettier cases. Section 3 looks at two objections: the claims that the conjecture fails to deal with all Gettier cases and that the Gettier Problem is a philosophical ‘dead end.’ In Section 4 I offer further support for the conjecture by situating it within a knowledge-first framework.

This volume features more than fifteen essays written in honor of Peter D. Klein. It explores the work and legacy of this prominent philosopher, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein's work. They engage directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors. In addition, a comprehensive introduction discusses the overall impact of Klein's philosophical work. It also explains how each of the essays in the book fits within that legacy. Coverage includes such topics as a knowledge-first account of defeasible reasoning, felicitous falsehoods, the possibility of foundationalist justification, the many formal faces of defeat, radical scepticism, and more. Overall, the book provides readers with an overview of Klein's contributions to epistemology, his importance to twentieth and twenty-first-century philosophy, and a survey of his philosophical ideas and accomplishments. It's not only a celebration of the work of an important philosopher. It also offers readers an insightful journey into the nature of knowledge, scepticism, and justification.

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3).

This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology. There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions. Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

According to Jennifer Lackey, one should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe that p and if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p. As data for this norm of assertion Lackey appeals to the intuition that in cases of ‘selfless assertion’ agents assert with epistemic propriety something they don’t believe. If that norm of assertion was true, then it would explain why selfless assertions are epistemically proper. In this paper we offer a reductio ad absurdum of this view. The result is that selfless assertions are not epistemically appropriate.

Can new evidence against what one knows defeat one’s knowledge? It depends on whom you ask. Strong views of knowledge claim that knowing cannot be defeated by counterevidence. Weak views of knowledge claim that knowing can be defeated by counterevidence. I discuss recent versions of those views of knowledge—Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s and Peter Klein’s, respectively—and argue that both are wanting. Strong views have to account for the defeat intuition (i.e., the inclination some of us have, at least some of the time, to think that knowledge is defeated in particular cases). Weak views have to solve the indeterminacy problem (i.e., explaining, in a principled way, when and why knowledge is defeated). I argue that Lasonen-Aarnio’s view cannot account for the defeat intuition, and that Klein’s view cannot account for the indeterminacy problem. I then offer a novel version of the strong view of knowledge, one that improves on the version previously discussed.

Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge.

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood.

The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory.