Universidade Federal Do Amapá
  • Universidade Federal Do Amapá
    Professor
Programa de Pós-Graduação Em Lógica E Metafísica From Universidade Federal Do Rio de Janeiro
Alumnus, 2016
CV
Macapá, AP, Brazil
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept an intermediate view
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism I accept non-skeptical realism, but even so I think it is important to try to beat the skpetic.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: no free will causality makes impossible for anyone to do otherwise.
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided I reject theism but I am not an atheist; I am a weak agnostic.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean Laws are independent objects (independent metaphysical substract).
Logic: classical and non-classical Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism Wittgenstein showed us the problem with the private speaker, but there is something private we have in mind (even if there is no effect to communication).
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism There are no real moral facts.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: naturalism But we have to think that the imateriality of the mind is part of the natural world, as anything there is.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism I do accept a kind of supervenience physicalism but I also accept that the mind is somehow imaterial.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: non-cognitivism If we are determinist and an error theorist (as I am), we have to see the ethics as nothing more than influence on behaviour, and values as entities that do not exist in the world.
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics There is no fact of the matter
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept more than one
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory I am tempted to accept presentism.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch There is no fact of the matter
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept more than one A deflationary theory for some cases and a correspondence theory for the most part of cases.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible