Roger Congleton

Solving Social Dilemmas develops a new explanation for the rise of prosperous commercial societies. The book argues that an endless series of social, economic, and political dilemmas have to be solved or ameliorated to sustain social and economic progress and suggests that the most plausible solutions involve internalized rules of conduct. Previous texts suggest that formal institutions often emerge to address social dilemmas, but the book focuses on a solution that is arguably prior to formal institutions: the internalization of principles and rules of conduct that directly affect individual behavior and thereby group outcomes. Elementary game theory is employed to illustrate social dilemmas and possible ethical solutions to them. An intellectual history of the relevance of economic activities in a good life and good society is used to demonstrate the connection between changes in ethical dispositions and the great acceleration of commerce that took place in the nineteenth century.

James Buchanan wrote many short pieces on human nature and on the weaknesses of the rational choice model used by mainstream economics. Although he normally used such models in his own work, he recognized that their usefulness was limited to only a subset of choice settings. This chapter provides the rule-based model of choice that Buchanan may have had in the back of his mind when writing his critiques. It is not an effort at mind reading, but rather develops a model of rule-bound but not rule-determined choice that is consistent with Buchanan’s remarks on human nature and with contemporary research from evolutionary psychology. It develops a theory of self-constitutions or homo constitutionalus.

This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and pre-existing institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of governance, the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, constitutional exchange, and suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries. The third part provides additional evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.

In his treatise, The Constitution of Liberty (1960), F. A. Hayek emphasized the central role of the generality principle, as embodied in the rule of law, for the maintenance of a free society. This book extends Hayek's argument by applying the generality principle to politics. Several important policy implications emerge. There are no direct implications to suggest how much governments should do. The argument suggests strongly however, that, whatever is done politically, must be done generally rather than discriminatorily.