Romanos Koutedakis

Most assume that the bad cases of illusion and hallucination are not perceptions. What I call ‘Meinongian Theories of Perception’ disagree: in the good case, I stand in a relation to existing objects—Macbeth perceives the existing dagger—whilst in the bad case, I stand in a relation to non‐existent objects—Macbeth perceives the non‐existent dagger. My aim is to properly introduce Meinongian Theories of Perception, for they receive little notice in the literature. I distinguish between two versions of such theories, a psychological version, in which non‐existent objects are intentional, and an apsychological version, in which non‐existent objects are mind‐independent. I argue that the psychological version collapses into disjunctivism, whilst the apsychological version remains a live but underexplored option. The broader lesson learned is that the ontological status of what is perceived matters for theories of perception.

Most naïve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so naïve realism fails. I argue that although most attempts to account for the character in terms of what I perceive fail, naïve realism is not affected, and an account of the character of experience can still be offered. I do so by proposing a version of naïve realism—called Neo‐Reidian Naïve Realism—suggested by a study of Thomas Reid's work. Reid distinguishes between perception and consciousness, and based on this distinction, I propose that in perception I stand in a relation to the world, and the character is constituted by qualia.