Most naïve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so naïve realism fails. I argue that although most attempts to account for the character in terms of what I perceive fail, naïve realism is not affected, and an account of the character of experi…
Read moreMost naïve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so naïve realism fails. I argue that although most attempts to account for the character in terms of what I perceive fail, naïve realism is not affected, and an account of the character of experience can still be offered. I do so by proposing a version of naïve realism—called Neo‐Reidian Naïve Realism—suggested by a study of Thomas Reid's work. Reid distinguishes between perception and consciousness, and based on this distinction, I propose that in perception I stand in a relation to the world, and the character is constituted by qualia.
