Romina Padro Birman

After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.

This edited volume brings together papers by both eminent and rising scholars to celebrate Saul Kripke’s singular contributions to modal logic. Kripke’s work on modal logic helped usher in a new semantic epoch for the field and made facility with modal logic indispensable not only to technically oriented philosophers but to theoretical computer scientists and others as well. This volume features previously unpublished work of Kripke’s as well as a brief intellectual biography recounting the story of how Kripke became interested in, and made his first contributions to, modal logic. However, the majority of the volume’s contributions are forward-looking, and produce new philosophical and technical insights by engaging with ideas tracing back to Kripke.

After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.

¿Podemos adoptar una regla de inferencia como si fuera una hipótesis e inferir algo en virtud de esa regla? ¿Podemos revisar nuestras reglas y principios lógicos en virtud de la evidencia disponible? El antiexcepcionalismo lógico desafía la idea de que la lógica es excepcional y la vincula con el resto de las teorías científicas. Sin embargo, el desafío de la adopción planteado por Kripke y Padró imponen límites a esta concepción. En esta sección, se exploran distintos aspectos vinculados a la imposibilidad de adoptar reglas, el antiexcepcionalismo, la revisión y la normatividad de la lógica.

¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferencia constituye un desafío para todo aquel que proponga que podemos seguir nuevos patrones inferenciales a partir del reconocimiento de reglas. En esta sección temática se exploran diversos asuntos conectados a si podemos seguir un nuevo patrón inferencial en virtud de una regla.