•  31
    Indistinguishability as a constraint on priors
    Synthese 204 (1): 1-14. 2024.
    Invoking metaphysical naturalness is “perhaps the most popular proposed solution” to the problem of grue (Hedden in Can J Philos 45:716–743, 2016). Accordingly, Bradley (Mind 129:179–203, 2020) develops a “Lewisian” method for constraining priors based on the syntactic simplicity of descriptions of possible worlds in a language whose predicates correspond to natural properties. The Lewisian method therefore requires a solution to the arguably unsolved problem of measuring syntactic simplicity. B…Read more
  •  498
    The Boltzmann Brains Puzzle
    Noûs 57 (4): 958-972. 2022.
    Leading cosmological theories engender a controversial puzzle which has prompted philosophers to propose competing epistemological solutions and physicists to propose methodological changes to cosmology. The puzzle arises from the prediction that every brain on Earth will eventually be vastly outnumbered by physical duplicates formed by random collisions of particles in outer space. Supposing that this prediction is correct, shouldn't you believe that your brain is probably one of these vastly m…Read more
  •  237
    Problems with purely pragmatic belief
    Philosophical Studies 178 (12): 4151-4163. 2021.
    Rinard (2019) brings to our attention the fact that, typically, the questions What should I believe? and What should I do? are treated differently. A typical answer to the first question is Believe according to the evidence, and a typical answer to the second question is Do what is right. But Rinard rejects this dichotomy. In its place, she argues for a view which she calls “Equal Treatment” in which one should believe according to the same considerations that govern what one should do. Christen…Read more