-
4Theory of IntentionalityIn Jitendra Nath Mohanty & William R. McKenna (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology, University Press of America. 1989.Although ‘intentionality’ is a technical term in philosophy, it stands for something familiar to us all: a characteristic feature of our mental states and experiences, especially evident in what we commonly call being “conscious” or “aware”. As conscious beings, or persons, we are not merely affected by the things in our environment; we are also conscious of these things – of physical objects and events, of our own selves and other persons, of abstract objects such as numbers and propositions, a…Read more
-
18Husserl and Realism in Logic and MathematicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3): 624-628. 1990.
-
13Chapter fifteen naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualiaIn Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Stanford University Press. pp. 429-439. 1999.
-
86Husserl’s Identification of Meaning and NoemaThe Monist 59 (1): 115-132. 1975.This essay is a study of Edmund Husserl’s conception of meaning. In this first section we indicate its importance for his conception of phenomenology. In Section 2 we see that Husserl’s conception of linguistic meaning, of its nature as “ideal” and its role in mediating reference, is almost exactly that of his contemporary Gottlob Frege. In Sections 3 and 4 we further argue that, for Husserl, linguistic meaning and noematic Sinn are one and the same. For, according to Husserl, every linguistic m…Read more
-
224Theory of intentionalityIn Jitendranath Mohanty & William R. McKenna (eds.), Husserl's phenomenology: a textbook, University Press of America. 1989.§1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs
-
Husserl and Referentiality: The Role of the Noema as an Intensional EntityDissertation, Stanford University. 1970.
-
36Review of David Hyder, Hans-jörg Rheinberger (eds.), Science and the Life-World: Essays on Husserl's 'Crisis of European Sciences' (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
-
822"We-Subjectivity": Husserl on Community and Communal ConstitutionIn Christel Fricke & Dagfinn Føllesdal (eds.), Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection of Essays, Ontos. pp. 61-92. 2012.I experience the world as comprising not only pluralities of individual persons but also interpersonal communal unities – groups, teams, societies, cultures, etc. The world, as experienced or "constituted", is a social world, a “spiritual” world. How are these social communities experienced as communities and distinguished from one another? What does it mean to be a “community”? And how do I constitute myself as a member of some communities but not of others? Moreover, the world of experience is…Read more
-
9Husserl et la théorie représentationnelle de l'esprit in phénoménologie et psychologie cognitiveLes Etudes Philosophiques 1 31-56. 1991.
-
38II. Searle on Intentionality∗Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (1-4): 468-483. 1984.
-
44Husserl's phenomenological conception of intentionality and its difficultiesPhilosophia 11 (3-4): 223-248. 1982.
-
457Naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualiaIn Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Stanford University Press. pp. 429--439. 1999.First, I briefly characterize Dretske’s particular naturalization project, emphasizing his naturalistic reconstruction of the notion of representation. Second, I note some apparent similarities between his notion of representation and Husserl’s notion of intentionality, but I find even more important differences. Whereas Husserl takes intentionality to be an intrinsic, phenomenological feature of thought and experience, Dretske advocates an “externalist” account of mental representation. Third, …Read more
-
138Husserl and the representational theory of mindTopoi 5 (2): 101-113. 1986.Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.
Los Angeles, California, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Continental Philosophy |