Ronny Miron

This is a study of the work of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), from his beginnings as a young psychiatrist to his mature days as an existentialist philosopher. This critical study of Jasper's philosophy traces his effort to instill meaning into the human quest for self-understanding and reveals the difficulties and frustrations inherent in this search. The book presents to the reader Jasper's attempts to deal with these difficulties by means of a philosophical approach to the concept of being as a whole, beyond the individual – the other, the world and transcendence. In this book the author conducts an ongoing dialogue with existing research on Jasper's works and proposes a new reading for them. Along with a critical interpretation, the author reveals the challenges that the figure of Jaspers posed to his readers. Unlike most researchers, who ignored Jasper's early writings dealing with psychiatry and psychology, this book proposes a philosophical reading of these works, revealing the unity of the world in which Jaspers created – first as a psychologist and later as a philosopher. This approach enables the reader to discover in Jasper's work a daring effort to formulate an original philosphy regarding two basic concepts central to philosophy and human culture throughout all times – "selfhood" and "being".

This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. The problem discussed is how to characterize the relationship that exists between science—defined on pure Kantian grounds as a universally valid knowledge of phenomenal objects—and philosophy—conceived by Jaspers as the transcending mode of thinking of personal Existenz rising towards the totality and unity of Being. Two solutions to that problem arise from Jaspers’s writings. The oppositionist view is based in his earlier philosophy of Existenz. It describes the discrepancy between determinateness, bestowed by science to its objects, and freedom of self-determination, which is both a synonym and a condition of possibility for Existenz. The reciprocal view is based in Jaspers’s later works, where he focuses on exploration of his concept of Being (das Umgreifende). By contrast with most of Jaspers’s commentators, the present interpretation is anchored in a developmentaland contextual understanding of Jaspers’s thought. Showing the transcendental background of this topic, the proposed interpretation allows us to abstain from viewing the two solutions as incoherent or contradictory and instead to see them as constitutive of a single philosophical course.

This article addresses a basic question: what elements in Husserl’s phenomenology can account for the variety of post-Husserlian phenomenologies? The answer, I suggest, is that Husserl’s idea of reality, particularly his notion of givenness vis-à-vis self-givenness, facilitated the work of his followers by offering them at once a firm ground and a point of departure for their inquiries. However, adopting Husserl’s phenomenology as their starting point did not prevent his followers from developing their own independent phenomenological theory. Moreover, despite the elusive particulars that shape one’s individual experience of the world, so it transpires, Husserl’s thinking which was different and beyond their own observations and actual experiences, namely, transcendent, appears to have been a genuine guide along their path to achieve meaning. This interpretation thus gives precedence to a metaphysical point of departure, that is, to Husserl’s idea of reality as ‘givenness’, in launching phenomenol...

This article seeks to extricate and explicate the unique vocabulary that was consolidated by the realistic phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius in her establishing book Realontologie, published in 1923. Among the concepts are: “Essence”, “Bearer”, Self-adherence, Capability, Tangentiality, Incorporation, Internality, “Quiet,” Fullness, Depth, Layeredness, Abyss, and others. CM does not always coin them as distinguished concepts, but they function as philosophical concepts due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. The author suggests that these terms can inaugurate the realistic discourse on reality, which is noticeably almost absent in the modern philosophy that has been almost sweepingly conquered by the literal and advanced idealistic discourse

This volume, the first of its kind written in English, interprets the realistic-phenomenological philosophy of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). She was a prominent figure in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, the first generation of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and was known as the “first lady of German philosophy”.The articles included in this collection deal with the two main themes constituting her realistic-metaphysical phenomenology: Being and the I. The new edition includes an additional chapter opening a new path into the study of Conrad-Martius with Heidegger. In addition, the collection includes a comprehensive Introduction that describes the personal background and the social and philosophical contexts behind Conrad-Martius’s thought, with an emphasis on the mutual influence and fertilization of the group of early phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The book is aimed at scholars of philosophy and educated readers.

This volume, the first of its kind written in English, interprets the realistic-phenomenological philosophy of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. She was a prominent figure in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, the first generation of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl, and was known as the “first lady of German philosophy”. The articles included in this collection deal with the two main themes constituting her realistic-metaphysical phenomenology: Being and the I. In addition, the collection includes a comprehensive Preface that describes the personal background and the social and philosophical contexts behind Conrad-Martius’s thought, with an emphasis on the mutual influence and fertilization of the group of early phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The book will be of interest to scholars of philosophy and educated readers.

_Husserl and Other Phenomenologists_ addresses a fundamental question: what is it in the thinking of the founding father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, that on the one hand enables the huge variety in the phenomenological discourse and, at the same time, necessitates relying on his phenomenology as a point of departure and an object before which philosophizing is conducted. The contributors to this volume, each with his or her own focus on a specific figure in the phenomenological school vis-à-vis Husserl's thinking, demonstrate that every reference to Husserl is necessarily bound up with modifying his ideas and crossing the boundaries of his phenomenology. In this sense, and given the insight that Husserlian phenomenology is already imbued with the potential modifications and revisions, the post-Husserlian phenomenologies may be included together with Husserl in one so-called ‘Phenomenological Movement’. The discussions in the book open for philosophers and intellectuals a window upon phenomenology, which has been one of the richest and most influential cultural phenomena since its very appearance at the beginning of the twentieth century. The book also conveys the complex interpretive dynamic within which a given framework of ideas becomes a sort of magnetic field, with attracting and repelling forces acting on its participants, and thanks to which the great ideas of modernity maintain their vitality and relevance a hundred years after their first appearance. This book was originally published as a special issue of _The European Legacy: Towards New Paradigms. _.

This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius against the worldview of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics by turning the real into the ideal, thereby reducing reality to an idea. This article analyses Conrad-Martius’ understanding of the evolution of idealism and of her criticism regarding the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Her subsequent response to idealism attempts to rehabilitate the facticity of real reality within metaphysics.

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, the woman pioneer of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of coming to terms with the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM's understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.