Ronny Miron

The Angel of Jewish History casts a philosophical gaze upon the relationship between the traditional Jewish past and the present through the metaphysical worldviews of five formative Jewish studies scholars: Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Amos Funkenstein, Gershom Scholem, Baruch Kurzweil, and Nathan Rotenstreich. Their hermeneutic worldviews and writings deal with the nature and formation of modern Judaism, the Wissenschaft des Judentums, historicism, the image of the Jewish past and tradition, secularization, and God’s status in present-day Jewish reality. In this volume, these issues are explored against the background of the tense discourse between the perception of modern Jewish reality as a break from the past and tradition and the argument for continuity despite the changes and developments of modernity.

This article[aut]Miron, Ronny presents the dualist perception of the ‘I’ of the woman phenomenologist[aut]Conrad-Martius, Hedwig, Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1880–1966). In this regard, she discerns “two opposing extremes” regarding the _I-being (ichhafte Sein): autonomic and “causa sui” being on the one hand, and “complete powerlessness” (vollkommene Seinsohnmacht) that is surrounded by the threat of nothingness on the other hand. As opposed to unifying views of the “I”, in particular Husserl’s idealistic one that identifies it with the pure consciousnessConsciousness of the ego, Conrad-Martius leaves room neither for a mutual exclusion nor for a convergence into unity of the two composing elements of the “I”. Hence the dualityDuality of the I transpires as a genuine philosophical problem that as such is unresolved.

This chapter addresses the ontological perspective regarding the issue of the Nothing through the thinking of the realist phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). As many of her writings were never fully elaborated, the discussion consults the thinking of her contemporary, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who shares with her the phenomenological ontological orientation and especially the idea regarding the inception (Anfang) of Being in the Nothing. Based on the analysis of their thinking, the article suggests an outline of a phenomenology of the Nothing in three steps: starting by presenting the point of departure in a fundamental ontological difference, proceeding to establishing the precedence of the Nothing over the real existence, and culminating in unveiling the fundamental bond between Nothing and Being. The discussion demonstrates that the three arguments join and eventually consolidate into one metaphysical argument, according to which the Nothing precedes Being, is maintained within it, and thereby consolidates the essential finitude of reality.

This chapter focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916) (Doctrine of Appearance)—the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that HCM explores in this treatise by studying the phenomenon of the real external world designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical aspect from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in HCM’s approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such.

The question “what is reality?” that opens Realontologie (HCM, 1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (HCM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. To counter this, HCM’s ontology seeks the “gateway of reality”, meaning the datum-point where things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. The discussion in this chapter distills three characteristics of the real that should be capable of addressing what she refers to as the “task of Being”. Each is personally imposed upon the real and brings about the fulfillment of the essence inherent in it: corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), and primordiality (Primordialität). The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.

This chapter proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (1888–1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (Conrad-Martius in Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III. Max Niemeyer, Halle, pp. 345–542) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory, of whole and parts in Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole (Ganz)” with “sensory givenness” and “parts (Teile)” with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The dependent-independent relations and laws that prescribe unity of objects at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This is torn between two forces. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world.

This chapter addresses the two questions HCM poses at the opening of her first great treatise, “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916): “In which real mode are perceived “essences (Washeiten)” given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in HCM’s opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916, 427). The philosopher deals with the first through a careful investigation of what she calls “feeling givenness” (Empfindungsgegebenheit) and the second through a keen observation of the givenness of “manifest-appearance”. These two tracks are woven together, and thus, the phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposing directions: by following the line from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial” phenomena we are looking for the ideal reality that brings about the reality of things. This reality does not manifest itself on the phenomenal level but transpires as covering or hiding reality as such. However, since the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea, while moving from the “primordial” to the “covered”, we search for the reality that transcends its ideal boundaries—a transcending that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality achieving external dimensions. The real transcendence of the external world to human consciousness is revealed in these opposing directions, and thus, the reality of the phenomenon of the external world is confirmed.

This chapter seeks to extricate and explicate the unique vocabulary that was consolidated by the realistic phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) in her establishing book Realontologie (HCM, 1923). Among the concepts are: “Essence” (Wesenheit), “Bearer” (Träger), Selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), Capability (Können), Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit), Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), Internality, “Quiet”, Fullness (Fülle), Depth (Tiefe), divisibility (Teilbarkeit), Abyss (Abgrund; Ungrund), and others. HCM does not always coin them as distinguished concepts, but they function as philosophical concepts due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. The author suggests that these terms can inaugurate the realistic discourse on reality, which is noticeably almost absent in the modern philosophy that has been almost sweepingly conquered by the literal and advanced idealistic discourse. Moreover, this realistic vocabulary is one of the greatest contributions of HCM to modern philosophy.

This chapter delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking against Husserl’s transcendentalism. It starts by uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by HCM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The following discussion delineates the path to the internality of Being in Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world. As a result, the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten. In contrast, for HCM, there is no such opposition. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool for achieving an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general.

This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) against the worldview (Weltanschauung) of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics by turning to the real (das wirkliche) into the ideal (Ideelles) and thereby reducing reality to an idea. This article analyzes HCM’s understanding of the evolution of idealism and of her criticism regarding the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Subsequently, her response to idealism will be illuminated. HCM attempts to rehabilitate the facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics.

Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM), one of the outstanding pioneers of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality (Realität) to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression, she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This chapter focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of accounting for the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this chapter demonstrates the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.

The Introduction presents what has been largely absent from the discussions in the various chapters: HCM’s personal background and the social and philosophical contexts of her thought. In addition, the Introduction addresses crucial aspects for understanding the hermeneutic dimensions involved in specific issues that addressed in the book. However, in the introduction special emphasis has been given to the mutual influences of the early phenomenologists. Thus, HCM’s ideas are discussed in the Introduction along with those of Husserl, Reinach, Geiger, Pfänder, Stein, von Hildebrand, and Spiegelberg. At the same time, the fascinating phenomenon whereby often the ideas of one member of the Circle were explained and further developed by other members reveals the group nature as a philosophical characteristic, which thus transpires as a key for the interpretation of early phenomenology in general.

This chapter addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (hereafter: HCM) (1966–1888). Focusing on HCM’s early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousness: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit), in itself the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs” (gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, these two dispositions correspond to two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as a passive and self-including being vis-à-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things.

This chapter deals with the duality that characterizes the idea of the I in the realist ontology of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1880–1966). At the basis of the discussion is the uncovering of two dimensions of duality in HCM’s perception of the I: one, appearing in her early treatise On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of the I, and in it, she lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological duality in HCM’s later writings that addresses the ontological aspects of the I. The later phase in HCM’s thinking of the I focuses on the spiritual I and established the simultaneous operation of two elements in it: its “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and its spritualness (geistlichthafte), which is also referred to as “infrastasis” (Infrastase). The phenomenological interpretation of the idea of the I in HCM’s thinking commences with unveiling these two phases in her writing, proceeds to explicate the meaning of the I, explores them, and culminates in the illumination of the relations between them. Meanwhile, HCM’s radical response to Husserl’s turn towards transcendentalism transpires and the well-established criticisms of realistic phenomenology contemporary with Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I are refuted.

The pivotal insight that paved Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ (1880–1966) (HCM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, often referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only by coming to terms with “ontological foundations” can “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung) of the I be enabled” (HCM, 1931, 6). The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this chapter presents HCM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics—existence, intelligibility, and “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit/Sichheit/Selberkeit)—which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the ontological exclusivity of the “I-being” is illuminated by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.

This chapter seeks to unearth the philosophical resonance of the ideas of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’(HCM) with Edith Stein’s thinking and thus to add an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two phenomenologists. Here, resonance has two meanings. The first is phenomenological and apparent in manifestation of a spiritual communality between the two philosophers. The second relates to the constitutive establishing of a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities might emerge for understanding the ideas under discussion. The discussion starts with presenting Conrad-Martius’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding core metaphysical aspects that serve as an introduction to the idea of the I, the explication of which within the writing of both philosophers occupies the bulk of the discussion in this chapter. The discussion presents the dual structure of the I in the thinking of both Conrad-Martius and Stein and analyzes their different stances toward it: While the former regards it as an utmost indication of the realism of the I, the latter illuminates its reconciliation within the Christian religious faith.

This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) against the worldview (Weltanschauung) of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics by turning to the real (das wirkliche) into the ideal (Ideelles) and thereby reducing reality to an idea. This article analyzes HCM’s understanding of the evolution of idealism and of her criticism regarding the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Subsequently, her response to idealism will be illuminated. HCM attempts to rehabilitate the facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics.

This article addresses the two questions HCM poses at the opening of her first great treatise, “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916): “In which real mode are perceived “essences (Washeiten)” given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in HCM’s opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916, 427). The philosopher deals with the first through a careful investigation of what she calls “feeling givenness” (Empfindungsgegebenheit) and the second through a keen observation of the givenness of “manifest-appearance”. These two tracks are woven together, and thus, the phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposing directions: by following the line from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial” phenomena we are looking for the ideal reality that brings about the reality of things. This reality does not manifest itself on the phenomenal level but transpires as covering or hiding reality as such. However, since the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea, while moving from the “primordial” to the “covered”, we search for the reality that transcends its ideal boundaries—a transcending that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality achieving external dimensions. The real transcendence of the external world to human consciousness is revealed in these opposing directions, and thus, the reality of the phenomenon of the external world is confirmed.

This chapter focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916) (Doctrine of Appearance)—the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that HCM explores in this treatise by studying the phenomenon of the real external world designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical aspect from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in HCM’s approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such.

This paper proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (1888–1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory, of whole and parts in Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole (Ganz)” with “sensory givenness” and “parts (Teile)” with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The dependent-independent relations and laws that prescribe unity of objects at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This is torn between two forces. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world.

This paper addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (hereafter: HCM) (1966–1888). Focusing on HCM’s early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousness: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit), in itself the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs” (gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, these two dispositions correspond to two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as a passive and self-including being vis-à-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things.

Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM), one of the outstanding pioneers of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality (Realität) to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression, she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of accounting for the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.

The question “what is reality?” that opens Realontologie (HCM, 1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (HCM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. To counter this, HCM’s ontology seeks the “gateway of reality”, meaning the datum-point where things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. The discussion in the article distills three characteristics of the real that should be capable of addressing what she refers to as the “task of Being”. Each is personally imposed upon the real and brings about the fulfillment of the essence inherent in it: corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), and primordiality (Primordialität). The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.

This article seeks to unearth the philosophical resonance of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ideas with Edith Stein’s thinking and thus to add an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two phenomenologists. Here, resonance has two meanings. The first is phenomenological and apparent in manifestation of a spiritual communality between the two philosophers. The second relates to the constitutive establishing of a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities might emerge for understanding the ideas under discussion. The discussion starts with presenting Conrad-Martius’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding core metaphysical aspects that serve as an introduction to the idea of the I, the explication of which within the writing of both philosophers occupies the bulk of the article. The discussion presents the dual structure of the I in the thinking of both Conrad-Martius and Stein and analyzes their different stances toward it: While the former regards it as an utmost indication of the realism of the I, the latter illuminates its reconciliation within the Christian religious faith.

This article deals with the duality that characterizes the idea of the I in the realist ontology of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1880–1966). At the basis of the discussion is the uncovering of two dimensions of duality in HCM’s perception of the I: one, appearing in her early treatise On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of the I, and in it, she lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological duality in HCM’s later writings that addresses the ontological aspects of the I. The later phase in HCM’s thinking of the I focuses on the spiritual I and established the simultaneous operation of two elements in it: its “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and its spritualness (geistlichthafte), which is also referred to as “infrastasis” (Infrastase). The phenomenological interpretation of the idea of the I in HCM’s thinking commences with unveiling these two phases in her writing, proceeds to explicate the meaning of the I, explores them, and culminates in the illumination of the relations between them. Meanwhile, HCM’s radical response to Husserl’s turn towards transcendentalism transpires and the well-established criticisms of realistic phenomenology contemporary with Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I are refuted.

This article delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking against Husserl’s transcendentalism. It starts by uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by HCM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The following discussion delineates the path to the internality of Being in Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world. As a result, the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten. In contrast, for HCM, there is no such opposition. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool for achieving an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general.

This article seeks to extricate and explicate the unique vocabulary that was consolidated by the realistic phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) in her establishing book Realontologie (HCM, 1923). Among the concepts are: “Essence” (Wesenheit), “Bearer” (Träger), Selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), Capability (Können), Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit), Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), Internality, “Quiet”, Fullness (Fülle), Depth (Tiefe), divisibility (Teilbarkeit), Abyss (Abgrund; Ungrund), and others. HCM does not always coin them as distinguished concepts, but they function as philosophical concepts due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. The author suggests that these terms can inaugurate the realistic discourse on reality, which is noticeably almost absent in the modern philosophy that has been almost sweepingly conquered by the literal and advanced idealistic discourse. Moreover, this realistic vocabulary is one of the greatest contributions of HCM to modern philosophy.

The pivotal insight that paved Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ (1880–1966) (HCM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, often referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only by coming to terms with “ontological foundations” can “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung) of the of the I be enabled” (HCM, 1931, 6). The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents HCM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics—existence, intelligibility, and “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit/Sichheit/Selberkeit)—which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the ontological exclusivity of the “I-being” is illuminated by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.

The pivotal insight that paved Conrad-Martius’ (1880–1966) (CM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, denoted as “I-adhering being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only the ontological foundations of the real being in general might enable a faithful comprehension of the I. The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents CM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics – existence, intelligibility, and self-adherence (Sichheit/Selbsthaftigkeit) – which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the understanding of the ontological exclusivity of the I-adhering being is achieved by means of an explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.

The question „what is reality?“ that opens Realontologie (1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (CM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established „blinding insight“ in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. Her realontological philosophy seeks the „gate of reality“, meaning the datum-point where things „elevate“ themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at „operative Being“ or realistic fulfillment. CM identifies three characteristics of the real by which it meets the „task of Being“ imposed upon it to personally describe and fulfill the essence inherent in it: formationality (Leibhaftigkeit), self-standing and primordiality. The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the seeming contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.