Ronny Miron

The pivotal insight that paved Conrad-Martius’ (1880–1966) (CM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, denoted as “I-adhering being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only the ontological foundations of the real being in general might enable a faithful comprehension of the I. The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents CM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics – existence, intelligibility, and self-adherence (Sichheit/Selbsthaftigkeit) – which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the understanding of the ontological exclusivity of the I-adhering being is achieved by means of an explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.

The question „what is reality?“ that opens Realontologie (1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (CM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established „blinding insight“ in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. Her realontological philosophy seeks the „gate of reality“, meaning the datum-point where things „elevate“ themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at „operative Being“ or realistic fulfillment. CM identifies three characteristics of the real by which it meets the „task of Being“ imposed upon it to personally describe and fulfill the essence inherent in it: formationality (Leibhaftigkeit), self-standing and primordiality. The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the seeming contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.

This paper deals with the idea of the search for self, mainly in the thinking of Karl Jaspers. The discussion will focus on the very nature of this search and the power that motivates it. For this purpose, it will employ a phenomenological viewpoint that will follow Jaspers’ course from its first point of departure, in which the self appeared. As an object of observation, up to the point where the self acquired the status of the subject, i.e., appeared as a personal and existential issue. The positively achieved insights about the self and the frustrations involved in this search will be clarified systematically. The author argues that Jaspers’ search was inspired by a constant experience of dissatisfaction, which directed the self to transcend every present understanding of the self and to look for an improved one. Lastly, the search for the self will appear as leading to another search, i.e. that for Being and transcendence.

This volume, the first of its kind written in English, interprets the realistic-phenomenological philosophy of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). She was a prominent figure in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, the first generation of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and was known as the “first lady of German philosophy”.The articles included in this collection deal with the two main themes constituting her realistic-metaphysical phenomenology: Being and the I. The new edition includes an additional chapter opening a new path into the study of Conrad-Martius with Heidegger. In addition, the collection includes a comprehensive Introduction that describes the personal background and the social and philosophical contexts behind Conrad-Martius’s thought, with an emphasis on the mutual influence and fertilization of the group of early phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The book is aimed at scholars of philosophy and educated readers.

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, the woman pioneer of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of coming to terms with the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM's understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.

This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius against the worldview of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics by turning the real into the ideal, thereby reducing reality to an idea. This article analyses Conrad-Martius’ understanding of the evolution of idealism and of her criticism regarding the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Her subsequent response to idealism attempts to rehabilitate the facticity of real reality within metaphysics.

This volume, the first of its kind written in English, interprets the realistic-phenomenological philosophy of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. She was a prominent figure in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, the first generation of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl, and was known as the “first lady of German philosophy”. The articles included in this collection deal with the two main themes constituting her realistic-metaphysical phenomenology: Being and the I. In addition, the collection includes a comprehensive Preface that describes the personal background and the social and philosophical contexts behind Conrad-Martius’s thought, with an emphasis on the mutual influence and fertilization of the group of early phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The book will be of interest to scholars of philosophy and educated readers.

The widely accepted approach in scholarly literature on Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition emphasizes its political meaning and implications while neglecting its ontological dimensions. Against this trend, in this article I seek to uncover the implicit ontology that underlies her conception of the human condition. This human ontology appears to be comprised of five realms – the private, the public, intimacy, the social and the self. While Arendt explicitly bases her conception upon the first two, the paper shows that the remaining three, although not defined as realms, are explored by her as such. These appear as autarchic contexts of human activity, which are not supposed to refer to each other. The problematic of this split between the different realms is widely discussed in the paper. Yet, the split of the self from the two pivotal realms – the private and the public – acquires a special interest, for it undermines the entire project of the human condition.

The article seeks to elucidate the status of transcendence in the historiography of secularization through the perspective of collective memory. It discusses two typological models dealing with the basic metaphysical problem concerned with the presence and meaning of transcendence in real human existence. According to the first, the historical reality of secularization causes a break from the collective memory whose roots are in religion. In contrast, the second model considers that despite the deep transformations in the status of religion in a reality of secularization, an experience of historical continuity may also occur there. These models denote the two poles in the argument about the meaning and value of history for modern people. The article suggests a phenomenological analysis of the two models and criticizes their deficiencies. Finally, the “tension model” is outlined as a third alternative that aims at overcoming the binary situation created by the first two in favor of a perspective that necessitates and contains both immanence and transcendence.