Rory Harder

There is a growing body of evidence that the mentalizing abilities of humans and other primates have a “knowledge-first” character, according to which the ability to appreciate others’ knowledge is more basic than the ability to appreciate others’ beliefs. This paper proposes an overlooked way of understanding the knowledge-first character of mentalizing and develops a particular model along those lines. I motivate the model by comparing it to alternatives and explain how, if the model is correct, then the step some have made, from the evidence for knowledge-first mentalizing to more theoretical claims about the relative basicness of knowledge and belief (or the concepts thereof), is not motivated.

This is a piece of public philosophy about Friedrich Nietzsche’s discussion of justice in the second essay of his On the Genealogy of Morals. My aim is to present the subtle and sophisticated way in which he thought about (i) how individuals relate to the social reality they find themselves in and (ii) how that social reality shapes them. His story regarding (ii) is that with the establishment of justice—that is, with punishment for misdeeds becoming more and more deferred to a central authority—individuals could no longer directly discharge their instinctual drive to bring about suffering in others, so that drive turned inwards, leading to our self-domestication. Regarding (i), Nietzsche argues that popular conceptions of justice—such as that the punishment of wrongdoers is meant to deter others from doing the same, or perhaps that rehabilitation is part of the purpose—are merely rationalizations individuals come up with to justify their social reality, where the unfolding of that social reality is in fact governed by naturalistic laws. I situate the distinction here, between a part of objective reality and an interpretation placed upon it, alongside more general existentialist themes in Nietzsche’s thought, and emphasize the relevance for us now of his naturalistic view of social reality.

This paper explains how an assertion may be understood despite there being nothing said or meant by the assertion. That such understanding is possible is revealed by cases of the so-called ``felicitous underspecification'' of demonstratives: cases where there is understanding of an assertion containing a demonstrative despite the interlocutors not settling on one or another object as the one the speaker is talking about (King 2014a, 2017, 2021). I begin by showing how Stalnaker's ([1978] 1999) well-known pragmatic principles adequately permit and constrain the felicitous underspecification of demonstratives. I then establish a connection between the satisfaction of Stalnaker's principles and understanding, and show how that connection sheds further light on the relevant cases. After developing and motivating my proposal, I address some objections to it, then briefly discuss the felicitous underspecification of expressions other than demonstratives alongside contrasting my proposal with a similar one from Bowker (2015, 2019) that concerns definite descriptions.

Joint attention occurs when two (or more) individuals attend together to some object. It has been identified by psychologists as an early form of our joint engagement, and is thought to provide us with an understanding of other minds that is basic in that sophisticated conceptual resources are not involved. Accordingly, it has also attracted the interest of philosophers. Moreover, a very recent trend in the psychological and philosophical literature on joint attention consists of developing the suggestion that it holds partially in virtue of communication: it is because we share our thoughts or feelings about an object that our individual attention becomes joint. This paper unpacks the communicative suggestion in a way that accounts for joint attention's basicness.