Rory O'Neill

This article argues that “knowing enough” (zhizu) and “mastering cessation” (zhizhi) are aligned with a Laozian view of the “natural,” understood as the broadest observable patterns of the world, but not with “self-emanation” (ziran). As such, the article questions the equation of Laozian ziran with the concept of “nature.” While Laozian ziran does signify a “self-emanation” free from human curtailment, from a Laozian perspective natural patterns also include acts of human restraint. “Knowing enough” and “mastering cessation” are aligned with the natural movement signified by Laozian concepts of reversal (fan) and return (fugui). This movement opposes and complements spontaneous self-emanation. What is “natural” in the Laozi (also known as the Daodejing) thereby not only includes self-emanation but also timely cessation and return. By examining the functioning of ziran within the philosophy of the Laozi alongside its complementary moment of return and curtailment, this article also critiques the use of Laozian “naturalness” understood as purely emanative and spontaneous to support liberalist and laissez-faire readings of the Laozi.

A major pillar of Brook Ziporyn’s argument for adopting a mystical atheist religious attitude is what he calls “The Great Asymmetry.” This is the idea that the purposeless, infinite, undetermined and unnamed—all concomitants of his mystical atheist view—have the capacity to encompass and ground other positions, whether monotheist or “secular atheist,” while the reverse is not the case. An attitude characterized by purposelessness, for instance, necessarily contains elements of purpose, while purposivity does not accommodate purposelessness. The locus classicus of this Great Asymmetry, according to Ziporyn, is the A/B relationship in the Daodejing, a Daoist text with origins stretching back to several centuries BCE. The A/B schema describes the interplay of opposites, a theme that pervades the Daodejing. Based on a comparison of different versions and interpretations of the text—the received Wang Bi text, Ziporyn’s translations and interpretations, and the excavated Guodian manuscript—this article questions whether the A/B relationship is indeed characterized by asymmetry. I propose instead that it is primarily a relationship of complementarity and balance. Through a reformulation of the A/B schema, the article reassesses the relationship between Ziporyn’s mystical atheism and two adjacent positions: secular atheism and the negative theology.

This article explores gong 公 (‘public-mindedness’) as an epistemic virtue in two Warring States Chinese philosophical texts, the Shenzi and the Xunzi. The epistemic dimension of gong is born from an awareness of the narrowness of one’s epistemic perspective. It represents an impartial and unbiased approach to governance. Gong is considered here alongside three epistemic virtues previously identified in the Chinese tradition: intellectual humility, open-mindedness, and knowledge abstinence. While there is some overlap between these and gong, there are important differences due in part to the political focus of the latter. There are also marked differences between its usage in the two texts. Gong in the Shenzi connotes a capacity to outsource the bases for political decisions to systems and processes external to one’s epistemic faculties. The Xunzi, by contrast, maintains confidence in the cultivation of mind as a basis for governance, and gong represents a balanced and unbiased epistemic virtue.

Daoism, broadly considered, is a global living tradition with roots in early Chinese philosophical texts, encompassing scholarly, religious, and practical elements. This article examines its key ethical, political, and metaethical dimensions, particularly as expressed in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. These texts aspire to speak from the broadest of perspectives, pushing us beyond all-too-human considerations. Daoist philosophy recognizes how extremes tend to be eroded by their opposites. They caution against holding firmly to absolute ethical positions and against adopting overweening political ambitions. A Daoist ethical-political approach is one of not overdoing things, and allowing things to get done of their own accord.

This article develops a Laozian perspective to assuaging conflict by means of a stillness that complements aggressive activity. Contrary to readings of the Laozi that understand stillness as a pure and undisturbed state, this article draws attention to parts that observe and engage with weapons and warfare, such as Chapters 31, 68, and 80. The article there­upon argues that Laozian stillness is intrinsically interconnected with its antonymous ac­tivity, including aggressive activity. Laozian stillness allows one to observe patterns that foster aggression, violence, and instability, and thereby enact a complementary and sta­bilizing role through that same stillness. Overweening and domineering forms of activity are seen in the Laozi as likely to lead to instability, unrest, and decline. In line with the Laozian recognition of the interplay of opposites, if one strives for a pure state of passiv­ity divorced from aggression, then ironically this tends to exacerbate that aggression. If those who have the capacity to effect peaceful stillness detach from the world, the world thereby becomes more rife with aggressive activity. Furthermore, a political application of this interplay between stillness and activity implies that when stillness and activity are taken as fundamental political categories, they are not easily deployed in service of particular political motives. As such, the Laozi seeks to arrive at political stability, but this entails that political convictions must be fluid like water in order for this stillness to be brought about.

This article explores gong 公 (‘public-mindedness’) as an epistemic virtue in two Warring States Chinese philosophical texts, the Shenzi and the Xunzi. The epistemic dimension of gong is born from an awareness of the narrowness of one’s epistemic perspective. It represents an impartial and unbiased approach to governance. Gong is considered here alongside three epistemic virtues previously identified in the Chinese tradition: intellectual humility, open-mindedness, and knowledge abstinence. While there is some overlap between these and gong, there are important differences due in part to the political focus of the latter. There are also marked differences between its usage in the two texts. Gong in the Shenzi connotes a capacity to outsource the bases for political decisions to systems and processes external to one’s epistemic faculties. The Xunzi, by contrast, maintains confidence in the cultivation of mind as a basis for governance, and gong represents a balanced and unbiased epistemic virtue.

This article philosophically examines the _Shenzi Yue Gong Jian_ 慎子曰恭儉 (“Shenzi Speaks of Reverence and Frugality”), part of the Shanghai Museum cache of excavated fragments published in 2007, and provides a tentative translation based on a range of paleographic and philological studies previously carried out. The fragments make reference to a Master S hen 慎, a denomination typically associated with the pre-Qin 秦 political philosopher Shen Dao 慎到 (c. 359–275 BCE) and the received _Shenzi_ 慎子 _Fragments_. Some elements of the excavated fragments, such as “administrative methods” (_fa_ 法) and “positional power” (_shi_ 勢), seem to establish a connection with the received _Shenzi_—a supposedly “Legalist” text. However, terms such as “reverence” (_gong_ 恭) and “frugality” (_jian_ 儉), which appear together in the fragments, are found in “Confucian” pre-Qin texts, such as the _Lunyu_ 論語, _Mengzi_ 孟子, _Xunzi_ 荀子, and the “Book of Rites” (_Liji_ 禮記). “Publicness” (_gong_ 公) is an underexamined concern in the received _Shenzi_. When considered in terms of publicness, and not in the typical framing of Legalist doctrine, the received _Shenzi_ provides a fitting philosophical backdrop for the _Shenzi Yue Gong Jian._.

This chapter describes an economic ethic implicit in the Daoist tradition that envisages economic health, not as synonymous with growth, but akin to stability. The Daoist notion of health aspires to achieving longevity of body, of political rule, and, in contemporary applications, of our natural environment. Longevity is possible through alignment with patterns of nature, and by shunning anthropocentric urges to dominate. In the context of contemporary economic discussion, the Daoist maxim of ‘noncoercive action’, or wuwei, is often likened to the notion of laissez-faire in classical liberal economics. While both traditions advocate a lack of intervention, Smithian classical economics views self-interested desire as a positive force for increasing economic prosperity within society. By contrast, the Daoists of ancient China cautioned against excessive desire and self-interest. This chapter begins with a very brief history of Daoism and goes on to draw primarily from the core teachings of the Daoist tradition: the Zhuangzi and particularly the Daodejing.

The “center” is a key concept in early Chinese philosophy. While readings of the Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 often rely on concepts of “nature” and the “natural”, this article proposes the “center” as an interpretive key that informs discussion of contemporary issues while remaining faithful to the core concerns of the texts. While both texts use the “center” to promote a philosophy of moderation, in the Laozi, “holding to the center” (shou zhong 守中) refers to a focus on one’s inner center to counteract the dangers of the external, whereas the Zhuangzi speaks of a centeredness between inner cultivation and outward socialization. In the Laozi, we examine images of one-, two- and three-dimensional centers as well as the bodily practice of focusing on the inner stomach rather than the outward-looking eyes. Our discussion of the Zhuangzi focuses on occupying the “center” (zhongyang 中央) between extreme inward and outward modes of being. The result is a philosophy of moderation that fosters a sense of humility, balance, and impartiality, cautioning against a drive for overreaching solutions for all humanity, and tempering attempts to conform to extreme “naturalness” or reject all “artificiality”.

Drawing on the Confucian political philosophy of China, Roger Ames presents “family feeling” (xiao) as a candidate for a universal minimalist morality. Challenging certain conventional views in political philosophy that see family feeling as a threat to achieving an egalitarian level playing field, Ames underscores the ethical and political significance of family, advocating for the integration of familial sentiments into the political sphere. He addresses modern challenges, showing how diverse cultural expressions are allowed for within this philosophy’s pluralistic and locally focused framework. This dynamic ethical perspective rooted in the shared sentiment of family feeling challenges us to critically reexamine Confucianism, China, and our entire geopolitical situation.

In addition to the classical mode of classroom philosophy education that focuses on the history of philosophical thinking, methods of “doing” and “using” philosophy, including philosophical practice and philosophical drama can also form part of philosophy education. Such thinking and language exercises are introduced into activities of the academic philosophy cafe, Inner Mongolia University’s 1957 Coffee. Based on core activities of the philosophy cafe as well as the concept of “language game”, an additional language training project is being designed for bilingual participants and language learners, especially for students in secondary education. A two-pronged approach of linguistic and philosophical foci encourages learners to sharpen their minds to the use of languages in the academic world.

This paper discusses how a Platform for Philosophy Education can help to alleviate issues of alienation in the lives of university students. This is done through various personal cultivation and community building activities in the Academic Philosophy Café. The activities draw from philosophical traditions, including traditions with religious or “spiritual” elements. These encourage reflection on one’s place in the world. In addition, students and teachers cooperate to ensure the smooth running of the café and activities, which strengthens the community bond. There is thus a “spiritual contract” formed between participants. In contrast to a written contract that binds parties by means of explicit rewards or sanctions, a “spiritual contract” is built on mutual understanding that higher-level needs will be met through the process of cooperation. Based upon this, a community is established that nourishes the lives of those on campus, benefits their wellbeing and strengthens their capacity to learn effectively.

The title of Gao Xinhua's 高新華 work contains two somewhat distinct elements: "Huang-Lao thought" (huanglao sixiang 黃老思想) and "Warring States to Early Han" (zhanguo zhi Han chu 戰國至漢初). They are distinct insofar as "Huang-Lao" takes on a different meaning when described based on the works of political philosophy--the task of roughly the first half of the book--and when traced through history in the thought of the political elite, as is the focus of the second half. Of course, they are not entirely distinct and to some extent the historical Huang-Lao is a manifestation of the philosophical works. As Gao shows, however, the relationship between the two is far from simple. The book consists of an Introduction, four chapters--each containing three to five sections--and a short Conclusion.

William James’s category of “first-hand religion” allows us to arrive at the religious from an internal and individual perspective, including in those activities and phenomena usually considered secular. B. B. King’s 1972 performance at Sing Sing Prison, documented by David Hoffman, brings both the prisoner audience and the performers to an “additional dimension” distinct from the hollowness of everyday (prison) life. In addition, the presence of this intense experience on the YouTube platform creates a fluid community of second-order observers, bound not by any overarching belief but by observation of the experience itself. King’s performance is in the genre of blues music, which, in turn, has associations with African religious traditions. While the study of diverse religious traditions helps inform our understanding of the kinds of activities that might constitute the religious, this study takes individual experience as primary rather than as a manifestation of a particular tradition.

Given they are the most important components of Daoist thought, it is not surprising that the relation between dao 道 and One ( yi 一) takes many forms. It is often presumed that dao is the higher-level concept and that One supplements dao. However, through studying ancient texts, such as the Huangdi sijing 黃帝四經 and the Heguanzi 鶡冠子, another form is discovered, namely that dao is the lower-level concept of One. Two schools may well have co-existed in early Daoism, one that "values the One" and one that "values the dao." Whereas One refers to sameness or commonality, dao points to distinctness. The One can fully take the place of dao in terms of status and function, while also retaining functions that dao lacks. A fuller understanding of this complex relationship between dao and One is helpful for a more accurate grasp of early Daoism.

This essay focuses on A Brief Response on the Controversies over Shangdi, Tianshen and Linghun by Niccolò Longobardo (1559–1654), a text that played a crucial role in the formation of European understanding of Chinese philosophy. Taken historically, the text is an important vehicle for the transmission of Chinese concepts into early modern European philosophy as well as a key intervention in the debate shaping the ideological premises of the Jesuit mission in China. It contains one of the first systematic accounts of Chinese philosophy written by a European author. More importantly, it presents a narrative that links Mediterranean and Chinese intellectual history into a single historical current. In this way Longobardo plays a role analogous to the mapmaker who distorts three-dimensional spaces in order to project them together onto a two-dimensional plane. We present some of the peculiar shifts and emphases made by Longobardo in his reading of what seems to him a transhistorical current linking the Chinese and ancient Mediterranean philosophical milieus. In particular, we examine (1) the relationship between Longobardo’s attempt to situate Chinese thought in a global context and the choice to place special emphasis on the philosophy of Shao Yong 邵雍, treating him as a figure of primary importance among Song 宋 Neo-Confucian authors, and (2) the focus on the monist and cosmogonic aspects of Chinese thought, summarized by the “ten thousand things forming one body” (wanwuyiti 萬物一體) “axiom.”

Philosophy is presented in a wide range of forms, none of which can be convincingly claimed to be the “genuine” one. Historically speaking, there is not one “proper” way of doing philosophy, evidencing what may be called the social contingency of philosophy. This paper aims to provide a “critical” philosophy of today, in the Kantian sense of a philosophy that reflects on the conditions of its possibility, and thereby acknowledges the limitations they impose. Conceptually, our approach is grounded in Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, in which “functional differentiation” and “second-order observation” are two crucial characteristics of modern society. The paper discusses how presentations of philosophy align themselves with the second-order observation mechanisms of the specific social systems in which they are “hosted.” This paper deals in particular with two such systems: academics and social (or mass) media. These forms of presenting philosophy produce two different kinds of philosophy presenters: the expert and the influencer.