Rosalind Hursthouse

In this text book Rosalind Hursthouse examines the complex questions surrounding the morality of abortion. Beginning by discussing the moral status of the foetus, she outlines and criticizes the main philosophical liberal positions on abortion, discussing alsl their bearing on the related issues of ifanticide, foetal research, surrogacy, murder and our treatment of animals. In place of the currently prevailing positions, the author offers a novel approach to these issues based on the recently revived theory of neo-Aristotelianism which emphasizes moral virtues and vices. A central element of _Beginning Lives_ is its emphasis on the special nature of abortion: its unique relation to the facts of women's pregnancies and hence to our attitudes to childbearing, motherhood, maturity and sexual relations.

Twenty-five years ago, Inwood said that the question of what the excessiveness of the impulses involved in the emotions or passions consisted in was ‘perhaps the most difficult aspect of the [Stoic] theory of the passions’. In this chapter it is argued that we need to distinguish the violent, ‘literal’, form of excessiveness from an ‘ethically loaded’ form, but that Chrysippus’s account of excessiveness as being ‘out of control’ applies to both. Moreover, if, as he does not, we push the story of our natural development as rational animals back to where it truly starts, namely with speech in toddlers, his view that excessive impulses come from a defective rational soul, one that has not developed in accordance with nature, also applies to both.

Shows that virtue ethics can specify right action and defends the view that the sort of practical guidance it provides accommodates several conditions of adequacy that any normative ethics should meet. It is argued that (1) it generates an account of moral education, (2) it incorporates the view that moral wisdom cannot simply be acquired from textbooks, and (3) it can resolve resolvable dilemmas or moral conflicts but is not committed in advance to there being no such things as irresolvable dilemmas.

This introductory textbook is ideally suited to newcomers to philosophy and ethical problems. Rosalind Hursthouse carefully introduces the three standard approaches in current ethical theory: utilitarianism, rights, and virtue ethics. She links each chapter to readings from key exponents such as Peter Singer and Mary Midgley and asks students to think critically about these readings for themselves. Key features include clear activities and activities, chapter summaries and guides to further reading.

This introductory textbook is ideally suited to newcomers to philosophy and ethical problems. Rosalind Hursthouse carefully introduces the three standard approaches in current ethical theory: utilitarianism, rights, and virtue ethics. She links each chapter to readings from key exponents such as Peter Singer and Mary Midgley and asks students to think critically about these readings for themselves. Key features include clear activities and activities, chapter summaries and guides to further reading.

Twelve eminent philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic here offer essays exploring topics in moral philosophy to which Philippa Foot has made a distinctive contribution. There are chapters on virtue ethics, naturalism, non-cognitivism, relativism, categorical requirements, and the role of rationality in morality. Professor Foot is one of the most original and widely respected philosophers of recent years; the outstanding work gathered in Virtues and Reasons offers an impressive demonstration of her continuing influence on the development of moral philosophy.

Philippa Foot (1920–2010) is widely regarded as one of the foremost Anglo-American moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Her published work, spanning 50 years, consisted entirely of essays until its culmination in her only monograph, Natural Goodness (2001). Although her work forms, by and large, a coherent whole, subsets of the essays relate to different areas of ethics, in each of which she made a substantial contribution. In applied ethics, most of the essays are on abortion (1967, 1970, 1985). In the first one she famously introduced the trolley problem, one of many examples employed in a subtle discussion of the moral relevance of foreseen consequences involving the death of the innocent. The discussion involves the distinction between killing and letting die – a key feature in all the abortion essays, and also in “Euthanasia” (Foot 1977).

The proponents of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism (henceforth “Aristotelian naturalism” for short) include Foot (2001), Geach (1956, 1977), Hursthouse (1999), McDowell (1995), MacIntyre (1999), Nussbaum (1993, 1995), and Thompson (1995); and also Anscombe because her work has influenced so many others. (Gaut [1997, 2002] should also be known as a significant contributor.) Their views are so unlike those of other proponents of ethical naturalism (see Naturalism, Ethical), and they occupy such an unfamiliar position in philosophy, that they are simultaneously criticized on at least two quite different bases. Some say they are not trying to offer naturalism at all, because they avowedly employ a moralized conception of human nature; some say they are trying to offer naturalism insofar as they offer a biological foundation for ethics, but that either this has counterintuitive upshots or the biology is Aristotle's and thereby pre-Darwinian and not a proper naturalistic foundation at all.

Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Stagira, Macedonia. He went to Athens and entered Plato's Academy when he was eighteen. He remained there until Plato's death in about 347 BC, when he left Athens to spend the next five years at Assos in Asia Minor and at Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, working on philosophy and biology. In 343 he was invited to return to Macedonia to tutor the son of Philip II of Macedonia, the future Alexander the Great. This lasted three or four years. After a further period at Stagira, Aristotle returned to Athens where he opened a philosophical school at the Lyceum or Peripatos. On the death of Alexander in 323 there was anti-Macedonian feeling in Athens, and to avoid the same fate as Socrates, Aristotle took refuge in Chalcis on the island of Euboea, leaving the school in the charge of his pupil Theophrastus. He died the following year.

This book has an ambitious aim—to make convincing the rejection of the hard and fast cognitive–conative divide currently so prevalent in philosophy of mind and moral psychology. Only such a rejection, Helm believes, can solve—or dissolve—the two major problems of practical reason. The ‘motivational problem’ is ‘a puzzle about the connection between our choosing something as the outcome of deliberation and our being motivated to pursue it’ (p. 1); the ‘deliberative problem’ concerns ‘how deliberation about value is possible’ (p. 11) given that ‘our concept of value is pulled in seemingly opposed directions of objectivity and subjectivity’ (p. 200). Helm ‘suggests’ in chapter one, and argues with respect to particular attempts to solve these problems in later chapters, that acceptance of the cognitive-conative divide makes them quite intractable.

Very soon after Philippa Foot’s death, there was a flood of newspaper obituaries and ‘posts’ on blogs referring to her as one of the greatest moral philosophers of the twentieth century. She was also, though very few of the writers were in a position to say so, a particularly loyal Somervillian. She read PPE at Somerville during the war, started teaching there after war work in London in 1947, became its first Philosophy Tutorial Fellow in 1949, Vice Principal in 1967, and, although she resigned her Fellowship in 1969, she retained, as a Senior Research Fellow and then Honorary Fellow, very close links with the College and Somervillians, past and present, until the end.

PHILIPPA RUTH FOOT was born on 3 October 1920, the second daughter of William Bosanquet, who had done mathematics at Cambridge and became the manager of a steelworks in Yorkshire, and Esther Cleveland, daughter of President Grover Cleveland. She was educated mainly at home in the country by governesses, and not well. She said, many years later, that, ‘unsurprisingly’, she had been left ‘extremely ignorant’, and when the last one, ‘who actually had a degree’, suggested to her that she should go to Oxford, she had to work for it. She spent a year with an established Oxford entrance coach and took a correspondence course to acquire the necessary entrance Latin; the result was a place at Somerville College, where she went to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) in 1939.

The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.