Rosario Croce

This paper reconstructs Paci’s neglected phenomenological account of need, illustrating its role in his project of a “new phenomenology.” While peripheral in most phenomenological authors, the theme of need becomes central in Paci’s approach, representing the main tool for reshaping the nature and aims of phenomenology. I begin by illustrating the main features of Paci’s approach, in Sect. 2.1, then I move on to discuss, in Sect. 2.2, how he connects concepts like epoché and the mundane-transcendental distinction to the problem of alienation, thus proposing phenomenology as an emancipatory practice. This lays the groundwork for Paci’s anchoring of Marxism within phenomenology, of which his theory of need represents the major theoretical result. As I argue in Sect. 3.1, this theory serves to ground economics in the subject’s operations in the lifeworld and overcome the major blind spots in both Husserl and Marx’s theories. Thus, I demonstrate how an analysis of need is designed to clarify phenomenologically Marx’s concept of “economic structure,” in an anti-objectivist way. Finally, in Sect. 3.2, I turn to Paci’s description of need in terms of negative intentionality, showing why it brings to light a deeper level of subjectivity and lifeworld and how it is useful to develop critical analyses of factual social arrangements, in line with Paci’s overall approach to phenomenology.

This article revisits Max Weber’s theory of values by focussing on the often-overlooked concept of ‘worldview’ ( Weltanschauung ). By exploring Weber’s distinction between reason, decision and historical context, this study shows the role of worldviews in shaping and creating values. In doing so, it proves that Weber’s approach to values is more nuanced and complex than the so-called reason-value dichotomy and voluntarism, as it seeks to make sense of how collective cultural frameworks contribute to individuals’ practical and ethical life (Section 1). The article also addresses Weber’s famous claim of an antagonism of values, contrasting it with competing views such as relativism and universal values systems. It argues that this claim is best understood in light of Weber’s metatheoretical reflections on the difference between empirical-descriptive and speculative-interpretative analysis (Section 2).