Ross Wilks

Albert Camus claimed that the only philosophical problem that mattered was suicide. All other worldly concerns and philosophical quandaries come second to the burning question: Why should I not kill myself tomorrow? A lover of Schopenhauer may take this one step further and ask: Is existence preferable to non-existence? That is, given our experience of the world, would it not have been better for us, on the whole, to have never been born in the first place? In this essay, I argue that existence is preferable to non-existence because certain aspects of life make life worthwhile. First, I explore aesthetic experience as a possible aspect of life that would make existence worthwhile. However, because aesthetic experiences are too fleeting, I reject them. Instead, I propose love as a more robust aspect of life that makes existence worthwhile, and, after rejecting Schopenhauerian objections to my idea, I conclude that existence is preferable to non-existence.

In this essay, I will argue that we should accept xenogenders as negative arguments against xenogenders fail. First, I will explore the objection that we cannot accept xenogenders as they should not be classified as genders, which I reject by presenting an account of gender which allows us to classify xenogenders as genders. Next, I examine the objection that we cannot accept xenogenders because they are transphobic; thus, we must reject them to protect trans people. I reject this by arguing that we can distinguish between xenogenders and transphobic “attack-helicopter” cases by appealing to authenticity. Finally, I explore the objection that we cannot accept xenogenders because they fail to communicate ideas, and reject this by arguing that, even if xenogenders do not communicate ideas to the majority of people, it is short-sighted to reject them on these grounds. So, I conclude that we should accept xenogenders.