Ruairí Maguire

Statist (or functionalist) theories of territorial rights have often been thought to rule out the permissibility of unilateral secession from a legitimate, non-usurping state—if states have rights over their territory, the thought goes, then it is impermissible to unilaterally take any portion of this territory. In this article, I argue that the most plausible versions of statist theories of territorial rights do not have the theoretical resources to rule out unilateral secession. I show that proponents of these revised statist views cannot explain why unilateral secession from a legitimate, non-usurping state, is always impermissible, because they cannot explain why other types of entity—such as sub-state nations, for example, cannot have rights to territory. This opens the door for so-called “primary right” theories of secession—theories that do not make suffering from serious injustice a necessary condition for having a right to unilaterally secede. I conclude with a discussion of how to settle questions about the assignation of territorial rights in the event of secession.

Are (unilateral) secessionists traitors? In this paper, I first set out an account of treason that is, I argue, superior to competing accounts. This account is the disjunctive account, and it holds that someone is a traitor if he or she participates in activities that aim to subject the political community to which they belong to ongoing serious violations of self-determination, or which aim to commit widespread, systematic violations of the basic rights of individual members of that political community. I then apply this account to the case of unilateral secession. Unilateral secession, I argue, need not be treasonous, in part because it is difficult to explain how even many cases of unjustified unilateral secession necessarily violates the self-determination of the political community seceded from, or violates the basic rights of its members. I argue that this is true even when the secessionists fight a war of independence against their state.

In this article, I argue that because co-nationals have an intrinsically valuable relationship, they have a presumptive claim against interference in their collective affairs. My argument from the claim that co-nationals have an intrinsically valuable relationship to the presumptive claim against interference is threefold, and I set it out in section “From Intrinsic Value to Self-Determination”: firstly, parties to an intrinsically valuable relationship have a respect-based claim to autonomy. Secondly, the relationship between co-nationals realizes some important goods, and collective autonomy is internally related to these. Finally, the fact that co-nationals have an intrinsically valuable relationship, and affective attachments means that they have a strong interest in carrying out certain activities together, without interference from outsiders. In section “Grounding the Presumptive Claim,” I argue that these three grounds cumulatively amount to a presumptive claim to collective autonomy. I outline the implications for the issue of secession.

In this paper, I consider the objection that unilateral secession by a national group (e.g., the Scots) from a legitimate, nonusurping state would wrong minority nationalities within the seceding territory. I show first that most proponents of this objection assume that the ground of the right to national self-determination is the protection of the group’s culture. I show that there are alternative justifications available. I then set out a version of this objection that does not rely on this claim; on this objection, a national minority that seceded and created its own state would commit an expressive wrong against minorities within the territory over which it claimed jurisdiction. I show that this objection is undermotivated: only under a specific set of circumstances would the minorities of the secessionist region be subject to an expressive wrong. Finally, I show that the correct way to think about the claims of minorities in secessionist regions is in terms of a claim to secure access to equal civic status such that they are not at risk of becoming justifiably alienated from their new state. If a secessionist group cannot provide this guarantee to the minority residents of their territory, then their seceding would commit wrongful harm, and the presumption in favour of collective autonomy is defeated. I call this defeater the ‘Alienation Defeater.’With this in hand, we are now in a position to explain why nations are normatively special. Responding to the objections broached by Allen Buchanan and others, I show that even if other kinds of groups, such as religious groups, have the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, this does not entail that those groups also have the right to secede. This is because an account of self-determination needs a list of ‘defeaters’—features in virtue of which a group’s claim to self-determination is defeated. I argue that religious groups are the strongest candidate for having a claim to collective autonomy in virtue of sharing many features with nations. I then argue that religious groups will run afoul of the Alienation Defeater; religious identity is too narrow to be the basis of the dominant collective identity of a state. This does not apply to nationality. This, I explain, is because of qualitative differences between religious groups, qua religious groups, and nations.

In this paper I argue that when states commit, assist, or culpably fail to prevent crimes against humanity against their own people, they should, subsequently, have primacy in prosecuting those crimes. They have a presumptive right (and duty) to punish perpetrators, and so a claim against third parties not to do so. In contrast to those who emphasise the importance of national sovereignty, I set out a victim-centred justification for this claim. I argue that victims of crimes against humanity, and members of groups that have been targeted for these crimes, have a special interest in having their status as members of their political community re-affirmed. Punishment by their state of war-related crimes against them has the expressive function of re-affirming their status as equal members of their national community, and the state’s commitment to protecting their rights. I set out some reasons to think that this is valuable for victims and members of targeted groups. These interests, I argue, are weighty enough to ground the primacy of states in prosecution.