Rubén Marciel

Despite the vast literature on deliberative democracy, comparatively little has been said about the kind of journalism that best suits it. Drawing on insights from deliberative theorists and communication scholars, I suggest that the core function of deliberative journalism is to promote high-quality democratic deliberation. I then identify and explicate four key duties that journalists should honor to fulfill this function. The general duty of deliberative gatekeeping commands journalists to select the contents with the greatest potential to foster quality deliberation. The selection of issues is regulated by the duty to set a deliberative agenda, which requires journalists to report only on issues worth deliberating about. The selection and communication of information is regulated by the duty to explain, which commands journalists to make issues understandable to their audiences, and the duty to promote public reasoning, which commands journalists to actively stimulate their audiences’ engagement in deliberations. Finally, to clarify the distinctiveness of deliberative journalism, I contrast this ideal with the ideals of objective reporting, partisan journalism, watchdog journalism, commercial journalism, and public journalism.

After the digital revolution, quality journalism is more necessary than ever. And yet, journalism is undergoing an unprecedented economic crisis precisely because the digital revolution led its advertisement-based funding system to collapse. How can we save journalism as a key institution for upholding the quality of democratic deliberation? Most approaches to this question focus either on media literacy campaigns, restricting the dissemination of disinformation, or fostering public media. This article explores another, largely neglected approach: the civic strategy in media policy, which consists of distributing public funds among private news media through democratic allocation mechanisms. Civic media policies promise to create a more democratic media system, enhance media pluralism, and, crucially, secure robust funding for quality journalism. To examine how they might do so, I assess the four main proposals within this civic paradigm: Cagé’s proposal to create ‘nonprofit media organizations’, Latham’s ‘voter-funded media’ system, Ackerman’s ‘internet news voucher’, and McChesney and Nichols’ ‘citizenship news voucher’. Drawing on a critical examination of these proposals, I extract some lessons for designing more effective civic media policies in the future.

Although communication scholars have extensively documented how populist actors engage in deceitful forms of speech, it remains unclear why populists so blatantly disregard truth. This article addresses that question by drawing on the works of Laclau and Mouffe to develop a normative theory of populist communication. This theory posits that, to successfully achieve their goal of uniting ‘the people’ against ‘the elite,’ populist actors should produce three distinct kinds of discourse: agonistic, articulating, and mobilizing. Against this theoretical backdrop, the article advances three claims that shed light on the relationship between populism and deception. First, while populist speech is indifferent to truth, it need not involve lies, as its functions can be fulfilled by non-lying strategies such as cherry-picking and the avoidance of falsifiable statements. Second, due to its indifference to truth, populist speech is nonetheless prone to containing lies, which are likely to increase in number as populist actors gain popularity. Third, populist speech can be conceptualized as a specific variant of what Harry Frankfurt defined as ‘bullshit,’ which I refer to as ‘populist bullshit’. The article thus bridges political theory and empirical research, provides a novel theoretical framework for understanding populist communication, and poses a direct challenge to the acceptability of populism as a political strategy.

This chapter surveys the four main contemporary theories of democracy. First is democratic elitism, developed mostly by Schumpeter and Downs. Elitism assumes that citizens are apathetic and politically incompetent, seeing democracy as a method for periodically selecting the ruling elites. Second is liberal pluralism, typically associated with Dahl, among others. Liberal pluralism sees democracy as competition among rival factions, calling for institutions that prevent the tyranny of any minority over the others. Third is populism (or radical democracy), chiefly defended by Laclau and Mouffe. Populists believe that social identities are malleable and rational agreements unattainable, which leads them to see democracy as a struggle to rhetorically create a popular identity. Finally, deliberative democracy, pioneered by Habermas, holds that political power must be justifiable to all and proposes that democracy should be a process in which citizens exchange arguments to determine the most acceptable policies.

Could citizens have a right to be offered quality news? Some argue that such a right is impracticable because the obligations it would generate would entail a de facto suppression of journalistic freedoms. In this article, I argue that this problem only affects the right to the news if conceived as an individual legal right. Yet, conceived as a moral right, citizens’ right to the news is not only compatible with journalistic freedoms but also the moral foundation of the journalistic institution itself. Moreover, I argue that citizens’ right to the news can (and should) have significant legal effects, as it imposes upon public administrations an obligation to implement measures to protect it, which I classify into direct and indirect protections.

¿Puede tener la ciudadanía un derecho a recibir noticias de calidad? Hay quien cree que semejante derecho es inviable porque las obligaciones que de él se seguirían implicarían una supresión de facto de las libertades periodísticas. En este artículo defiendo que ese problema afecta solo al derecho a las noticias si se lo concibe como derecho jurídico subjetivo. Concebido como un derecho moral, el derecho de la ciudadanía a las noticias es no solo compatible con las libertades periodísticas, sino el fundamento moral de la institución periodística misma. Además, argumento que el derecho a las noticias puede (y debe) tener importantes efectos jurídicos, ya que impone a las administraciones públicas una obligación de adoptar medidas para protegerlo, las cuales clasifico en directas e indirectas.

What should be news in a democracy? This article offers a deliberative answer to this question by developing a deliberative account of newsworthiness. Drawing from the deliberative theory of democracy, I define the general criterion of deliberative newsworthiness as a mandate that commands journalists to seek, select, and report the contents that are most capable of stimulating high-quality deliberation. I then develop a two-step process through which journalists may apply this criterion. First, journalists should select the most newsworthy issues, which are those that most profoundly affect (or are likely to affect) how just our society is. Second, journalists should select the most newsworthy facts and the most newsworthy arguments, both of which are to be chosen on the basis of their capacity to promote quality deliberation about the newsworthy issues. Ultimately, what should be news is a context-dependent issue that only journalists can decide, but deliberative newsworthiness is the normative criterion that journalists should follow when making these decisions – at least, if they want to produce the news that deliberative democracy needs.

RESUMEN: En este trabajo defiendo que el ideal de una ciudadanía competente es viable incluso en los contextos adversos que ofrecen las sociedades digitales. Para ello, identifico cinco problemas que obstaculizan a la ciudadanía la adquisición de competencia política: el pluralismo, el problema del moderador, la dificultad para acceder a información relevante, la apatía política y los sesgos políticos. Aunque estos problemas se agudizan en las democracias digitales, muestro que existen mecanismos institucionales que permiten corregir y mitigar sus efectos perjudiciales sobre la competencia política. Por ello, concluyo, el ideal de ciudadanía competente es prima facie factible y podría lograrse mediante la implementación de medidas institucionales que fomenten la adquisición de competencia política por parte de la ciudadanía. ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that the ideal of a competent citizenry is feasible even in the adverse context digital societies offer. To do so, I identify five problems that hinder citizens’ acquisition of political competence: pluralism, the chairman problem, difficulties in finding relevant information, political apathy, and political biases. Even though these problems worsen in digital democracies, I show that there are institutional mechanisms that allow for the correction and mitigation of the detrimental effects they might have on political competence. I thus conclude that the ideal of a competent citizenry is prima facie feasible and could be achieved through the implementation of institutional measures that foster political competence among citizens.

Aunque el populismo es uno de los conceptos políticos más empleados en nuestra época, suele decirse que también es uno de los más escasamente comprendidos (Taggart 2002, 62), y hay incluso quien cree que está rodeado de un “completo caos conceptual” (Müller 2016, 11). También hay quien ha intentado clasificar diferentes aproximaciones al populismo (véase especialmente Taggart 2000, 10-22; también Panizza 2005, 2-3; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 186-96; Weyland 2017, 51-55). Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el principal consenso académico sobre el populismo es, precisamente, que no hay ningún gran consenso sobre lo que pueda ser el populismo. Por eso hay quien dice que el populismo es un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que Gallie (1955) denominó “conceptos esencialmente controvertidos” (Weyland 2001; Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; 2017). Semejantes dificultades para acordar una definición permiten explicar por qué prácticamente cualquier texto académico sobre el populismo empieza advirtiendo que en este debate hay que andar con pies de plomo. Así las cosas, esta entrada no aspira a ofrecer ninguna definición concluyente del populismo (para intentos de ese tipo, véase Mansbridge y Macedo 2019 o Urbinati 2019b). Cada sección tiene una aspiración más modesta. La primera identifica algunas dificultades que complican la comprensión y definición del populismo. La segunda sección presenta dos rasgos en los que, a pesar de las discrepancias, la mayoría de las definiciones del populismo coinciden. La tercera ofrece una reconstrucción sintética de la teoría populista desarrollada por Laclau y Mouffe –dos de los teóricos más influyentes tanto política como académicamente.

Happy cow messages are instances of commercial speech by the animal industry which, by action or by omission, mislead consumers about the harmful effects that the industry has for nonhuman animals, the environment, or human health. Despite their ubiquity, happy cow messages have received little philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to call attention to this form of speech, and to make the case for its restriction. To do so we first conceptualize happy cow messages. Second, we argue that they encroach upon individual autonomy in two particularly objectionable ways: by impairing our ability to behave according to our moral convictions, and by thwarting our capacity to identify and reason about our moral duties. This, we hold, grounds a pro tanto case for stricter and more comprehensive regulations of commercial speech by the animal industry. Third, and against the objection that restricting happy cow messages would violate freedom of speech, we contend that none of the most influential arguments for free speech grants them protection. Indeed, we suggest, those rationales seem to call for their restriction. Fourth, and finally, we review some possible ways to defuse the misleading potential of happy cow messages through commercial speech regulations.

The scope of public reason determines which political decisions should be taken according to its standards. In this paper, I defend a broad-scope view of public reason, according to which every single political decision should be justified by public reasons. In the first part, I argue that, despite the unclarity of Rawls’ position, it is compatible with the wide-scope view. In the three following parts, I refute the main arguments in favour of the narrow-scope view of public reason. Finally, I offer an argument for the wide-scope view and conclude that it is preferable from the point of view of political liberalism.

Este trabajo aborda la relación entre el populismo y los discursos del odio. Tomando como referencia la visión favorable del populismo teorizada por Laclau y Mouffe, desarrollaré un concepto de discurso populista formado por tres subtipos de discurso: el agonista, el solidario y el movilizador. Tras contrastar este concepto con el de discurso del odio, concluyo que ambos son independientes y que por tanto el populismo no necesita recurrir a discursos del odio, al menos en teoría. Sin embargo, advierto, la naturaleza del populismo le hace propenso a caer en ese tipo de discursos, lo cual sugiere que la praxis populista difícilmente podrá evitarlos. Dada la inmoralidad del discurso del odio, esta afinidad ofrece una razón _pro tanto_ para abstenerse de prácticas populistas.

The idea that citizens have a right to receive information that is relevant for their suitable exercise of political rights and liberties is well established in democratic societies. However, this right has never been systematically analyzed, thus remaining a blurry concept. This article tackles this conceptual gap by conceptualizing citizens’ right to information. After reviewing previous approaches to this idea, I locate citizens’ right to information on the map of communication rights, and put forward a systematic framework for both justifying and analyzing it. This framework focuses on this right’s grounds, its function, its holders, its content, and its correlative duties. Although the conceptualization offered here will be incomplete, it will be enough to distinguish the general concept of citizens’ right to information from both its specific conceptions and from the other two best-known rights of the public: freedom of information and the public’s right to know.

In this article I try to shed some light on the complex relation between democracy, political knowledge, and disinformation. To do so, I first define three related concepts which, once clarified, could facilitate our understanding of the problems digital democracies face. First, drawing from the general notion of competence, I define civic competence. Then, drawing from the general notion of knowledge, I define political knowledge. Finally, and drawing from the general notion of information, I define democratically relevant information. After clarifying these concepts, I will present three epistemic positions, to which I will refer to as knowledge, ignorance, and mistake. These three epistemic positions will be further connected with informative phenomena such as disinformation, fake news, and misinformation.