Ruby Main

“What is nonsense?” is one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy and has been implicit since the subject’s origins. This thesis explores the role of nonsense in the work of Wittgenstein, the philosopher perhaps most critical of philosophy itself. Wittgenstein’s work, alongside that of Hume and Kant, is emblematic of the critical impulse in philosophy. This approach does not build philosophical systems or offer answers to philosophical questions. Rather, it interrogates whether the very questions asked are valid, useful, or clear. Though most philosophers are critical to an extent, some make especially broad critiques and distance themselves from other philosophical practices. Broad philosophical critiques, such as those found in Hume, Kant or Wittgenstein require a notion of nonsense with which to frame other philosophy. Through critical comparison, I argue that Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense is more concrete than Hume's or Kant's, as is his method for addressing philosophical nonsense as it emerges. I argue that Wittgenstein’s understanding of nonsense emerges in response to his biggest influences: Russell and Frege. Wittgenstein’s approach emerges from a reply to Russell’s language-adjacent philosophy and incorporates Frege’s understanding of sense. I argue that the early and later Wittgenstein have distinct methods but share a conception of nonsense as something which cannot have meaning. The later Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach emerges from his dissatisfaction with the Tractatus’ response to nonsense. Understanding the later work requires engagement with the earlier. Finally, taking seriously Wittgenstein’s comparisons between psychotherapy, particularly psychoanalysis, I argue that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach uses arguments to dissolve philosophical problems. Further, appropriately incorporating Freud into my interpretation shows that Wittgenstein’s method does not put an end to philosophy – rather it creates a productive, reflective role for philosophical nonsense.

Against the medical and social models of disability are two newer proposals. Elizabeth Barnes’ Minority Body proposes that it is the bodies which are advocated for and included in the disability rights movement which are rightfully called “disabled.” Savulescu and Kahane’s Welfarist approach proposes that disability is intrinsically tied to the effects of bodily states on welfare. They put the need for a consistent and relatively simple normative theory above accounting for standard case judgements about who is and is not disabled or looking at all to membership of the disabled community. I argue that Barnes’ theory offers the best response to issues with the dominant models of disability. Further, I argue that the Welfarist theory operates in a space removed from the wishes and lived experiences of disabled people – separating ‘disability’ from activism entirely – to its detriment. Doing so compromises its explanatory power, over-generalizes the concept and prevents the insertion of meaningful boundaries. Barnes’ ‘solidarity thesis’ soundly conceptualizes disability whilst making room for activist voices. The centering of activist projects makes it stronger.