Rudolf Meer

Based on two intertwined distinctions (I-Archetype / I-Rule and categorial / systematic / ideal reading of the connection between Analytic and Dialectic), both the status and the function of transcendental illusion are reconstructed within the framework of Kant’s regulative use of reason. It is shown that in Kant’s philosophy multi-layered a priori structures and different claims are connected with each other. In contrast to the constitutive use of reason, the regulative one has merely a certain degree of objective validity. Nevertheless, regulative ideas are not mere conventions, but pragmatic principles through which science is possible at all. This differentiation makes it possible to situate Kant’s approach in the context of the debates on the dynamization and relativization of the a priori in the long 19th century.

In this paper, I analyse Kant’s derivation of ideas in the Introduction and the First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Despite the increasing interest in the First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant’s crucial differentiation between the logical and the real or rather transcendental use of reason remains unconsidered or even misinterpreted. To expose the logical structure of Kant’s argumentation, I provide firstly a precise analysis and offer a reconstruction of his derivation in five steps. Based on this investigation, I will secondly show that the logical structure used by Kant has its roots in the early modern period, and became canonical in the Port-Royal Logic. This perspective in turn allows a critical discussion of the basic problems of the Transcendental Dialectics. © 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

In dem Band entwickeln renommierte Autorinnen und Autoren in 22 Beiträgen Antworten auf eine Reihe von Fragen zu Immanuel Kant und der Rezeption seiner Philosophie in Österreich, die bis heute noch nicht ausreichend diskutiert wurden: Gab es überhaupt einen österreichischen Neukantianismus? Wie prägend ist die Philosophie von Kant für die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Österreich? Oder anders formuliert: Inwiefern haben österreichische Denkerinnen und Denker des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts einen Beitrag zu einem spezifischen Verständnis der kantischen Philosophie geleistet? Dabei zeigt sich, dass neben den zwei Hauptformen des Neukantianismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts – d.h. der Marburger und der Südwestdeutschen Schule – ein spezifisch österreichischer Zugang zu Kant historisch wie systematisch von besonderer Bedeutung ist und weitreichende Folgen hatte. Unter Absehung der üblichen geografischen Zuordnungen der verschiedenen Schulen lässt sich dieser als realistischer Kritizismus beschreiben und hat neben Richard Hönigswald und Robert Reininger seinen wichtigsten Vertreter in Alois Riehl.

En el volumen 1 de su Crítica filosófica, Alois Riehl propone lo que podría denominarse en términos contemporáneos una forma de “no conceptualismo de estado”. Especialmente en relación con A 89-90/B 122-123, su postura puede reconstruirse y defenderse en consonancia con el debate actual en la investigación kantiana. La interpretación realista de Riehl del idealismo trascendental de Kant ofrece estrategias para soluciones interpretativas que cuestionan cualquier escepticismo precipitado sobre las interpretaciones no conceptualistas.

In this paper we examine Euler’s influence on Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as a non-Newtonian source. We show that he is more than a mere mediator between Newton and Kant. Rather, Euler’s perspective on the relationship between mechanics and metaphysics as well as the law of inertia and space can be seen as paving the way for Kant’s critical project and his natural philosophy. To demonstrate this, we analyze key passages from Newton’s work and examine Euler’s Reflections on space and time. It becomes clear in this analysis that Euler, in contrast to Newton, reverses the relationship between metaphysics and physics as well as the law of inertia and space. This provides a new perspective on Euler’s influence on Kant and, on the basis of a critical discussion of the current state of research, allows a non-Newtonian source to appear in a new light.

Based on previously unpublished archival sources, such as Riehl’s correspondence with Heinrich Rickert, Friedrich Jodl, Bartholomäus von Carneri, Hugo Münsterberg, Wilhelm Wundt, Eduard Spranger, Ernst Mach, and Hans Vaihinger, as well as the files of the universities of Graz, Vienna, Freiburg, Halle, Kiel, and Berlin, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s life, work, and impact. This reveals two things: Firstly, with the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of realistic criticism, and rose to one of the leading figures in Germanspeaking philosophy at the turn of the century. Secondly, Riehl proves to be a thinker who was deeply influenced by humanistic ideals and an enlightened spirit, even if these took on an ambivalent form during the years of the First World War.

Alois Riehl’s View of Friedrich Nietzsche and His Relationship with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Alois Riehl and Friedrich Nietzsche were contemporaries – both were born in the same year, 1844. But the philosophical paths they followed could hardly be more different. Nevertheless, Riehl recognized Nietzsche as one of the most important thinkers of his time. He was one of the first academic philosophers to devote a detailed analysis to Nietzsche’s writings. And Riehl saw in Nietzsche’s work a complementary counterpart to the scientific philosophy that he developed in his Philosophical Criticism. At the heart of the present paper is a speech given by Riehl on October 15, 1903, on the occasion of the reopening of the Villa Silberblick and the unveiling of Max Klinger’s bust of Nietzsche. The argument is divided into three parts. First, it reconstructs the background to these events historically in light of the friendly relationship between Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Riehl, as well as Riehl’s hesitation to give a speech. Second, Riehl’s ambivalent attitude in his reception of Nietzsche is analyzed through a close reading of his text. Third, the paper concludes with a final look at the specific event of October 15, 1903, based on historical material.

With the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of Realistic Criticism, and emerged as one of the leading figures in German-speaking philosophy at the turn of the century. In 1901, he applied for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. In the appointment procedure for the succession to Ernst Mach, he was chosen by the committee with the recommendation unico loco, and also confirmed by the faculty. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Wilhelm von Hartel, rejected the recommendation for political and ideological reasons. Using previously unpublished archival sources, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s academic career, the conditions of the appointment procedure, the internal decision-making processes, and the reasons that ultimately led to his rejection. The aim of the article is to develop a case study that, first, makes educational policy in Austria visible and, second, critically evaluates the term Austrian Philosophy that dates back to this time.

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis.