Rufaida Al Hashmi

The history of immigration policy is marked by the wrongful and discriminatory exclusion of certain groups of people. In this article, I argue that descendants of those who were wrongfully excluded have a pro tanto right to immigrate to the state in question as reparation. I begin by identifying the two main approaches theorists generally take to establish a claim for reparation: the inheritance approach and the counterfactual approach. In the first section, I argue that the inheritance approach does not offer a promising argument for reparations for descendants of those who were wrongfully excluded. In the second section, I argue that the counterfactual approach, by contrast, does. In the third section, I respond to the objection that this prima facie claim for reparation can be undermined by current circumstances. In the fourth section, I show why this reparation should be offered in the form of immigration rights.

There is growing interest among political theorists in the ways in which states select which would-be immigrants to admit and which to exclude. Sahar Akhtar's book Immigration and Discrimination and Désirée Lim's book Immigration and Social Equality are both important contributions to this topic. This review contextualises and summarises both books and critically assesses the arguments in each book. In response to Akhtar's book, I raise some questions about the possibility of global status and whether the arguments for this hold. In response to Lim's book, I ask whether her account of the importance of social equality applies to the immigration context and, if so, how demanding it is. I end by considering how Akhtar's focus on the global context and Lim's focus on the domestic context raises the interesting question of which context matters more in our evaluation of immigrant selection policy.

Many believe that it is morally impermissible to select refugees applying for resettlement on the basis of religion but morally permissible to do so on the basis of language. In this paper, I challenge this position. I argue that if we oppose selection by religion, then we should also oppose selection by language. I argue that the kind of religious selection proposed by some is demeaning because of a history of cultural injustice, which I examine through the context of colonialism. I show that this account of the wrongness of religious selection fares better than alternative views. Since language played an important role in this history of cultural injustice, I conclude that language selection is demeaning for the same reason. An upshot of my argument is that some kinds of language selection should be viewed as a form of cultural selection. Language, like religion, can be culturally laden in ways that makes it impermissible grounds for the selection of refugees applying for resettlement and indeed would-be immigrants more generally.