Russell Anderson

I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.

The creation of science archives, the historical study of modern science, and major changes in archival practice roughly coincided in the 1950s and 1960s. This has allowed science archives to respond to contemporary issues in the history of science. It has also allowed them to develop as an integral part of the revolution in archival practice since that time, adopting international archival standards that make science archives more accessible to researchers. We are now on the cusp of new technologies and approaches that promise to make a sizable number of collections available online for the first time. This essay describes the development of modern archival principles and practices and discusses the impact they are having on science collections