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34Smoke and Mirrors: Subverting Rationality, Positive Freedom, and Their Relevance to Nudging and/or Smoking PoliciesAmerican Journal of Bioethics 16 (7): 20-22. 2016.
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33The Road to HEAVEN Is Paved With Good Intentions: Transplanting Heads, Manipulating Selves, and Reassigning GendersAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (4): 223-225. 2017.
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27“I Just Wanna Get My Self, or My Story, Back Again”: Narrative Identity, Neurosurgical Intervention, and the Temporary Change ArgumentAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3): 178-180. 2017.
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15Review of Dignity: Its History and Meaning, by Michael Rosen (review)Essays in Philosophy 14 (1): 112-116. 2013.
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16Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against NaturalismPhilosophia Christi 5 (1): 308-314. 2003.
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39The Arc of the Moral Universe Is Long, But it Bends Toward Mercy and Grace: And Other Delightful Surprises of a Distinctively Christian BioethicsChristian Bioethics 21 (3): 262-281. 2015.
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15The Two-Essence Problem That Wasn’tAmerican Journal of Bioethics 12 (9): 34-35. 2012.The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 34-35, September 2012
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23Review of "Dignity: Its History and Meaning" (review)Essays in Philosophy 14 (1): 112-116. 2013.
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60Capacities, hierarchies, and the moral status of normal human infants and fetusesJournal of Value Inquiry 43 (4): 479-492. 2009.
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12Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An IntroductionBritish Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1): 96-97. 2006.
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57Three Christian Arguments Against Germline EngineeringChristian Bioethics 18 (2): 201-218. 2012.Are there any specifically Christian grounds for prohibiting, in principle, human germline engineering? In addressing this question, I deliberately limit my investigation in scope (by focusing narrowly on germline engineering itself) and in perspective (by focusing narrowly on the direct and often distinctive contributions of Christian theology). The three arguments I consider for the conclusion that germline engineering is morally prohibited are the argument from playing God, the argument from …Read more
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49Not every cell is sacred: A reply to CharoBioethics 20 (3). 2006.ABSTRACT Massimo Reichlin, in an earlier article in this journal, defended a version of the ‘argument from potential’ (AFP), which concludes that the human embryo should be protected from the moment of conception. But R. Alta Charo, in her essay entitled ‘Every Cell is Sacred: Logical Consequences of the Argument from Potential in the Age of Cloning’, claims that versions of the AFP like Reichlin’s are vulnerable to a rather embarrassing problem: with the advent of human cloning, such versions o…Read more
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33What Does Not Budge for Any Nudge?American Journal of Bioethics 12 (2): 14-15. 2012.The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, Page 14-15, February 2012
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22Small-r-republicans, big-r-republicans, and government bioethics councilsAmerican Journal of Bioethics 9 (2). 2009.
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70Human Capacities and Moral StatusSpringer. 2010.Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often controversial: if a human’s capacities are the basis of its moral status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? Thi…Read more
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60The Ghost in the Machine Is the Elephant in the Room: Souls, Death, and Harm at the End of LifeJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5): 480-502. 2012.The idea that we human beings have souls that can continue to have conscious experiences after the deaths of our bodies is controversial in contemporary academic bioethics; this idea is obviously present whenever questions about harm at the end of life are discussed, but this idea is often ignored or avoided because it is more comfortable to do so. After briefly discussing certain types of experiences that lead some people to believe in souls that can survive the deaths of their bodies, I begin …Read more
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34Precisely which claim makes spontaneous abortion a scourgeAmerican Journal of Bioethics 8 (7). 2008.
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32A qualified endorsement of embryonic stem cell research, based on two widely shared beliefs about the brain-diseased patients such research might benefitJournal of Medical Ethics 34 (7): 563-567. 2008.Are there persuasive approaches to embryonic stem cell (ESC) research that appeal, not just to those fellow-citizens in one’s own ideological camp, nor just to those undecided citizens in the middle, but to those citizens on the other side of the issue? I believe that there are such arguments and in this short paper I try to develop one of them. In particular, I argue that certain beliefs shared by some proponents and some opponents of ESC research—beliefs about the personal identity and moral s…Read more
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26What's wrong with deliberately proselytizing patients?American Journal of Bioethics 7 (7). 2007.This Article does not have an abstract
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37Human embryos in the original position?Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (3). 2005.Two different discussions in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice lead naturally to a rather conservative position on the moral status of the human embryo. When discussing paternalism, he claims that the parties in the original position would seek to protect themselves in case they end up as incapacitated or undeveloped human beings when the veil of ignorance is lifted. Since human embryos are examples of such beings, the parties in the original position would seek to protect themselves from their em…Read more
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46The Parthenotes and the ParthenonAmerican Journal of Bioethics 11 (3): 35-36. 2011.This Article does not have an abstract
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112Reproductive autonomy, the non-identity problem, and the non-person problemBioethics 23 (1): 59-67. 2008.The Non-Identity Problem is the problem of explaining the apparent wrongness of a decision that does not harm people, especially since some of the people affected by the decision would not exist at all were it not for the decision. One approach to this problem, in the context of reproductive decisions, is to focus on wronging, rather than harming, one's offspring. But a Non-Person Problem emerges for any view that claims (1) that only persons can be wronged and (2) that the person-making propert…Read more