Ryan Haecker

Hegel’s dialectical syllogism links his logic to his theology. For the middle term of the syllogism in logic is essentially mediated by the absolute Idea of Logic, as ultimately by the self-return of Logic in Spirit, and the Holy Trinity of the Christian Religion in a trinitarian ontology of logic, that is, a trinitarian logic. This link of logic to theology signals the clearest contribution to what I designate as ‘theology of logic’. Theology of logic is a theological interpretation of logic: in contrast to philosophy of logic, it asks the prior question of the contingent grounds for our very belief in logic. Hegel has, in the Syllogism chapter of his Logic, developed a post-Aristotelian dialectical syllogism, in which the Concept dynamically differentiates even as it sublates its extremes to produce new knowledge. This dialectical syllogism is distinguished as a dynamic self-mediating cycle of judgments, where indifferently connected judgments are circuitously united through the reciprocal intermediation of a shared middle term. Since mediation and extremity mutually coincide, each syllogism may be intermediated by each other. This exchange of judgments further implies an interchangeability of concepts, where each subordinate concept interchangeably cycles within every superordinate concept, in dialectical triads consisting of a self-dirempting universal, a coincident opposition of mutually related particulars, and a reconciling concrete singular. Every such dialectical triad of concepts can then cycle around one another, through such interchangeable relations of mediation and extremity, like a ‘circle of circles’, in which the intermediating centre and the furthermost periphery forever coincide. Hegel presents the Holy Trinity in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion as the absolute triad of all triads in each syllogism, which comprises this ‘absolute syllogism’ of the entire system of philosophy. Since, finally, the system itself is an absolute syllogism, and this absolute syllogism is the economic procession of the Trinity, every conceptual category of the system can ultimately be sublated and re-posited in and through the logic, dialectic, and syllogisticity of the Holy Trinity. The Christian Trinity thus not only figuratively corresponds to but truly coincides with the logical moments of every concept, and any thought. In answer to this absolute theological questioning of logic, Hegel shows logic to be ontology, ontology to be theology, and theology to be trinitarian, in a trinitarian ontology of logic, that is, a trinitarian logic.

Origen of Alexandria can be credited as the founder of a Christian speculative angelology, in which Christ the Logos is both the creator and the interpreter of the angels. He introduces the angels as the first created rational beings who, in contemplating the divine Word (Logos), freely choose to direct their will as holy angels in service to or wicked demons in antagonism against the love of God. The first created rational beings are divided into three orders: the angels, the demons, and the neutral spirits of human souls. The angels remain closest in contemplation of the Logos, yet, due to their negligence, descend to unfold in the angelic hierarchy. The angels and demons thereafter guide the movements of all spirits, substances, and signs in the created world. The neutral spirits of human souls can choose to follow either the guidance of guardian angels or demons. And yet after the Incarnation, the angels are distinguished from the demons by their choice to follow Christ. Origen’s angelology has often been regarded as an early Christian alternative to Middle Platonic daemonologies. And after Karl Barth, his angelology has come to be dispensed from Christian theology. However, as Jean Daniélou has observed, Origen had previously departed from Platonic daemonology in affirming that angelic mediacy must pass away like the light of the stars before the brilliance of the Logos of Christ. He had, in this way, already assimilated the mediacy of the angels to the absolute mediation of Christ. And, in assimilating angelic to christic mediacy, Origen also attributes the reason with which the world is moved to the divine reason of the divine Word (Logos) of Christ in God. Origen’s angelology can thus be read both before and after Barth as a science of the angels.

Philosophers of education often view the role of religion in education with suspicion, claiming it to be impossible, indoctrinatory or controversial unless reduced to secular premises and aims. The ‘post-secular’ and ‘decolonial’ turns of the new millennium have, however, afforded opportunities to revaluate this predilection. In a social and intellectual context where the arguments of previous generations of philosophers may be challenged on account of positivist assumptions, there may be an opening for the reconsideration of alternative but traditional religious epistemologies. In this article, we pursue one such line of thought by revisiting a classic question in the philosophy of education, Meno’s Paradox of inquiry. We do this to revitalise understanding and justification for religious education. Our argument is not altogether new, but in our view, is in need of restatement: liturgy is at the heart of education and it is so because it is a locus of knowledge. We make this argument by exploring St Augustine’s response to Meno’s Paradox, and his radical claim that only Christ can be called ‘teacher’. Though ancient, this view of the relationship of the teacher and student to knowledge may seem surprisingly contemporary because of its emphasis on the independence of the learner. Although our argument is grounded in classic texts of the Western tradition, we suggest that arguments could be made by drawing on similar resources in other religious traditions, such as Islam, that also draw upon the Platonic tradition and similarly emphasise the importance of communal and personal acts of worship.