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Ryan Ogilvie

University of Maryland University CollegeMinnesota State University, Mankato
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 More details
  • University of Maryland University College
    Liberal Arts
    Graduate student
  • Minnesota State University, Mankato
    Department of Philosophy
    Adjunct Professor
University of Maryland, College Park
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2017
Adelphi, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (3)
  •  40
    Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues
    with Peter Carruthers
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
  •  72
    Better tests of consciousness are needed, but skepticism about unconscious processes is unwarranted
    with Peter Carruthers
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1): 36-37. 2014.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceUnconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  121
    Opening Up Vision: The Case Against Encapsulation
    with Peter Carruthers
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4): 721-742. 2016.
    Many have argued that early visual processing is encapsulated from the influence of higher-level goals, expectations, and knowledge of the world. Here we confront the main arguments offered in support of such a view, showing that they are unpersuasive. We also present evidence of top–down influences on early vision, emphasizing data from cognitive neuroscience. Our conclusion is that encapsulation is not a defining feature of visual processing. But we take this conclusion to be quite modest in s…Read more
    Many have argued that early visual processing is encapsulated from the influence of higher-level goals, expectations, and knowledge of the world. Here we confront the main arguments offered in support of such a view, showing that they are unpersuasive. We also present evidence of top–down influences on early vision, emphasizing data from cognitive neuroscience. Our conclusion is that encapsulation is not a defining feature of visual processing. But we take this conclusion to be quite modest in scope, readily incorporated into mainstream vision science.
    PerceptionModularity and Cognitive Penetrability
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