Ryo Tanaka

As some authors have recently pointed out, the notion of first-person authority has an importantly social dimension: it concerns not only how one’s mental self-ascriptions can be usually (or always) true, but also how one’s interlocutor can presume such mental self-ascriptions to be true (Borgoni 2019, Winokur 2023). An adequate theory of first-person authority should account for both aspects of the phenomenon, but the traditional discussion has focused mainly on the former. In this paper, I will reexamine Davidson’s account of first-person authority in this light and argue that it has interesting theoretical resources to address both aspects of first-person authority within a unified framework. In the literature, there is a consensus that (1) the key idea in Davidson’s account is to explain first-person authority in terms of a speaker’s authoritative knowledge of the meanings of her own words, and (2) Davidson explains the special status of a speaker’s semantic knowledge by invoking his non-communitarian view of meaning-determination. I will argue that, to see a fuller picture of Davidson’s view on first-person authority, these ideas need to be integrated with his discussion on triangulation, where he purports to show that meaning should be essentially social and interpretable. This will allow us to recognize how Davidson's theoretical system, as a whole, is indeed tailored to capturing the social dimension of first-person authority highlighted in the recent discussion.

In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism’s implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On’s neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework.

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the following question that falls in the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology: is there any distinctive kind of knowledge that one might possess, merely in virtue of being a native, competent speaker of a certain natural language? When this is expressed as a question specifically about meaning, intuitions may support an affirmative answer. Philosophers of language often emphasize that human language use is essentially a rational activity and as such it must be rationally controlled by what speakers know about meaning; and competent speakers are often expected to be able to rationalize their choice of words by stating what they take the meanings of relevant words to be. At the same time, however, plausible empirical views of semantic competence tell us that speakers’ semantic competence is not in general a matter of possessing reflectively accessible propositional knowledge about meaning; rather, it consists in their knowing how (i.e. possessing practical skills/abilities) to meaningfully use linguistic expressions for various purposes. Semantic competence then may seem to resemble purely practical skills such as knowing how to ride a bicycle, or play a musical instrument. In this dissertation, I propose and defend an account of competent speakers’ reflective knowledge of meaning that can reconcile these potentially conflicting views. I argue that the most fruitful approach to this issue is to accept the plausible empirical claim that semantic competence does not in general require reflectively accessible propositional knowledge of meaning, and then show how competent speakers might still derive propositional knowledge of meaning from their semantic competence alone. To show this, I defend a pragmatist thesis that the derivation of knowledge from competence is made possible to competent speakers in virtue of their ability to perform what I call acts of meaning explication. Acts of meaning explication are acts that speakers can, in virtue of their semantic competence alone, perform by using linguistic expressions to express their (potentially tacit) conceptions of meaning. I argue that competent speakers can form reliably true beliefs about the meanings of linguistic expressions in their vocabularies by performing various acts of meaning explication.

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results.