Ryoji Sato

Throughout history, theistic thinkers such as Anselm (1080/1998), Aquinas (1485/1947), Descartes (1641/2003), and Plantinga (1993) have argued that our cognitive faculties are innately veridical as a divine creation. However, contemporary findings from cognitive science have exposed our vulnerability to numerous cognitive biases, which many recent authors consider as evidence against divine creation (Fales, 1996; Ramsey, 2002; Childers, 2011; Teehan, 2016; Park, 2018; Lucas, 2018; Launonen, 2021; Kvandal, 2022; contra Loke, 2022). We draw on a point of convergence between the theistic perspective and the naturalistic evolutionary perspective, namely, that we are finite, corporeal beings, and argue that there are good empirical reasons to view our cognitive biases as grounded in reasonable designs within such finitude. The upshot is that the problem lacks a solid empirical foundation. This paper can simultaneously be considered a scientifically grounded exploration on human cognitive finitudes within a theistic context.

A standard methodology in philosophy of language is to use intuitions as evidence. Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich challenged this methodology with respect to theories of reference by presenting empirical evidence that intuitions about one prominent example from the literature on the reference of proper names vary between Westerners and East Asians. In response, Sytsma and Livengood conducted experiments to show that the questions Machery and colleagues asked participants in their study were ambiguous, and that this ambiguity affected the responses given by Westerners. Sytsma and Livengood took their results to cast doubt on the claim that the current evidence indicates that there is cross-cultural variation in intuitions about the Gödel case. In this paper we report on a new cross-cultural study showing that variation in intuitions remains even after controlling for the ambiguity noted by Sytsma and Livengood