S. M. Love

The foundation of the Kantian theory of right is the one innate right to freedom. Here, I offer a comprehensive philosophical comparison between Kantian rightful freedom and the conception of freedom as negative liberty or non-interference, a hugely influential view in terms of which Kantian rightful freedom is often understood. This fruitful comparison clarifies the fundamental differences between the two views, emphasizing the resources the Kantian approach offers for contributing to contemporary debates on freedom as a distinctive rights-based republican view. This Kantian perspective also offers a useful lens for critiquing negative-liberty-based views, revealing a dilemma they face.

What economic system does a Kantian ideal of freedom entail? In Living with the Invisible Hand, Waheed Hussain argues it entails intermediated capitalism. Here, I investigate these arguments within the framework of a Kantian theory of right. I sketch a Kantian theory of equal democratic government where we have the right to make together through equal democratic processes decisions that structure our rightful relationships with one another. I argue that any plausible Kantian view of the natural determinacy of property rights justifies extensive government intervention in the economy, creating space to argue for alternative economic systems such as intermediated capitalism.

Contemporary republican political theory, with its general commitment to freedom from domination, offers a powerful critique of social subordination. Here, I develop a novel republican critique of social subordination within the framework of a Kantian theory of right. The foundation of Kantian political philosophy is the right to freedom, which includes a general right not to be subordinated to others under law. Within this Kantian framework, wrongful social subordination is injustice that we have the right to be free of rather than something we should seek to minimize. Further, freedom from subordination is not an absolute right, nor is it the only right: not all social subordination is unjust, and there are forms of injustice beyond social subordination. Given these distinctive features, I argue that Kantian republicanism can enrich contemporary republicanism more broadly, as it enables nuanced and principled distinctions between different forms of social subordination while also making it possible to argue that particular forms of social subordination are unjust and categorically impermissible.

The article argues that Kant’s argument for ownership entails a standard of meaningful use by which property regimes can be evaluated: a regime must make it possible for usable objects to be meaningfully used. A particular form of fully communal ownership can satisfy this standard. Further, this form of communal ownership is compatible with Kantian freedom more broadly. I conclude that, if this is so, there is a great deal of space for further consideration of the rightfulness of diverse regimes of ownership and exchange within a Kantian framework.

While there are many points of opposition between the political philosophies of Marx and Kant, the two can greatly benefit from one another in various ways. Bringing the ideas of Marx and Kant together offers a promising way forward for each view. Most significantly, a powerful critique of capitalism can be developed from their combined thought: Kant’s political philosophy offers a robust idea of freedom to ground this critique, while Marx provides the nuanced understanding of social and political power structures under capitalism that allows this idea of freedom to be properly applied.

Socialism has long been thought by many to be the enemy of freedom. Here, I argue that in order to understand the relationship between socialism and freedom, we must have a better idea both of what socialism is and of what it is to have a right to freedom. To start, I argue that the right to freedom is best understood as a right to direct one’s own will in the world consistently with the rights of others to do the same. This Kantian conception of the right to freedom is importantly different from the ubiquitous conception of freedom as negative liberty: with this Kantian conception, one’s right to freedom is limited to directing one’s own will and does not include a right to direct the wills of others. I then argue that socialism, like the right to freedom, is often misunderstood: today, socialists often argue for robustly democratic forms of socialism that are far from the autocratic so-called “socialist” regimes of the last century. With a better understanding of both socialism and the right to freedom, we can see that the right to freedom is indeed compatible with a robustly democratic form of socialism.