S. Miller

In this paper it is argued that: (1) political rights and obligations are a species of institutional (moral) right and obligation (respectively) and are not, therefore, natural rights and obligation; (2) political rights and obligations in a given polity are not simply aggregates of individual rights and obligations rather they are joint political rights and obligations; (3) the exercise of these joint rights, and the concomitant discharging of these joint obligations, is (i) a collective good in itself; (ii) productive of the collective good of legitimate government, and (iii) productive of the collective good of the coordination and regulation of other social institutions (government is a meta-institution), and (4) the procedure of voting in a democratic polity is a joint institutional mechanism – understood as a particular construction out of the notion of a joint action – and a specific expression of the joint right and obligation to engage in political participation.

This chapter addresses predictive policing, which is a term that refers to a range of crime-fighting approaches that use crime mapping data and analysis, and, more recently, social network analysis, big data, and predictive algorithms. The rise of predictive policing, especially in many police jurisdictions in large cities in the USA, has raised the spectre of the surveillance society in which citizens can be arrested by police for crimes they have not yet committed on the basis of evidence that they will commit them. Speaking generally, predictive policing faces several problems. Some of these are problems for predictive policing even in its own terms of contributing to crime reduction. Others are moral problems, about whether predictive policing violates moral rights or is unjust. These two types of problems are interconnected. Ultimately, the expanding use of biometric facial recognition databases and other emerging technologies in law enforcement as part of predictive policing should be clearly and demonstrably justified in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the service of specific law enforcement purposes rather than by general appeals to community security or safety. Moreover, it should comply with moral principles constitutive of liberal democracy, such as the principle that individuals have a moral right to freedom from state interference absent prior evidence of violation of its laws.

Cyberwar is a new form of conflict. Contemporary nation-states and, for that matter, nonstate actors such as corporations, now suffer and inflict ongoing cyberattacks on a large scale. Whether these attacks constitute war rather than conflict short of war or mere breaches of security (criminal or otherwise) is not always entirely clear. This chapter distinguishes between cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cybercrime, cyberespionage, and what the chapter refers to as “covert political cyberaction”—a species of covert political action. The chapter argues that many, if not most, cyberattacks perpetrated by nation-states on other nation-states for political reasons are best understood neither as acts of war nor as crimes but rather as a new form of covert political action—that of covert political cyberaction. The chapter argues that much covert political cyberaction is best understood as a species of dirty hands action; harmful and unlawful action undertaken to achieve an (alleged) greater good.

This article is concerned with three key ethical issues that arise from the use in military combat of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). The first issue concerns the unpredictability of LAWS in respect of the requirement of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) – as opposed to machine control - in theatres of war. It is argued that the unpredictability of (especially) ‘self-learning’ LAWS is not necessarily a barrier to their morally acceptable use under some restricted conditions. The second issue concerns a normative framework for ascribing moral and, potentially, legal responsibility in respect of LAWS, i.e., the so-called responsibility gap. It is argued that the notion of collective responsibility is potentially helpful here. The third issue concerns human on-the-loop LAWS. It is argued that whereas human out-of-the loop weapons should be prohibited, nevertheless, under certain restrictive conditions some human on-the-loop LAWSs (as well as human in-the-loop LAWSs) may be morally acceptable.

Participation in experimental studies can be conceptualized as Goffmanian frames, i.e. a set of rules which include the fact the experimenter will be observing participant behavior through (the recording of) the experiment. This study is focused on frame breaches in 16 video- and audio-recorded dyadic conversations taking place in an experimental setting. Our main conclusion is that the experimental frame is conceptualized by participants as including constraints that go beyond non-experimental interactions, and in particular the need to mitigate frame breaches, which are seen as face-threatening. Analyses revealed that participants only broke the research frame after they completed the task they were assigned by the researcher, and that breaches did not necessarily correspond to changes in key. Insights gained in relation to face and mitigation are discussed, as well as the participants’ need to determine their next steps once the research purpose has been perceived complete.

Undoubtedly, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a wake-up call to the scourge of global terrorism facing twenty-first century societies. But was the attack on the World Trade Center a crime or an act of war? Is seemingly indiscriminate violence inflicted on civilians ever morally justified? And should society's response always be in kind – with blind, destructive violence? For that matter, are all civilians truly ‘innocent’? The answers are not always so simple._ _Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy__ provides sobering analyses of the nature of terrorism and the moral justification – or lack thereof – of terrorist actions and counter-terrorism measures in today's world. Utilizing a variety of thought-provoking philosophical arguments, the historic roots of terrorism and its contemporary incarnations are explored in depth. Detailed analyses of organizations such as the IRA, the ANC, Hamas and Al-Qaeda will reveal the many faces of terrorism and its disparate motives and tactics. Discussion of the nature and scope of terrorism and whether it can ever be morally justified is balanced with analysis of counter-terrorism strategies and the methods and moral limits of counter-terrorism._ _Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism__ will greatly broaden our understanding of the nature and morality of terrorism and counter-terrorist pursuits – a crucial precondition for establishing any form of enduring peace between nations in the twenty-first century world.

What obligations and responsibilities, if any, do adult children have with respect to their aged parents? This paper briefly considers the socio‐historical and legal bases for filial obligations and suggests there is a mismatch between perceptions in the community over what they see as their obligations, what policy makers would like to impose and how philosophers identify and ground these obligations. Examining four philosophical models of filial obligation, we conclude that no one account provides an adequate justification for the types of responsibility that might be assumed in a family relationship.

This study delves into the influence of intelligent compaction (IC) systems on the perceptions and actions of roller operators in road pavement practices. These operators occasionally tend to ignore these IC systems or even turn them off while performing their tasks. A major question is why the operators don’t always use IC systems. By using the technological mediation approach, operators’ reasons for ignoring or even turning IC systems off in road pavement practice are explored. In the technological mediation approach, users and technologies co-shape each other. Based on semi-structured interviews with roller operators, experiences with these systems are investigated. Physical, cognitive, and contextual mediation through IC systems is related to behavior-changing strategies encompassing coercive and persuasive interventions, as well as decisive designs. These interventions are now experienced as conflicting with the individual autonomy and responsibility of the operators for the quality of work. Because IC systems amplify certain facets of reality while reducing others, roller operators must ensure that the output of an IC system is judged in the light of the specific project context. Given their “thrownness” in such a specific context, operators’ experience and tacit knowledge remain important for taking action.

In this article, firstly, cooperative interaction between robots and humans is discussed; specifically, the possibility of human/robot joint action and (relatedly) the possibility of robots occupying institutional roles alongside humans. The discussion makes use of concepts developed in social ontology. Secondly, certain key moral (or ethical—these terms are used interchangeably here) issues arising from this cooperative action are discussed, specifically issues that arise from robots performing (including qua role occupants) morally significant actions jointly with humans. Such morally significant human/robot joint actions, supposing they exist, could potentially range from humans and robots jointly caring for the infirm through to jointly killing enemy combatants.

In this article on collective responsibility, the concern is twofold. First, several types of collective responsibility are distinguished: principally, collective natural, institutional, and moral responsibility. Second, numerous modes of application of various kinds of collective responsibility are identified and analyzed, including collective responsibility for the outcomes of joint institutional mechanisms (such as voting systems), for organizational action (by multi-layered structures of joint action), and the outcomes of chains of institutional responsibility (such as the verdicts of juries in criminal trials). Throughout, the concept of collective responsibility as joint responsibility is used.

Scientific freedom is rightly extolled as an important moral and intellectual value. However, as is often noted, with freedom comes responsibility; Scientific freedom is no different in this respect. However, science is essentially a cooperative enterprise that typically takes place in institutional settings and is shaped by institutional purposes. Therefore, scientific freedom, properly understood, is in large part an expression of the intellectual freedom of scientists engaged in cooperative epistemic activity in organisations, such as universities and firms. Accordingly, the responsibilities of scientists and technologists are a species of collective responsibility. In this chapter I argue that collective responsibility is essentially joint responsibility and, therefore, a species of relational individual human responsibility. I distinguish institutional responsibility from moral responsibility, and both from mere causal responsibility. In doing so I also rely on the analysis of the organized, indeed organisational, action of scientists in terms of my notion of a layered structure of joint epistemic actions. This analytical notion allows me to ascribe collective moral responsibility to scientists, at least in principle, both for the bad, as well as the good, outcomes of their research. It paves the way for scientists and technologists to be ascribed moral responsibility (jointly with legislators, regulators etc.) for devising training programs, regulations and so on to deal with dual use issues. I also consider various collective actions problems that exacerbate dual use problems.

Cyber-technology is a new and emerging area of dual use concern. Consider autonomous robots. On the one hand, autonomous robots can provide great benefits, e.g. providing for the health and safety of elderly invalids. On the other hand, autonomous robots have the potential to enable great harm, e.g. weaponised autonomous robotsWeaponised autonomous robots (so-called ‘killer robotsweaponised autonomous robotsKiller robots’). As we have seen, the intended great harm is typically delivered by a weapons system of some sort, e.g. chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. Cyber-technology is apparently no different in this respect since, after all, there are so-called cyber-weapons, such as the StuxnetStuxnet virus virus used to shut down Iranian nuclear facilities. In this chapter the definition of dual use technology elaborated in Chap. 10.1007/978-3-319-92606-3_2 is modified in light of some distinctive properties of cyber-technology. This modified definition is applied to cyber-technology with a view to identifying cyber-technologies that are dual use technologies. It is concluded that weaponised autonomous robotsWeaponised autonomous robots, various forms of computer viruses, and ransomware are dual use technologies, but that the internet and other forms of cyber-infrastructure are not.

Scientific knowledge—a species of collective knowledge—contributes greatly to human well-being; yet scientific knowledge enables technologies that can be extremely harmful. Accordingly, the question arises as to whether we ought to aim at ignorance and, in particular collective ignorance, rather than scientific knowledge, of certain technologies. We might do this by means of banning certain scientific research, e.g. into biological weapons, and/or by censorship of certain scientific findings. In this chapter I provide a taxonomy of concepts of collective knowledge (e.g. public propositional knowledge, expert practical knowledge) and an account of the related concepts of collective ignorance. In doing so my concern is with the concepts of collective knowledge and ignorance relevant to harmful technology and, especially, scientific knowledge/ignorance in the chemical industry, nuclear sciences, cyber-technology field and biological sciences relevant WMDs—such knowledge/ignorance being salient in discussions of dual use issues.

Scientific research leading to the production of chemical agents and technologies enables malevolent agents to engage in harmful behaviour by way of a number of different pathways. For example, scientific research led to knowledge-how to aerolize chemicals for crop dusting (benefit); yet this discovery also made possible the aerolizing of chemicals for use in weaponry (harm). For nation-states (especially) can and do directly establish chemical weapons research programs. However, according to the definition in this book weapons research programs, including chemical weapons research programs, are not dual use because weapons are designed in the first instance to cause harm, and this is the case even if the weapons in question are developed for defensive rather than offensive use. Naturally, at least in principle, chemical weapons research might be conducted not with the intention of making and potentially using chemical weapons, but rather with the intention merely of understanding the functioning of such weapons so as to enable (say) the design and production of protective clothing in case of a chemical weapons attack by one’s enemies. Such weapons research might be dual use in our favoured sense. It is also argued in this chapter that the management of dual use risks in chemical research should be seen as a collective moral and institutional responsibility of multiple actors that can only be fulfilled with a Web of prevention (an integrated suite of regulatory measures).

There are a number of different preliminary definitions of dual use familiar in the literature. Research or technology is dual use if it can be used for both: (1) Military and civilian (i.e. non-military) purposes; (2) Beneficial and harmful purposes—where the harmful purposes are to be realised by means of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); (3) Beneficial and harmful purposes—where either the harmful purposes involve the use of weapons as means, and usually WMDs in particular, or the harm aimed at is on a large-scale but does not necessarily involve weapons or weaponisation. I favour the third definition of “dual use”—at least as a preliminary definition—since some dual use research, such as Gain Of Function (GOF) research research in the biological sciences, need not involve a process of weaponisation or a military purpose. However, further conceptual unpacking is called for and provided in this chapter.

The problem of dual-use science research and technology arises because such research and technology has the potential to be used for great evil as well as for great good. On the one hand, knowledge is a necessary condition, and perhaps a constitutive feature, of technologies that contribute greatly to individual and collective well-being. Consider, for example, nuclear technology that enables the generation of low cost electricity in populations without obvious alternative energy sources. So technological knowledge is a good thing and ignorance of it a bad thing. On the other hand, these same technologies can be extremely harmful to individuals and collectives. Consider, for example, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and NagasakiHiroshima and Nagasaki. So it seems that, at least with respect to some technologies, knowledge is a bad thing and ignorance a good thing. Accordingly, the question arises as to whether we ought to limit scientific research and/or the development of technology and, if so, which research or technology, in what manner and to what extent.

Developments in the biological sciences have produced great benefits, including in relation to the control of diseases. However, in the recent and not so recent past, a number of governments have sought to develop biological weapons, e.g. the large-scale biological weapons program in the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1992. Moreover, there have been a number of acts, or attempted acts, of bioterrorism, notably by the Aum ShinrikyoAum Shinrikyo in Japan. Techniques of genetic engineering have been available for some time to enhance the virulence, transmissibility and so on of naturally occurring pathogens. Recent developments in synthetic genomicsSynthetic genomics have exacerbated the problem even further. Accordingly, there is the very real possibility of malevolent individuals or groups acquiring pathogens that have enhanced virulence and transmissibility and releasing them into the environment with catastrophic consequence. Some obvious regulatory measures that might be considered in relation to dual use issues include: regulations providing for mandatory physical safety and security of the storage, transport and physical access to samples of pathogens, equipment, laboratories etc.; mandatory licensing of dual-use technologies/techniques/pathogen samples; mandatory education and training; mandatory personnel security regulation e.g. background checks; censorship.

The main arguments and findings in this work are summarised. Dual use issues are to be found in the chemical industry, nuclear industry, in cyber-technology and in the biological sciences. Moreover, they are exacerbated by collective action problems. However, they exist in a somewhat different form in different domains of science and technology, (e.g. nuclear vs. biological sciences), and in somewhat diverse institutional settings (e.g. universities vs. private firms). Therefore, the appropriate responses to the problem in these different domains of science and technology and different institutional settings may need to differ somewhat. That said, these domains and institutions do share some common general features. Firstly, in each case the dual use issues in question may call for restrictions on R&D research and dissemination of findings; something that is, generally speaking, antithetical to scientists and technologists. Secondly, they are a collective moral responsibility, e.g. of scientists and governments. Thirdly, the response needs to be multi-faceted and will typically involve a so-called ‘web of prevention’ (an integrated suite of regulatory measures).

Dual use problem exists in an acute form in the nuclear sciences and technology. For scientific research, technology and materials in the nuclear sciences have enabled, on the one hand, unbounded nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and yet on the other, massive arsenals of nuclear WMDs with the potential to destroy humankind. The nuclear industry has also facilitated the potential for malevolent actors to deploy ‘dirty bombs’ and created the conditions under which culpable negligence can result in nuclear disasters. Moreover, scientists and technologists have specific moral responsibilities, both individual and collective, given their central roles in nuclear power plants and government sponsored weapons programs, in particular. These include the collective responsibility to maintain collective public ignorance and not to enable collective expert knowledge in respect of certain expert groups. The generic solution to the kind of collective action problem to be found in the nuclear sciences, notably the nuclear weapons arms race, is at least in part an enforced cooperative scheme: enforced cooperative schemes are one important way to embed collective moral responsibility in institutional settings suffering from harm inducing collective action problems. This requires widening and strengthening existing institutional arrangements such Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also creating additional ones, especially in the area of enforcement.

In this article, firstly, cooperative interaction between robots and humans is discussed; specifically, the possibility of human/robot joint action and (relatedly) the possibility of robots occupying institutional roles alongside humans. The discussion makes use of concepts developed in social ontology. Secondly, certain key moral (or ethical—these terms are used interchangeably here) issues arising from this cooperative action are discussed, specifically issues that arise from robots performing (including qua role occupants) morally significant actions jointly with humans. Such morally significant human/robot joint actions, supposing they exist, could potentially range from humans and robots jointly caring for the infirm through to jointly killing enemy combatants.