Saad Malook

This article examines the philosophical perspectives of three substantial human development approaches by Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen, and Martha Nussbaum, and defends reverence as an ethical value vital to the development of human capabilities. These human development theorists focus on individual agency, the extension of human choices and ethical values of freedom and dignity. In general, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, T. H. Green, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls primarily provide philosophical foundations to these human development theorists. Mahbub ul Haq’s idea of extending human choices, Sen’s idea of freedom, and Nussbaum’s idea of dignity are key ethical values essential to human development. The central question is whether reverence, as an ethical value, could help drive human development. Although choice, freedom and dignity are vital, reverence is essential to human development because it protects people from humiliation, exploitation, oppression, discrimination and exclusion. Thus, this article examines the philosophical perspectives of Mahbub ul Haq, Sen, and Nussbaum within the human development approach and, by going beyond their development paradigms, argues that reverence is an ethical value crucial to human development.

This article presents an account of reverent republicanism that underpins an ethical framework comprising five moral and political values to foster human development and global peace. Republicanism, as a political theory, envisions a society in which citizens are not subject to humiliation, exploitation, oppression, discrimination, or exclusion by the government or by others. The key argument of reverent republicanism as an ethical framework proclaims that all citizens are owed self-respect, dignity, equal status, freedom, and fraternity, and no one is subject to humiliation, exploitation, oppression, discrimination, or exclusion, irrespective of their racial, cultural, religious, national, or linguistic disparities, because every human person has human worth with distinctive potentials for bringing about the common good – human development and global peace. Reverence comprises a myriad of ethical values – self-respect, dignity, equal status, freedom, and fraternity – that recognise the value of human beings regardless of their identity, race, culture, nationality, or religion. Reverent republicanism envisages a reverent government and a reverent society, meaning neither government nor civil society uses arbitrary power to oppress or dominate others, while both enshrine reverence in their conduct. In this account of republicanism, reverence as a moral and political value plays a key role in protecting and nurturing infinite human potential – creativity and rationality – so fostering human capital for peaceful coexistence. Lack of reverence leads to hubris and arrogance, thwarting the development of human potential and peaceful coexistence in society. Thus, reverent republicanism not only fosters human potential but also helps resolve conflicts, which ultimately lead to peaceful coexistence in the world.

This article posits and defends an argument that a cosmopolitan common mind approach is essential for resolving global challenges that cannot be resolved by individuals working independently from one another, such as achieving global peace, cleaning the environment, and improving public health. A ‘cosmopolitan common mind’ refers to an intersubjective recognition across states, cultures, or continents. This argument of the cosmopolitan common mind is centred on Philip Pettit’s theory of the common mind and cosmopolitanism. Pettit argues that a common mind is a shared mind. The standard account of cosmopolitanism claims that all human beings are members of the human community. This account is based on three key ideals: individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. Cosmopolitanism considers individuals rather than groups, nations, or states, giving them equal moral status across the world without any discrimination. A cosmopolitan common mind can direct collective actions across cultures or continents to resolve global problems. Terrorism and climate change are global problems that are not the products of individual actions but collective actions. For instance, pollution is created by many people working together. If people all together create pollution, they all together can stop it. The problems of establishing global peace and clean ecology are similar to preventing pollution because they are beyond the ability of any lone individual to solve. If it is not impossible, there is a need to develop a cosmopolitan common mind to acquire the common good. The research concludes that the cosmopolitan common mind approach can be a promising framework for resolving contemporary global challenges. In qualitative research methodology, I use empirically informed philosophical analysis to critically evaluate documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and the proceedings of conferences and congresses.

This article introduces a strategic decision-game theoretic approach, the Pardoner’s Dilemma, and juxtaposes it with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Game theory has emerged as a significant approach in the twentieth century for explaining strategic decision-making in numerous arenas, including economics, business, politics, ethics, international relations, biology, law, and war studies. ‘Game theory’ explains how and why players/actors/agents cooperate or conflict to procure their self-interests in a social world. Life is a game, and human, corporate, and artificial intelligent agents are players who play different games to maximise utility or minimise disutility. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a promising game-theoretic approach that explains strategic decision-making in zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. ‘Strategic decision-making’ means that the outcome does not depend upon the actions of a player but upon all players. There are numerous essential game strategies, including tossing, negotiation, bargaining, balloting, competition, chance, power, and arbitration. Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a good game-theoretic approach, it does not allow players to use the key game strategies. In contrast, Pardoner’s Dilemma is a game theoretic approach that not only explains zero-sum and non-zero-sum games but also allows the players to use different game strategies, such as negotiation, bargaining, tossing, chance, balloting, competition, arbitration, and power. The article develops and defends the Pardoner’s Dilemma in the game-theoretic approach as an alternative to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The article claims that the Pardoner’s Dilemma is a more promising approach than the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the decision-game theoretic framework. By introducing the Pardoner’s Dilemma, the article enhances the scope of decision/game theory in social sciences.

This article defends Ibn Khaldun as a social holist philosopher. Ibn Khaldun is an Arab philosopher regarded as a proto-social holist theorist of modern social thought. The central thesis of social holism asserts that human beings are social creatures because they depend upon one another for their biological existence and the development of human cognitive potential. Many European philosophers since the eighteenth century, including Giambattista Vico, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried Herder, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Ferdinand Tönnies, contributed their roles to the development of social holism in the modern Western tradition. Significantly, after Aristotle and before these European social holist theorists, Ibn Khaldun developed his notion of social holism in the fourteenth century in the Islamic tradition. The key argument of Ibn Khaldun’s social holism holds that cooperation is essential for human existence. He makes a distinction between the sedentary and the nomadic social groups. Ibn Khaldun claims that Asabiyyah is the central value of the nomadic society. ‘Asabiyyah’ refers to ‘social cohesiveness’ which binds people together. Indeed, Ibn Khaldun is an essential philosopher because he is not only a bridge between classical and modern thought in Western tradition but also between Islamic and Western traditions. Thus, I argue that Ibn Khaldun is a significant social holist philosopher.

This article explains and defends reverence as a cardinal ethical value in the Western philosophical tradition, which was considered an underpinning value in ancient society, and it then gradually declined over time. Many contemporary Western philosophers embark on respect rather than reverence. Reverence and respect are not the same. Reverence is all-inclusive, while respect is limited. Reverence values the genuine person, while respect may flatter a powerful arrogant person. Reverence is a cardinal moral and political value necessary for decent politics, education, law, economics, and religion. Reverence is not only essential for becoming a perfect human person but also for instituting a good society. To expound the notion of reverence in the Western tradition, I select four significant Western intellectuals: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and Paul Woodruff. Goethe posits a tripartite account of reverence: reverence for God, Earth, and human beings. Russell argues for reverence in politics and education. Schweitzer not only developed his account of reverence but also lived his life according to it. Schweitzer declares that his life is his argument, which is reverence for life, life in all its forms. Woodruff intends to revive the notion of reverence in global politics and ethics. So, the article examines the accounts of reverence posited by Goethe, Russell, Schweitzer, and Woodruff and defends its role as a cardinal moral and political value vital for politics, education, and religion for acquiring the common good in the world.

This article examines the implications of utilitarianism for social justice, considering different cases of the trolley problems. Utilitarianism comprises a cluster of ethical theses, which have political and legal implications. In general, utilitarianism is assumed to augment the common good, such as pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, and utility, or to reduce pain, suffering, dissatisfaction, and disutility. The article investigates a key problem whether utilitarianism brings about social justice as a moral theory. In recent literature, many moral philosophers have developed several thought experiments, known as trolley problems, that help understand the utilitarian applications to social justice. Philippa Foot and others formulated several thought experiments to help explain the utilitarian difference between the maximum good and the minimum loss. Considering different cases of the trolley problem, I argue that utilitarianism does not do egalitarian justice to all people because it does not eliminate unjust inequalities in society. I hold that utilitarianism is an ethical theory without an egalitarian morality. John Rawls posited a landmark theory of social justice in contrast to the utilitarian notion of social justice. Utilitarianism does not provide social justice to the few, the minority, or the weak in the social world. So, utilitarianism is an inadequate moral theory for acquiring social justice. In qualitative research methodology, I adopt a method of an empirically informed philosophical analysis to examine documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and conferences and congresses.

This article critiques the account of the invisible hand theory that individual actions bring about macro-level social benefits. The standard account of the invisible hand theory asserts that individual actions, motivated mostly by self-interest, advance the common good inadvertently and unknowingly. The invisible hand theory provides explanation how social reality, such as emergence of language, social morality and culture, evolve through individual actions. The account of the invisible hand embedded in self-interest is generally attributed to Adam Smith. Adam Smith’s account of the invisible hand is centred on self-interest and freedom. In the invisible hand theory, freedom unfetters individual actions based on self-interests and promotes a kind of competition in an economic sense, which is known as capitalism. Certainly, the account of the invisible hand theory, which is based on only self-interest is un-Smithian. I argue that although the invisible hand theory provides an adequate explanation for the evolution of language, morality, culture, and market, it promotes an unbridled capitalism, which, in an economic sense, may cause malign consequences. In qualitative research methodology, I adopt the empirically informed philosophical analysis method to documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and proceedings of conferences and congresses.

This article explains and examines the ethical implications of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy for human development and global peace. The article addresses the problem of whether Kant’s philosophy advances human development and global peace. I argue that Kant’s philosophy promotes human development and global peace. The argument is based on the following premises: Kant’s moral philosophy supports reverence for humanity. Reverence for humanity promotes the cultivation of human potential, such as rationality. Kant considers rationality a property par excellence in human persons, making them superior to other animals; so, rationality is a guiding principle that makes human persons worthy of reverence. Rationality helps resolve conflicts among people in a society. Moreover, Kant’s political philosophy promotes cooperation among states, eventually leading to global peace. Peace and human development depend on each other: human development develops positive peace, and negative peace augments human development. Kant’s ethics of reverence for humanity promotes positive peace, while his politics of cosmopolitan rights creates negative peace among states. Negative peace is the absence of violence, while positive peace refers to activities affirming life. In general, Kant’s moral and political philosophy is characteristically rational and cosmopolitan, which strives to cultivate natural capacities among human persons across the states, which enhances human development and global peace. In the arena of qualitative research, this article uses the method of empirically informed philosophical analysis to examine journal papers, scholarly books, proceedings of conferences, and congresses.

This article investigates whether the politics of nationalism fosters human development and global peace. Nationalism is a political ideology that primarily gives birth to nation-states based on particular shared identities, such as religion, race, culture, or language. Empirical evidence shows that nationalism causes conflicts, which leads to violence, terrorism or war. On the one hand, nationalism gives birth to nation-states; on the other hand, it creates hostility in the world. However, Lahouari Addi argues that giving birth to nations and their nation-building are two different social phenomena. Addi contends that the public sphere and civil peace are the essential conditions for nation- building. Addi’s argument for nation-building is promising. In line with this argument, this paper asserts that the politics of nationalism should make human development and peace in their respective nation-states. To explain malign and benign aspects, the paper differentiates between two kinds of nationalism: negative and productive. Negative nationalism, based on the politics of exclusion, discriminates, humiliates, exploits, and coerces the people of other nations, which causes conflicts and, eventually violence. This strand of nationalism is inconsistent with human development and global peace. Instead, productive nationalism, based on the politics of inclusion, fosters a sense of reverence for humanity which supports self-respect, dignity, freedom, equality, and fraternity in the world. Productive nationalism helps develop human potential, which leads to positive peace through creative accomplishments, such as performing arts, literature, and sports. Thus, the research implies that the politics of productive nationalism creates positive moral values to promote cooperation among people within and across the nations, which fosters human development and peace in the world. In the domain of qualitative research, this paper adopts the methodology of empirically informed philosophical analysis to evaluate the documentary resources.

This paper aims to debunk the spectre of terrorism through social capital. At the advent of the twenty-first century, the menace of terrorism becomes a global phenomenon. Undeniably, terrorism is an evil. The central thesis of social capital theory holds that social relationships matter. There are three central elements of terrorism: politics, terror and ideology. Terrorists plan political strategies using certain kind of ideology to create terror. To deal with all these three elements of terrorism, social capital can be an effective weapon. For explicating the core contours of social capital theory, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. To deal with political, violent and ideological foundations of terrorism, I assert that social capital can be useful for countering all of these foundations. Putnam’s binding and bonding strands of social capital can potentially empower people to develop a social network between people, institutions and states to debunk political, violent and ideological roles of terrorism. Thus, a social capital of intellectuals can repudiate the ideological foundations of terrorism for bringing about global peace.

This article presents a critique of the contemporary realist political theory developed as an anti–thesis to the Rawlsian normative political philosophy. John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) fosters a colossal influence on the current Anglo–American political thought which defends that political philosophy ought to be an applied moral philosophy. It offers a normative standpoint. Political realists, on the other hand, argue that political philosophy should be independent of moral philosophy. It offers a realist standpoint. The core contention between these two standpoints is that whether political philosophy is (in)dependent to moral philosophy. The normative standpoint places ethics at the centre of politics while the realist standpoint places sociology and history at the centre of politics. In this paper, I examine the central contours of political realism to understand whether it can be consistent with political moralism. I conclude that reverence as a moral and political ideal could be a common foundation for political realism and moralism.

This article makes an exposition of the substantial cosmopolitan strands in Muhammad Iqbal’s writings. Cosmopolitanism is a philosophical approach that recognises human beings across nations to be members of a global tribe. This approach supports the idea of world citizenship, global state or global institutions. Individualism, egalitarianism and universalism are the key principles of cosmopolitanism. I argue that Iqbal is a cosmopolitan philosopher because his philosophical thinking is consistent with the core principles of cosmopolitanism and contains essential cosmopolitan aspects, including intellectual, moral and political. Iqbal postulates the idea of the human self that acquires the idea of a unique individuality which is compatible with egalitarianism and universalism in certain ways. Iqbal’s intellectual cosmopolitanism fosters the cognitive development of people for enhancing their creativity, which is based not only on the oriental and the occidental traditions but also on the inter-temporal epochs with an interdisciplinary approach ranging primarily from philosophy, religion and literature to science. Intellectual cosmopolitanism produces creative human agency. Iqbal’s moral cosmopolitanism develops certain moral values to make human perfection and human fraternity. Iqbal’s political cosmopolitanism envisions a federation of states in which people practising spiritual democracy in the kingdom of ends on earth create and sustains global peace. These strands in Iqbal’s philosophical ideas create a creative human agency, human fraternity, reverence for humanity, and global peace, respectively. Thus, I argue that Iqbal meets all the conditions squarely to be a cosmopolitan philosopher.

This article explicates the nature of social ontology. There are three social holist theses relevant to the problem: First, the individual and society are not independent of each other. Second, the development of the individual’s human potential depends upon the nature of society. Third, a good society cultivates rather than undermines human potential. To explore the problem, this paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit, two social holist philosophers, who belong to the Islamic and Western traditions, respectively. Drawing on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that the individual cannot develop human potential, such as creativity, without a society. Iqbal’s social ontology, based on his theory of egohood, asserts that the individual ego (the individual) develops in relationship to the holistic ego (society). Iqbal repudiates a totalitarian society while supporting an Islamic society based on the principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. In the Western tradition, Pettit posits an idea of holistic individualism by drawing on four contrasting social theories: atomism, holism, collectivism, and individualism. Pettit envisions a society that is neither totalitarian nor anarchic, but it is a creation of autonomous individuals. Hence, Iqbal’s and Pettit’s social ontological positions are significant to understanding the nature of society and their malign and benign roles in the social world.

This article fosters the significance of Muhammad Iqbal’s pacifist ethics in the post-9/11 world. In the post-9/11, there emerged a new world order in which violence emerged in many guises, including terrorism and war, which has devastated global peace since the advent of the twenty-first century. Undeniably, the threat of a nuclear war has been constantly harassing the world. Under these atrocious conditions, the question is whether Iqbal’s pacifist ethics could help achieve and sustain global peace. Iqbal was an empirically informed and trained philosopher in the early twentieth century in the Western and Islamic traditions. He witnessed the First World War and identified the factors of the Second World War, which had started just a year after his death. Iqbal identified that materialistic interests and colonial and imperial exploitations cause conflicts, eventually leading to violence and war. The recurrent problem is how we avoid the Third World War to sustain global peace. Iqbal’s ethics offer two ideas for achieving global peace: reverence for humanity and human fraternity. Reverence for humanity helps develop human potential, which promotes creative activities vital for positive peace. Human fraternity is the only dependable unity among human beings, despite their particular races, colours, cultures, or languages, for acquiring global peace. The article thus demonstrates the relevance and significance of Iqbal’s ethics in achieving and sustaining a peaceful co- existence in the world.

This article explains Muhammad Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity and determines how it fits with Islamic ethics. The cardinal goal of Islamic ethics is reverence for humanity. The Arabic expression ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’. The cardinal claim of Islamic ethics is that human beings deserve reverence because they are created with the best conformation. The Arabic phrase Ahsan al-Taqweem refers to the best conformation, which means a wide range of unique physical, metaphysical, moral, aesthetic and cognitive potentials. From a broader perspective, Islamic ethics foster reverence for humanity based on three primary moral and political values: equality, freedom, and fraternity. Drawing on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that all human beings are worthy of reverence irrespective of their racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic disparities because of their distinctive potentials, such as creativity, freedom, and knowledge. These potentials are preordained in human beings by birth. To develop these potentials, Iqbal posits his theory of egohood which fosters unique individuality. Under certain conditions, such as individual-society relationships, freedom, equality, and fraternity, Iqbal insists on developing these potentials to acquire the status of a perfect human. According to Iqbal, a perfect human is a God’s vicegerent on earth, who collaborates with Him in creation. Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity emancipates human beings from poverty, war, violence, humiliation, discrimination, exploitation, hatred, and destruction. Yet, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity furnishes human beings with prosperity, peace, self-respect, equality, dignity, friendship, fraternity, and survival on earth. Thus, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity is consistent with Islam’s ethics of reverence for humanity.

This article explains Muhammad Iqbal’s politics of spiritual democracy and examines its applications to Pakistan and the contemporary world. Almost an official doctrine has emerged that Pakistan's creation is the result of Iqbal’s philosophy. If it is the result of the intended or unintended consequences of Iqbal’s philosophy, the question is whether Pakistan has adopted the version of his democracy. Iqbal’s ‘spiritual democracy’ stands contrary to the European model of democracy. European democracy, according to Iqbal, is materialistic and acquires the interests of the individual rather than the interests of humanity. Iqbal used the expression “spiritual democracy” only once in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, but he did not explain it. Although Iqbal used the expressions: spiritual democracy, Muslim democracy, and Islamic democracy, interchangeably in his writings, he developed his idea of spiritual democracy by drawing on the key values of Islamic ethics, notably freedom, equality, and fraternity that posit the idea of an ideal society by discarding racial, cultural, ethnic, or linguistic disparities for acquiring the common good of humanity. This article explains four theses of Iqbal’s moral and political philosophy to make sense of his model of spiritual democracy: First, human beings have the potential to legislate laws to make this world livable. Second, all human beings are equal in the moral sense. Third, human beings are free and responsible agents. Fourth, human beings have fraternal relationships with each other. So, the article explains the salient features of Iqbal’s politics of spiritual democracy and determines its implications for Pakistan, and the contemporary world.

Muhammad Iqbal’s theory of egohood, also known as Khudi, selfhood, I-amness, or individuality, builds the foundation of his entire philosophical oeuvre. Despite a massive hoard of literature produced on the exposition of Iqbal’s theory of egohood, it is still elusive to grasp. Iqbal’s theory of egohood is a metaphysical theory that explains not only the ontology of the universe but also of human beings. An ego is an ontological substance: a unit of metaphysical or mental reality. This substance refers to the unique individuality of the existing beings. Iqbal's metaphysics of egohood contradicts the pantheistic metaphysics developed by Ibn al-Arabi's writings in the Islamic tradition. To make sense of Iqbal's theory of egohood, I investigate three questions: first, why did Iqbal posit his theory of egohood? I argue that Iqbal developed his theory of egohood to reject the pantheistic metaphysics, which undermines the individualities of God and humans as autonomous agencies. According to Iqbal's metaphysics, God and human persons refer to autonomous individualities. Second, what is Iqbal's theory of egohood? Iqbal's theory of egohood explains the ontology of the psychical (mental or immaterial) world, the organic (living physical) world, and the inorganic (non-living physical) world. Iqbal uses the expression Supreme Ego for God, while (finite) egos for humans and other entities of the universe. Third, what does Iqbal want to do with his theory of egohood? Iqbal wants to explain his social, moral, political, and religious philosophies with his theory of egohood. So, the article intends to make sense of Iqbal's metaphysical theory of egohood.