St Andrews, Scotland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  •  35
    What Logical Contextualism Cannot Be
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Logical contextualism is the view that ‘valid’ is a context-sensitive expression. An often-invoked motivation for this view is that, unlike traditional forms of logical pluralism, it appears to avoid the so-called collapse problem. In this paper, I argue for a twofold conclusion. First, I argue that the key tenets of logical contextualism require further development before the view can be fully assessed. Second, I argue that, even if we set this issue aside, logical contextualism rests on an unt…Read more
  •  245
    According to a prominent argument, logical pluralism arises due to the ambiguity – or other semantic features – of natural language expressions such as 'valid' or 'follows from'. In this paper, I show that this argument is unsuccessful. First, I argue that there is no compelling linguistic evidence for the claim that 'valid' and its cognates are ambiguous. As a result, logical pluralism cannot arise from the ambiguity of these expressions. Second, I point out that semantic considerations are gen…Read more
  •  683
    The papers contained in this collection were presented at the 24th Amsterdam Colloquium, organised by the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam, December 18–20, 2024. The Amsterdam Colloquia aim at bringing together linguists, philosophers, logicians, cognitive scientists, and computer scientists who share an interest in the formal study of the semantics and pragmatics of natural and formal languages. Besides the general programme, the 2024 edition f…Read more