Sabrina Little

ABSTRACT A virtue often neglected in character education is humor. Sometimes it is deprioritized to focus on virtues deemed more important. Occasionally, it is forgotten altogether. Other times, humor’s formation is regarded as incidental to the process of character formation, with the expectation that, as learners proceed through moral education, they are likely to come away decently well-positioned in their humor, too. This article explores how humor ought to be regarded in character education. It assesses humor’s status as a virtue, its moral and civic value, and potential liabilities. It defends the claim that, without a curricular emphasis on humor, students do not cease to laugh but laugh at the wrong things, and this is an obstacle to the overall success of character education. This article provides a preliminary account of how to educate humor, as part of a general sequence of character development.

On neo-Aristotelian accounts, moral virtues are often defined as dispositional traits to think, act, and feel in excellent ways, relevant to the virtue. However, not all moral virtues are dispositional traits. Some moral virtues are emergent properties that depend on both normative and non-normative traits, as well as situational features and resources available to the agent. In cases when moral virtues are emergent, several questions arise. These include how best to conceive of virtue phenomenology and the assumed predictability or habitual nature of virtue, such that one is reliably good long-term. Other questions include how moral luck features in one’s character and how to evaluate an agent’s freedom with respect to developing that property, given that emergence is contingent upon aspects of a person not squarely within their control.

Both Plato and Aristotle make use of an image of warped wood for virtue development. Just as a carpenter straightens warped timber by dragging the timber in the direction that opposes its natural warp, so, too, should we “drag ourselves away in the opposite direction, for by steering wide of our besetting error we shall make a middle course” (Aristotle NE 1109b). Moral virtue is a mean, and we are inclined by nature to different faults. To draw closer to the mean, we can act in terms of an opposing vice, thereby correcting our natural warp. This article assesses the plausibility and empirical adequacy of overcorrection as a strategy for virtue development. It examines what happens internally when someone acts in terms of an opposing vice, and it explores the possibility that an opposing vice might stick.

Code-switching is the adjustment of one’s speech, behaviors, or appearance across various contexts. Sometimes we code-switch to adapt to the communication norms of different groups, and sometimes we code-switch from social necessity. In many cases, code-switching is not morally blameworthy. It demonstrates an agent’s discernment or practical wisdom in navigating various situations. However, not all cases of code-switching are compatible with a good moral character. Many cases of code-switching involve a kind of impression management or doublespeak that can compromise integrity. This article examines the conditions under which code-switching is duplicitous. More specifically, it explores code-switching regarding theological identity and plausible psychological and spiritual repercussions of code-switching for the agent.

Aristotle names two emotions that prepare a learner for virtue, which become less critical in the virtuous person. The first is emulation, which incites a learner to imitate the excellences of another. The second is shame. Shame is a means by which someone learns the actions she ought not perform and is motivated to not perform them. This article has two objectives. It examines the role these emotions play in virtue development, as emotional ‘training wheels’ for virtue, and explores how these emotions appear differently in virtuous agent. Next it proposes two additional virtue developmental aids—empathy and guilt. Empathy inclines us to perform good actions, but there are reasons to question how well it supports virtue long-term. Guilt likewise motivates good actions but is an unsuitable motivation for virtue.

The idea that sports can be used to shape a person in preparation for citizenship is not a new one. It was first articulated by the ancient Greeks, who employed physical training alongside poetry to form learners in virtue, so that they could contribute meaningfully to the polis. This article explores how, practically speaking, sports leadership today can use physical training toward the same end. It examines the value of sports in the acquisition of civic virtues. It also explores some of the difficulties in using sporting activities for character development, such as how competitive objectives can undermine community and whether values pluralism is an obstacle to coaching for citizenship.

A virtue often neglected in character education is humor. Sometimes it is deprioritized to focus on virtues deemed more important. Occasionally, it is forgotten altogether. Other times, humor’s formation is regarded as incidental to the process of character formation, with the expectation that, as learners proceed through moral education, they are likely to come away decently well-positioned in their humor, too. This article explores how humor ought to be regarded in character education. It assesses humor’s status as a virtue, its moral and civic value, and potential liabilities. It defends the claim that, without a curricular emphasis on humor, students do not cease to laugh but laugh at the wrong things, and this is an obstacle to the overall success of character education. This article provides a preliminary account of how to educate humor, as part of a general sequence of character development.

"The Examined Run provides an accessible treatment of what it might look like to use running as a laboratory for virtue development. This book engages many topics in the field of virtue ethics-virtue, vice, exemplarism, emotions, and competition-and places them in conversation with training and racing in endurance sports. The Examined Run explores happiness and success, competition and character. It investigates whether certain definitions of success conflict with being morally good, and whether certain virtues may be performance-enhancing in the world of sport. It asks whether athletes should strive to be "limitless," and it examines how to take seriously considerations of human nature in competitive sport. This book welcomes readers into a tradition of inquiry about character, flourishing, and suffering, so that they can ask better questions about what it means to live a happy life and how running might fit in"--

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Theories of Emotion: Expressing, Feeling, Acting by Pia CAMPEGGIANISabrina B. LittleCAMPEGGIANI, Pia. Theories of Emotion: Expressing, Feeling, Acting. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023. xiv + 199 pp. Cloth, $80.89; paper, $21.60In Theories of Emotion, Pia Campeggiani provides a philosophical introduction to the emotions. The book is multidisciplinary and empirically informed. It is organized around three “groundbreaking intuitions” of emotion theory—(1) expression, (2) subjectivity, and (3) action. Each section corresponds to a different thinker—Charles Darwin, William James, and John Dewey, respectively—and each section concludes with a discussion of relevant debates. This book is outstanding. It is clearly written, well organized, and impressive in its scope. In what follows, I outline key ideas and raise questions generated by each section, then conclude with general reflections on the text.Campeggiani begins with the “scandal” of emotion research: There is no agreement about what an emotion is. In part, this lack of consensus is due to the imprecise ways we employ concepts like feelings, emotions, affect, and passions in ordinary discourse. In part, it is due to empirical difficulties. For example, Campeggiani describes how implicit assumptions and a forced-choice format compromised an experiment about expression universality.Additionally, Campeggiani points out that the category “emotions” has an internal structure that lacks clear-cut boundaries. There are paradigmatic examples of emotions, such as fear and anger, but there are also ambiguous phenomena, such as respect and modesty, which we may or may not recognize as such. Throughout the text, Campeggiani introduces and evaluates numerous accounts of emotions, drawing our attention to the strengths, limitations, and empirical adequacy of each.Part 1 begins with Charles Darwin’s contributions to emotion theory—an emphasis on the biological origins of emotions and a focus on expression. This section examines emotions in connection to adaptive fitness, exploring phenomena such as blushing when we are ashamed and the biological bases of emotions. A highlight of this section is an exploration of the social or communicative character of the emotions, which Darwin described as “only a secondary effect” of expression. Campeggiani examines emotional contagion and imitation, as well as the [End Page 141] phenomenon of feeling more pain when we express pain on our faces. There is also a rich discussion about constructionism as an alternative to basic emotions theory.Part 2 opens with William James on subjective experience. Campeggiani describes the limitations of James’s position—of understanding emotions to be reducible to feelings. For starters, this position is not empirically well supported. Campeggiani cites Walter Cannon’s observation that “many of the autonomic changes that are symptomatic of a given emotion can also occur in its absence.” Additionally, James fails to “properly flesh out the link between emotions and evaluations.” Campeggiani then describes the cognitive turn in emotion theory that emerged in response to the lack of attention paid to evaluation. Cognitive accounts of emotion deemphasize the bodily dimensions of emotional experiences in favor of the intentional properties, or “aboutness,” of emotions. Emotions see things as things.From my vantage, this was the best part of the book. Campeggiani highlights Damasio’s point that decision-making depends on having a “correct affective perception of the values at stake in a given situation.” For instance, feeling outsized or misdirected fear may undermine our decision-making. Campeggiani also introduces debates about whether emotions are appraisals, and whether emotions entail judgments or make judgments more likely. In the introduction, she mentions that “decision-making processes are always and inevitably underpinned by emotions, for good and for ill.” We see what she means in this section. Emotions participate in reason, impede reason, and have cognitive content themselves.That emotions involve or participate in our judgments raises two kinds of concerns—epistemic and normative. The epistemic worry is that inaccurate appraisals may undermine our understanding of the world. This is especially worrisome for the class of emotions Campeggiani calls “recalcitrant,” or closed off to other mental states, and for the emotions she says are “heavily influenced by our needs and goals.” Emotions are imperfectly truth-tracking, as was made clear earlier, in part 1, regarding their adaptive nature. The normative worry is that certain emotional...

There are many reasons to worry about shame in moral development. Shame can be employed for bad ends, such as manipulation and making others feel powerless. Shame is often associated with denial and hiding behaviors, social phobia, and anxiety. It is also not a motivation suitable for performing virtuous actions. This article argues that, nevertheless, well-ordered shame plays an indispensable and constructive role, as part of a mixed-methods approach in the development of moral character. This article assesses various reasons why shame has fallen out of favor among Western moral educators and demonstrates why each of these reasons falls short of providing a compelling case against employing shame. It defends shame on epistemic and virtue developmental grounds. Moreover, it proposes ways to employ shame in character education, while mitigating potential damages and avoiding the concerns raised by social scientists.

The virtue development literature often draws on the language of goal-directed automaticity and flow states in discussions of virtue. This article examines the attentional features of various virtues and argues that only some virtuous actions can be adequately described in these terms. It proposes a distinction between three kinds of virtuous actions—flow state actions, deliberative actions, and presence actions—which have varying attentional features, bodily reliance, and conscious reasoning in virtue performance. Then the article motivates these distinctions as important, describing how one might take on-board these classifications in character education, providing a more tailored development of virtues.

ABSTRACT Mindfulness is an umbrella term for a set of practices and strategies related to attention and non-critical awareness of our thoughts. Mindfulness is currently having a moment in popular culture and in clinical psychology for its many perceived benefits. However, there are reasons to worry about whether certain commitments and strategies of mindfulness might conflict with long-term progress in character development. This article places mindfulness in conversation with developmental considerations of virtue, asking how mindfulness practices might impact the various stages between natural character and mature moral virtue in different ways. Moreover, it proposes a distinction between two kinds of virtues, presence and absence virtues, that are differently impacted by the continued use of mindfulness practices in the later stages of virtue development.

R.S. Peters coined the term the “paradox of moral education” to describe the I apply the resources of the classical tradition—poetry and gymnastics, the trivium, and the quadrivium—to examine recent strategies for character formation involving aretaic exemplars. I think there is forgotten wisdom here. We have a map of a productive pedagogical sequence of mixed methods in virtue education. For example, stories are paired with physical training. Virtue concept-learning comes next, and strategies involving imitation are adjusted as a student grows. I make the case that we should not think of virtue formation strategies as stand-alone tools, but as part of a broader narrative of training, suitable to age and building on the work of the methods that preceded them.

Admiration is often described as having a singular motivational profile – the disposition to imitate. This article provides a developmental assessment of admiration’s action-potential, proposing a series of stages between (1) naïve imitation, a basic mimetic impulse, and (2) non-imitative virtuous actions. The process is marked by an increasing ability to represent the actions and desires of another, becoming the middle term between the learner and the exemplar. This developmental assessment is necessary because the leading accounts of moral development today lean on the idea of imitation as essential to the process of virtue acquisition without providing an explanation of how imitation works, psychologically speaking. Moreover, these accounts treat imitation as a static disposition, rather than one that matures over time. Insight regarding this developmental progression can provide us with a better sense of how to educate using exemplars in order to advance a learner from admiration to moral virtue. This article also fills in gaps in the admiration literature concerning how we regard inimitable excellences and contends that it may not be beneficial to emulate an exemplar’s motivations, in addition to her actions.