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The Phenomenal Basis of IntentionalityOxford University Press. 2018.Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and…Read more
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The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and UnderstandingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 285-318. 2017.One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue …Read more
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University of Western OntarioMasters student
London, ON, Canada
Areas of Interest
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PhilPapers Editorships
Memory |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |