Saeed Javdaniyan

This article reexamines the status of logic in Suhrawardi’s philosophy of illumination, challenging the widespread interpretation according to which his thought stands in opposition to rationality. It argues that Suhrawardi does not reject logic but redefines its epistemic function: it operates as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of knowledge, functioning as a preparatory discipline for the direct manifestation of truth as luminous presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī). The analysis develops a meta-logical interpretation of this shift, showing that the criterion of truth is transferred from inferential validity to ontological self-evidence. It follows that rationality is not abandoned but structurally subordinated to a more fundamental regime of manifestation, in which truth is given as immediate presence rather than discursive representation. On this basis, the article reconstructs the illuminationist framework as an epistemologically stratified model that articulates discursive coherence and non-discursive evidence, and critically examines the tensions that arise from it, particularly with regard to the status of evidence, intersubjectivity, and the possibility of error. It concludes that Suhrawardi articulates a paradigm of rationality grounded in the primacy of manifestation, while also exposing difficulties related to epistemic validation.

This article examines the logical admissibility of religious propositions through the framework of Suhrawardi’s logic. It does not seek to confirm or refute religious claims, but to assess whether such propositions satisfy the minimal conditions required for epistemic evaluation. Four criteria derived from Suhrawardi’s logic structure the analysis: definability of the subject, self-evidence as the starting point of cognition, the capacity to generate genuine knowledge, and the preservation of the distinction between existence and essence. The study suggests that many widely employed religious propositions encounter significant difficulties in meeting these logical requirements. They often lack clearly determinate conceptual content, may not provide a legitimate epistemic starting point, and do not readily culminate in analyzable knowledge. Moreover, by loosening or suspending the relation between essence and existence, they tend to resist rational assessment. Consequently, within this strictly logical framework, such propositions can be understood as tending to remain outside, or at best at the margins of, epistemic validity.