Sally J. Scholz

In this paper, I argue that Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion of festivals appropriates Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s own account of the festival and its place in understanding freedom. I begin with a brief summary of Rousseau’s conflicting accounts of the festival from his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Mankind and the Letter to M. D’Alembert. The contrast of these two texts reveals Rousseau’s conception of freedom as circumscribed by the community. Although Rousseau has an idealized virtuous community in mind, the central insight regarding a community’s involvement in the development of freedom is nevertheless echoed in Beauvoir’s description of the festival in the Ethics of Ambiguity. I explore some of the implications of reading Beauvoir’s account of freedom and the festival as influenced by Rousseau and suggest how doing so impacts our understanding of Beauvoirian politics.

This article examines the relationship between trust and solidarity. Juxtaposing trust and solidarity reveals how they are different and how they recursively build on each other. By looking specifically at trust in political solidarity, I argue for an account of trust within solidarity movements for social change, one that suggests avenues for creating and building trust, rather than merely presuming it. Finally, reflecting on the interplay between trust and solidarity, I end with a nod to the transformative impact of solidarity on communities.

Transgenerational political solidarity disrupts the dominant framing that identifies conflict between generations-the “problem of generations”-as the driver of social change. Political solidarity across generations offers a way of thinking about social justice movements as contributing elements to global social justice efforts through their work in acknowledging the historical rootedness of structural injustice and their commitment to continually reimagine solidarities. Attending to features of transgenerational political solidarity is useful for theorists learning from engaged work on the ground. Transgenerational political solidarity - collective movements for social change connected across past, present, and future - demonstrates the commitment to navigate through disagreement in a forward-looking manner, to find support in and echoes of the cause of past movements for social change, and to foreground the possibilities of future movements by situating collective action in relation to social justice understood in context.

In Political Solidarity, I argue that political solidarity is a relation between humans against an injustice that is human in origin. I further argue that political solidarity requires a decision-making model that acknowledges differences in social and epistemological privilege while also seeking to understand the situation of oppression or injustice and acknowledging “multiple, overlapping, and at times contradictory knowledge claims.” However, because of unequal commitments to solidaristic aims and because of a variety of methods for enacting solidaristic commitments, I argue that political solidarity is not necessarily democratic in its decision-making.In this paper I ask whether these arguments stand up ..

Although blame for systemic sexual abuse in the Catholic church primarily rests with the perpetrators and institutional actors who engaged in cover-up, regular people also failed in their duties, both their secular or civil duties and their moral and religious duties. Using the language of social sin, this article examines responsibility for social sin and the structures of sin that contributed to the abuse of children within the church community. Using the tools of Catholic social teaching—especially the framework of “conversion, communion, and solidarity”—the article articulates some tenets of social morality in the wake of sexual abuse and cover-up. A conversion experience is needed to see how ordinary actions unintentionally contribute to injustice and social sin, and how structures of sin lead to intentional decisions that would not otherwise be pursued. Catholic social teaching helps to provide a framework for thinking through some of the obligations of ordinary folks in the aftermath of the collective failure to protect children from abuse and the structural injustices that encouraged it to continue.

Jus post bellum, a relatively new addition to the just war tradition, offers a set of principles to ensure a just peace. The jus post bellum principles establish important guidelines for punitive and transitional justice in the wake of unjust aggression. However, sexual violence during conflict highlights some of the limits of relying solely on a rights-based approach to jus post bellum. Using the jus post bellum principles, I offer some suggestions for what might be required regarding punishment, compensation, and rights vindication for both individuals and communities, highlighting throughout the limits of relying solely on a rights-based approach to jus post bellum. I then argue that post bellum considerations need to account for the structural injustices of sexual violence in conflict situations. Doing so supports important social justice initiatives proposed for a global response to sexual violence in conflict aimed not only at punishment but at prevention.

Designing a successful graduate seminar should account for more than just the content to be conveyed and the completion of the standard seminar paper. This article dissects the seminar structure, revealing some of what is obscured by the “hidden curriculum” of graduate education, with an eye toward transforming the climate in philosophy. I begin with a brief review of literature on graduate teaching and inclusive teaching in philosophy. I then examine four components of a typical graduate seminar: the faculty instructor of graduate courses, the graduate students themselves, the material selection, and the course requirements. Reflecting on the graduate seminar compels revisiting learning goals, ensuring inclusivity and accessibility, and adopting a more intentional approach to graduate course design that ties course goals to specific activities and assessments for the life of the professional philosopher.

This article seeks to shine some light on the teaching demonstration from the perspective of observers using three guiding attributes of effective teaching: connection, commitment, and coachability. Discussing what observers are looking for and how observers interpret what is seen, the article presents the basic forms, common myths, and practical wisdom for teaching demonstrations. By reframing the goals of the teaching demonstration, the article demystifies a key part of the campus interview for the academic job market.

The Battered Woman Syndrome, like the Cycle Theory of Violence, helps to illuminate the situation of the person victimized by domestic violence. However, it may also contribute to the violence of the battering situation. In this paper, I explore some of the implications of the Battered Woman Syndrome for domestic violence cases wherein an abused woman kills her abuser. I begin by delineating some of the circumstances of a domestic violence situation. I then discuss the particular moral issue of subjectivity or moral personhood involved in instances wherein a woman victimized by domestic violence responds by killing her batterer. Finally, I argue that the Battered Woman Syndrome and similar alternatives to or qualifications of self-defense are problematic because they strip a woman of her moral subjectivity. I conclude with a brief articulation of a proposal for reform of the criminal justice system specifically aimed at cases wherein there has been a long history of abuse or violence. This reform is unique because it does not rely on a separate standard of reasonableness particular to battered women, but arises out of consideration of the moral implications of legal proceedings involving domestic violence.

Iris Marion Young took a strong stance against humanitarian intervention and other so-called legitimate instances of what she calls ‘official violence’. Nevertheless, she was also aware that there may be some situations for which military humanitarian intervention should at least be considered. Young was concerned that some states will use their obligation to defend against human rights violations as a mechanism in securing or maintaining global dominance. In addition, she recognized that what counts as a violation of human rights is not uncontroversial; human rights norms and conventions are interpreted, negotiated, and otherwise contested. In this article, I build on Young’s arguments for a social connection model of responsibility by applying it to a situation where a forceful response to violence might be justified. I juxtapose Young’s position with the emerging international standard called ‘the responsibility to protect’ in order to suggest an account of intervention for global governance relations.

This article examines the particular moral obligations of solidarity focusing on the solidary commitment against injustice or oppression. I argue that political solidarity entails three relationships—to other participants in action, to a cause or goal, and to those outside the unity of political solidarity. These relationships inform certain obligations. Activism is one of those obligations and I argue that violent activism is incompatible with the other relations and duties of solidarity. Activists may find themselves confronted with a difficult choice between respecting the relationships of political solidarity or employing physical violence in resistant self-defense against oppressive practices.

This paper looks at some prominent discussions of rape in war as a violation of human rights within Radical Feminism. I begin with a brief overview of United Nations declarations and actions on the subject of rape in war. I then look at some radical feminist accounts of rape in war as a violation of human rights with particular emphasis on the discussions of Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon. I conclude the paper with a critical analysis of these radical feminist accounts and show how our human rights talk must distinguish between types of rape in war situations or risk silencing the individual victims.

In this dissertation I argue that the dichotomy of the public and the private legitimates the marginalization and/or exclusion of individuals identified as members of oppressed social groups from active participation in the public sphere. I begin by delineating the conditions of systemic oppression and the role of the dichotomy of the public and the private in that particular form of oppression. Next, I critique a traditional usage of the dichotomy based on the systemic exclusion of women in the social contract theory of John Locke. The next two chapters discuss the efficacy of two different feminist reconceptualizations of the dichotomy. The first is Jean Bethke Elshtain's communitarianism which attempts to preserve the dichotomy by revaluing the private sphere. The second is the reconceptualization of the dichotomy by Frances Olsen who suggests transcending the split and recreating our lives to enforce an ideology free from a public/private distinction. Finally, in the last chapter I use the dialogic community and work-place democracy of Iris Marion Young to argue that in order to eradicate systemic oppression, social theory, in expanding the notion of the public, must be guided by the concerns of oppressed and differently situated groups

This article examines some of the conceptual history of collective political action within feminist movements beginning with sisterhood and moving to feminist political solidarity. I argue that feminist political solidarity is built on a commitment by individuals to form a unity in opposition to injustice or oppression. Three moral relations emerge from this understanding of feminist political solidarity: the relation to the cause, the relation among members of the solidary group, and the relation between the solidary group and the larger society. These relations evoke certain obligations and responsibilities which I present and defend. Feminist political solidarity is informed by the particularities of the cause and thus any theoretical account of the moral obligations is necessarily limited, but by looking at these three relations together with a sociological account of transnational feminist political solidarity drawn from Clare Weber’s sociological description of the Women’s Empowerment Project, a clearer picture of some of the moral requirements of a commitment to feminist political solidarity emerges.