Saloni de Souza

Garcia de Orta (1501–1568) is largely remembered in academic circles as a minor figure in the history of medicine. The son of converts from Judaism to Catholicism, he fled escalating persecution in Portugal and settled in Goa, where he practised medicine and wrote Colóquios dos simples e drogas da Índia, a dialogue that is generally viewed as nothing more than an unorthodox manual of tropical materia medica. However, here, I cast light on an important philosophical contribution that de Orta makes through this dialogue. I argue that he points to several epistemological failings made by most European natural philosophers in Europe. For de Orta, I argue, the tendency towards four forms of Eurocentrism is a significant cause of these errors. However, de Orta is prone to two of the very sorts of Eurocentrism to which he objects. He is therefore guilty of some of the same failings. Consequently, he makes for a complex opponent of Eurocentrism in the history of philosophy: whilst he provides a nuanced philosophical critique of Eurocentrism, he shows signs of struggling to entirely escape Eurocentrism himself.

Causation in the myth in the Statesman has received little detailed scholarly attention. Yet, it is clear that there is a complex and multilayered causal story at work. First, according to the myth, there is a cyclical, causal relationship between the god and the cosmos; at times, the Stranger tells us, the god guides the cosmos in one direction; at others, it lets the cosmos go and the cosmos rotates on its own in the opposite direction until such time as it is appropriate for the god to take charge again and revert to guiding the cosmos in the opposite direction. Second, the direction of the cosmos determines the kind of causation that happens inside the cosmos. When it turns in one direction, for example, men start life with white hair and wrinkled skin and their hair becomes coloured and their skin smoother, in contrast with biological ageing in the cosmos when it revolves in the other direction, which works in the way we are familiar. In this chapter, we examine this complex causal story. We argue that not only does it yield an interesting and consistent causal account, but it reveals different kinds of causes that interact in complex ways. Furthermore, some of these causes do not feature anywhere else in the Platonic corpus.

On Malcolm Schofield’s highly influential reading of the Similarity Regress in Part I of the Parmenides, the problem that the Regress poses is explanatory. Socrates posited the Similarity Form in order to explain why similar things are similar: similar things are similar because they participate in the Form Similarity as copies of the same original. Yet, the Similarity Regress generates an infinite series of Similarity Forms such that explanation is deferred ad infinitum. Schofield provides a philosophical incentive for adopting his reading. He argues that the treatment of similarity in Part II of the dialogue yields a complete explanation of similarity. If we adopt this account, we can avoid the Similarity Regress altogether since a Form of Similarity is not needed in order to explain why similar things are similar. Thus, his interpretation has a hugely important philosophical pay-off. However, there is a different way to read the argument. Socrates claims that each Form is only one. Yet, the Similarity Regress is an argument that generates an infinite series of Similarity Forms. This results in a violation of the principle of non-contradiction: there is both only one Similarity Form and infinitely many Similarity Forms. Yet, anything that is incompatible with the principle of non-contradiction is surely absurd. Nobody, as far as I am aware, has explored whether this reading also has philosophical pay-off if we look at it together with similarity in Part II. However, should this interpretation pay off, it would be a viable alternative to Schofield’s. In this paper, I explore both views in the context of the treatment of similarity in Part II of the Parmenides. I argue for an account of similarity that differs from Schofield’s. Although my account is not wholly dismissive of Schofield’s, it renders the pay-off of Schofield’s account less appealing than he suggests. Furthermore, I show that the account of similarity in Part II also yields important lessons for the proponent of the alternative reading of the Similarity Regress: similarity as treated in Part II simply leads to further infinite regresses, thereby pushing us to consider rejecting the account of similarity in Part II too and to look for some other account intead.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we build upon M.M. McCabe's [2021] characterisation of two accounts of logos and Socratic endeavour in Plato's Euthydemus. We argue that the brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are engaged in and committed to an endeavour which has features in common with Socrates’. It has an aim, rules, and is subject to failure. It is also a unified activity in which structure, process and continuity are important. However, the brothers’ only aim is impressing their audience and they seem to have no interest in knowledge, truth or the kind of moral development that Socrates values. They are also committed to very few of Socrates’ rules for conversation. Our analysis of the brothers’ project shows us that Plato presents us with an interesting problem: how we should respond to people who engage in conversation with us but with an aim that seems trivial and without the rules that we think are crucial for intellectual and moral development.