Sam Andrews

Metaphysical proposals are strongly influenced by epistemic considerations. Our capacity to know, explain or perceive influences theories about what is fundamental, exists or is true. These kinds of connections are pervasive as, for example, Fine (2012) and Schaffer (2009) base their metaphysics on explanation, Benacerraf (1973) and Peacocke (1999) base their metaphysics on our ability to know metaphysical truths, and Lewis (1986) and Jackson (1994) base their metaphysics on compatibility with contemporary physics. In each case, pertinent epistemic factors are used to motivate – provide reasons to accept or reject – particular metaphysical theories. This thesis examines significant epistemic factors, their connected metaphysical theories and the nature of the motivating connection exhibited between them to develop a novel approach to metaphysics: called ‘Epistemic Metaphysics’. To do this, in four papers, arguments are constructed in specific areas of metaphysics where epistemic considerations play central roles. Among others, topics covered include explanation, realism, normativity, laws, chance, dependence, empirical adequacy, and ontology. Then, by drawing inspiration from this wide array of philosophical arguments, a fine-grained account of the epistemic constraints on metaphysical inquiry can be composed; one that properly respects the intricacies of functional philosophical debate and provides general guidelines that are appropriate in any piecemeal application. Identifying the epistemic factors already employed in metaphysical arguments makes it possible to systematise the motivating connections into a set of general metaphysical maxims that constrain metaphysical theory choice: a framework for an explicitly epistemic approach to metaphysics.

Super-Humeans argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology.

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma.