University of Leeds
School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science
PhD
Duisburg and Essen, NRW, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Moral Psychology
Emotions
  •  60
    Emotional Fittingness Over Time
    Ethics 136 (3): 569-594. 2026.
    When and why is it fitting for emotions to change over time? This article defends a novel answer to this question that emphasizes the motivational aspect of emotions. It is fitting for emotions to change over time insofar as our reasons for being motivated to fulfill the goals of emotions change over time. For example, it is fitting for guilt to dissipate when the agent has successfully made amends because the facts in virtue of which the agent has committed a culpable offense no longer provide …Read more
  •  346
    Wrongness, Blameworthiness, and Overridingness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    According to the Overridingness Claim, if it is morally wrong for an agent to φ, then that agent has decisive normative reasons not to φ. A common argument for the Overridingness Claim appeals to the connection between moral wrongness and moral blameworthiness. I argue that this argument fails.
  •  886
    Dimensions of Emotional Fit
    The Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1): 125-146. 2025.
    Emotions are open to various kinds of normative assessment. For example, we can assess emotions for their prudential or moral value. Recently, philosophers have increasingly attended to a distinct form of normative assessment of emotions – fittingness assessment. An emotion is fitting when it is merited by its object. For example, admiration is fitting when it is felt towards the admirable, and shame towards the shameful. This paper defends a hybrid account of emotional fittingness. Emotions are…Read more