Samantha Fritz

In Lockean social contract theory, the state exercises its authority over territory through property rights. The state has territorial authority over the property it and its citizens claim. This authority is legitimate when the state has the consent of the governed and effectively governs. In this paper, I argue that there is an irreconcilable tension between these concepts of authority and legitimacy. I argue that because Locke's view is property‐based, his view cannot justify more than a piecemeal territory. A piecemeal territory, however, makes the government's job of protecting life, liberty, and property nearly impossible. If we push to have a unified account of territory, the consent of the governed is undermined. Either the Lockean loses legitimacy by failing to protect life, liberty, and property, or they lose legitimacy by failing to have the consent of the governed. If I am correct, then the Lockean has to give up either legitimacy or territorial authority—neither of which is a workable option. This leaves us with having to either look elsewhere to justify territorial authority, give up the idea of territorial authority, or explore political alternatives to the state.

In this paper, I respond to one aspect of Elizabeth Barnes’s argument in The Minority Body: a Theory of Disability. To do this, I first explain her argument as it applies towards children: in order to have a genuine “mere-difference” view of disability, one may not cause nor remove disability. The consequence of this theory is that it is impermissible for parents to choose to remove their child’s disability. I argue this is incorrect. Barnes’s assumption relies on a non-interference framework, which is inappropriate when applied to children. When we use an interest-protection framework instead, it becomes at least permissible for parents, and in some situations obligatory, to choose to remove their child’s disability. Because the permissibility or obligation is situationally dependent, this view is consistent with Barnes’s overall argument for the mere-difference view of disability.