Samuel C. Rickless

In _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, John Locke distinguishes between knowledge (which he defines as the perception of agreement or disagreement between two ideas) and assurance (a kind of judgment grounded on the highest degree of probability, where judgment is the presumption, rather than the perception, of ideational agreement or disagreement). There is controversy regarding whether Locke takes our epistemic relation to the external world (what he calls ‘sensitive knowledge’) to be one of assurance or knowledge. This chapter defends the assurance interpretation of sensitive knowledge, originally proposed in his article ‘Is Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Inconsistent?’ (_Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 2008), against criticisms of it offered by David Owen, Jennifer Nagel, and Keith Allen.

Most non‐consequentialists accept that, other things equal, it is more difficult to justify doing harm than it is to justify allowing harm. But there is a further question regarding the moral status of enabling harm. Rickless (2011), following in the footsteps of Foot (1967) and Hanser (1999), has defended the moral equivalence of enabling harm and allowing harm (MEEA). His case for MEEA, as well as MEEA itself, has been criticized by Barry and Øverland (2016), as well as by Lippert‐Rasmussen (2015). In this essay, I revisit this controversy and argue that MEEA and the existing arguments for it withstand all of these criticisms.

There is an apparent inconsistency at the heart of Mary Astell’s theory of virtue, for she seems committed to contradictory propositions: (1) that virtue involves alignment of all passions with their proper objects; and (2) that virtue involves the elimination or extirpation of at least some passions, such as pride, anger, hatred, and overwhelming sorrow. Jacqueline Broad (2015) has tried to solve this interpretive problem by suggesting that Astell recommends a two-step process for the virtuous management of one’s passions, with (1) occurring first and in the short term and (2) occurring second and in the long term. This essay agrees with Broad that Astell does not fall into inconsistency, but for different reasons. It argues that Astell consistently treats self-esteem, anger, hatred, and sorrow as unmoralized (i.e., neither virtuous nor vicious) passions that cannot, and hence should not, be extirpated, but that vicious forms of these passions, such as in the case of pride and overwhelming sorrow but also in the case of excessive anger and hatred, should be removed from the soul through proper redirection and adjustment in both the short term and the long term.

A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral decision-making that are revealed when the numbers and ratio of lives to be traded off are varied, and when the probabilities of each outcome occurring are less than certain. Four studies examine participants' reactions to scenarios that diverge in these ways from the standard ones. Study 1 examines the extent to which people are sensitive to the ratio of lives saved to lives ended by a particular action. Study 2 verifies that the ratio rather than the difference between the two values is operative. Study 3 examines whether participants treat probabilistic harm to some as equivalent to certainly harming fewer, holding expected ratio constant. Study 4 explores an analogous issue regarding the sensitivity of probabilistic saving. Participants are remarkably sensitive to expected ratio for probabilistic harms while deviating from expected value for probabilistic saving. Collectively, the studies provide evidence that people's moral judgments are consistent with the principle of threshold deontology.

In the Protagoras, Socrates appears to affirm and defend a paradoxical doctrine: the unity of virtue. Plato scholars do not agree on how the doctrine should be understood. Some, following Vlastos (1972), take Socrates to hold that the virtues are biconditionally related, i.e. that anyone who has one of the virtues has them all. Others, following Penner (1973), take Socrates’ position to be that the names of the virtues all refer to the same thing, namely virtue. In this paper, I argue that both of these interpretations are mistaken: the main thesis of the Protagoras is, very simply, that each of the virtues is a kind of knowledge or wisdom.

In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke’Essay is a unified, self‐consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke’s arguments for it are simple, valid and (in one case) persuasive as well.

In the First Section of the Groundwork, Kant argues that a good‐willed person “under subjective limitations and hindrances” is required “never to act except in such a way that [she] could also will that [her] maxim should become a universal law.” Call this argument “K”. Although recent commentators (including Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Nelson Potter, and Allen Wood) have done much to clarify and defend many of the important claims Kant makes in the First Section, they have accurately identified neither K's premises nor the reasoning by means of which K's conclusion is derived. The result of this is that K's strengths are underappreciated. My aim is to rectify this state of affairs, by providing a detailed reconstruction of K, and thereby bring out the various ways in which the argument deserves our recognition and praise.

There are two main theories of how express consent and tacit consent determine societal membership and political obligation in Locke’s political philosophy. On the “Serious Stake” interpretation, all and only those who have a stake in the community (including some who only tacitly consent to membership) are members of society. On the “Express Consent” interpretation, all and only those who expressly consent to be or become members are members, and tacit consent determines political obligation. This essay articulates a version of the Express Consent interpretation on which express consent to X is given by means of conduct that has semantic meaning sufficient to count as agreement to X. It then explains how this interpretation can meet standard objections to the Express Consent interpretation while avoiding the serious textual problems that face the Serious Stake interpretation

In The Hardships of the English Laws in Relation to Wives (1735), Sarah Chapone argues that the English laws governing marriage, including the common law doctrine of coverture, are cruel and unjust to wives. In a close study of this work, Jacqueline Broad (2015) argues that Chapone endorses a republican (or nondomination) conception of liberty, as the absence of anyone else's arbitrary, non-normative power to intentionally worsen one's choice situation without tracking one's own needs and interests with respect to matters of importance in one's life. In this essay, I argue that Chapone is better read as a rights-based moral theorist who argues that English laws are unjust by virtue of the fact that they give husbands (not the non-normative power but) the legal authority to violate the moral rights of their wives, and otherwise do not protect wives from being wheedled, coerced, or manipulated into giving up that to which they have a moral right. This picture is consistent with a non-republican understanding of liberty as the absence of interference rather than as the absence of domination.

Some of the most basic assumptions of Just War theory have been dismantled in a barrage of criticism and analysis in the first dozen years of the twenty-first century. The Ethics of War continues and pushes past this trend. This anthology is an authoritative treatment of the ethics and law of war by eminent scholars who first challenged the orthodoxy of Just War theory, as well as by “second-wave” revisionists. The twelve original essays span both foundational and topical issues in the ethics of war, including an investigation of whether there is a “greater-good” obligation that parallels the canonical lesser evil justification in war, the conditions under which citizens can wage war against their own government, whether there is a limit to the number of combatants on the unjust side who can be permissibly killed, whether the justice of the cause for which combatants fight affects the moral permissibility of fighting, whether duress ever justifies killing in war, the role that collective liability plays in the ethics of war, whether targeted killing is morally and legally permissible, the morality of legal prohibitions on the use of indiscriminate weapons, the justification for the legal distinction between directly and indirectly harming civilians, whether human rights of unjust combatants are more prohibitive than have been thought, the moral categories and criteria needed to understand the proper justification for ending war, and the role of hope in the moral repair of combatants suffering from PTSD.

In Some Reflections Upon Marriage, Mary Astell issues a famous challenge: “If all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born slaves?” This comment has occasioned a debate over whether Astell thinks that marriage is a form of slavery. Some (e.g., Joan Kinnaird and Patricia Springborg) argue that Astell’s comment is rhetorical or ironic, a subversive stratagem designed to expose to ridicule the tenets of contractarian liberalism. Others (e.g., Jacqueline Broad) argue that Astell adopts Locke’s account of slavery as the state of subjection to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another, and that in this sense wives are indeed the slaves of their husbands, and wrongfully so. In contradistinction to both of these interpretations, we argue that, according to Astell, there are two kinds of slavery, bodily and mental; that a wife is, by divine institution and hence permissibly, the bodily slave of her husband; and that, although mental slavery would indeed be wrongful, it is, by the very nature of the case, impossible for a wife to be her husband’s mental slave.

Matthew Leisinger (2020) argues that previous interpretations of John Locke’s account of akrasia (or weakness of will) are mistaken and offers a new interpretation in their place. In this essay, we aim to recapitulate part of this debate, defend a previously articulated interpretation by responding to Leisinger’s criticisms of it, and explain why Leisinger’s own interpretation faces textual and philosophical problems that are serious enough to disqualify it as an accurate reconstruction of Locke’s views. In so doing, we aim to shed further light on Locke’s views on the various ways in which humans are prone to err in their pursuit of happiness.

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies, we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non-moral intuitive probabilities.

John Locke’s views on the nature of freedom of action and freedom of will have played an influential role in the philosophy of action and in moral psychology. Locke offers distinctive accounts of action and forbearance, of will and willing, of voluntary (as opposed to involuntary) actions and forbearances, and of freedom (as opposed to necessity). These positions lead him to dismiss the traditional question of free will as absurd, but also raise new questions, such as whether we are (or can be) free in respect of willing and whether we are free to will what we will, questions to which he gives divergent answers. Locke also discusses the (much misunderstood) question of what determines the will, providing one answer to it at one time, and then changing his mind upon consideration of some constructive criticism proposed by his friend, William Molyneux. In conjunction with this change of mind, Locke introduces a new doctrine (concerning the ability to suspend the fulfillment of one’s desires) that has caused much consternation among his interpreters, in part because it threatens incoherence. As we will see, Locke’s initial views do suffer from clear difficulties that are remedied by his later change of mind, all without introducing incoherence.

Psychologists and philosophers who pose moral dilemmas to understand moral judgment typically specify outcomes as certain to occur in them. This contrasts with real-life moral decision-making, which is almost always infused with probabilities (e.g., the probability of a given outcome if an action is or is not taken). Seven studies examine sensitivity to the size and location of shifts in probabilities of outcomes that would result from action in moral dilemmas. We find that moral judgments differ between actions that result in an equal increase in probability of harm (equal size), but have different end-states (e.g., an increase in harm probability from 25% to 50% or from 50% to 75%). This deviation from expected value is robust under separate evaluation, and increases when the comparison between shifts is made explicit under simultaneous evaluation. Consistent with the centrality of perceived harm in some models of moral judgment, perceived harm partially mediates sensitivity to location of harm probability shift. Unlike for shifts in harm probabilities, participants are insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of beneficial outcomes. They are also insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of analogous monetary losses and gains, suggesting an asymmetry between harm and benefit in moral reasoning, as well as an asymmetry between moral and monetary decision-making more broadly. Implications for normative philosophical theory and moral psychological theory, as well as practical applications, are discussed.

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the nature and purpose of Berkeley's criticisms of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's ethical systems in the third chapter ofAlciphron, explaining the extent to which those criticisms rely on the truth of idealism and considering whether Berkeley or his philosophical opponents have the better of the arguments. In the end, I conclude that some of Berkeley's criticisms are based on confusion and misunderstanding, others are likely contradicted by the empirical evidence, and yet others are unconvincing. At the same time, the criticisms reveal that Berkeley's metaphysical and ethical views are, perhaps surprisingly, significantly intertwined.

O Parmênides de Platão é um diálogo notoriamente desafiador. Para apresentar uma interpretação completamente satisfatória dele, cada argumento precisa ser reconstruído em seus próprios termos e se todas as reconstruções forem acuradas, as interconexões lógicas entre os argumentos de ambas as partes do diálogo devem revelar a mensagem geral do Parmênides. Aqui gostaria de resumir minha interpretação e considerar algumas importantes objeções e alternativas a ela, particularmente como estas aparecem nos trabalhos de Constance Meinwald e Mary Louise Gill. Quero explicar por que a interpretação de Meinwald é significativamente menos convincente do que a minha e, como Gill e eu chegamos a conclusões semelhantes, quero destacar as diferenças importantes entre nossas interpretações.

o (2000), 243). In particular, the idea is that binding interactions between the relevant expressions and natural lan- guage quantifiers are best explained by the hypothesis that those expressions harbor hidden but bindable variables. Recently, however, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore have rejected such binding arguments for the presence of hid- den variables on the grounds that they overgeneralize — that, if sound, such arguments would establish the presence of hidden variables in all sorts of ex- pressions where it is implausible that they exist (Cappelen and Lepore (2005), Cappelen and Lepore (2002)).1 In what follows we respond to Cappelen’s and Lepore’s attempted reductio by bringing out crucial disanalogies between cases where the binding argument is successful and cases where it is not. But we have a deeper purpose than merely to respond to Cappelen and Lepore: we think the attempted reductio goes wrong by not taking sufficiently seriously the nature of the binding relation that holds between quantifiers and arguments/variables, and that our criticism will serve to highlight the nature and importance of this relation.