•  77
    Wittgenstein and concept‐extension in mathematics
    Philosophical Investigations 48 (3): 333-348. 2025.
    I begin by attempting to get a perspicuous overview of what Wittgenstein means by saying that a mathematical proof forms concepts. I then distinguish these sorts of cases from those we might call concept‐extending proofs, which, rather than introducing new concepts, function to enrich those concepts that have already been given a home in our mathematical practice. At the same time, I also want to argue that the line between these two sorts of proofs is not always clear and will sometimes be blur…Read more
  •  90
    We analyze two problems in mathematics – the first (stated in our title) is extracted from Wittgenstein’s “Philosophy for Mathematicians”; the second (“What set of numbers is non-denumerable?”) is taken from Cantor. We then consider, by way of comparison, a problem in musical aesthetics concerning a Brahms variation on a theme by Haydn. Our aim is to bring out and elucidate the essentially riddle-like character of these problems.
  •  57
    Wittgenstein on Mathematics By Severin Schroeder, Routledge, 2021. xiii+238 pp (review)
    Philosophical Investigations 47 (1): 154-157. 2023.
    Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
  •  92
    Wittgenstein on Miscalculation and the Foundations of Mathematics
    Philosophical Investigations 46 (4): 480-495. 2022.
    In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein notes that he has ‘not yet made the role of miscalculating clear’ and that ‘the role of the proposition: “I must have miscalculated”…is really the key to an understanding of the “foundations” of mathematics.’ In this paper, I hope to get clear on how this is the case. First, I will explain Wittgenstein's understanding of a ‘foundation’ for mathematics. Then, by showing how the proposition ‘I must have miscalculated’ differentiates mathem…Read more
  •  100
    Defending Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Cantor from Putnam
    Philosophical Investigations 45 (3): 320-333. 2021.
    Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 320-333, July 2022.
  •  71
    A Response to Dehnel's ‘Defending Wittgenstein’
    Philosophical Investigations 47 (2): 258-267. 2024.
    This is a reply to ‘Defending Wittgenstein’, Piotr Dehnel's critique of my article, ‘Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam’. I first show that my position is much more in agreement with Felix Mühlhölzer than Dehnel takes it to be, and that his criticism of me is nothing more than a failure to recognize this. I then show how Dehnel incorrectly reads Wittgenstein as rejecting set theory as false. It is an overemphasis on and a much too narrow picture of ‘applicability’ which leads…Read more