Samuel Montplaisir

The conceptualization of patient insight in psychiatry has been criticized for its lack of clarity. A standard view about insight is that it encompasses three components: patient recognition of their symptoms, attribution of such symptoms to a mental disorder, and recognition of need for treatment. This paper challenges the necessity of the second criterion for establishing insight and questions whether the three criteria alone are sufficient to establish insight. I then present an alternative to the second criterion framed in terms of adequate explanations for psychiatric symptoms. This alternative criterion seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of patient insight beyond the conventional framework.

The conceptualization of patient insight in psychiatry has been criticized for its lack of clarity. A standard view about insight is that it encompasses three components: patient recognition of their symptoms, attribution of such symptoms to a mental disorder, and recognition of need for treatment. This paper challenges the necessity of the second criterion for establishing insight and questions whether the three criteria alone are sufficient to establish insight. I then present an alternative to the second criterion framed in terms of adequate explanations for psychiatric symptoms. This alternative criterion seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of patient insight beyond the conventional framework.

The conceptualization of patient insight in psychiatry has been criticized for its lack of clarity. A standard view about insight is that it encompasses three components: patient recognition of their symptoms, attribution of such symptoms to a mental disorder, and recognition of need for treatment. This paper challenges the necessity of the second criterion for establishing insight and questions whether the three criteria alone are sufficient to establish insight. I then present an alternative to the second criterion framed in terms of adequate explanations for psychiatric symptoms. This alternative criterion seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of patient insight beyond the conventional framework.

'Que devrions-nous croire?' est la question centrale des débats philosophiques en éthique de la croyance, un champ complexe de philosophie contemporaine où se mêlent la normativité, les théories de la connaissance et la psychologie. Spécifiquement, ce livre aborde la question de si nous devrions croire certaines choses parce qu'elles sont vraies ou parce qu'elles sont utiles. Que croire lorsque les preuves s'opposent aux avantages pratiques d'entretenir une certaine croyance? Sous quelle condition devrions-nous croire quelque chose d'avantageux, bien que faux? Ces questions ne peuvent faire l'économie d'autres débats portant sur notre autonomie et notre responsabilité quant à nos croyances. De par ces chemins sinueux vers les horizons normatifs de la croyance se dévoilent des questions sur les limites de l'activité philosophique."--Page 4 of cover.

The argument against skepticism relying on content externalism, which was made famous by Hilary Putnam, has been considered inconclusive by many philosophers. However, some believe that this argument has precluded the possibility of skeptical hypotheses. These hypotheses typically are fictional scenarios where a deceptive power makes your experiences indistinguishable from those you would have if you were not in such a scenario, making most of your justified belief false. Some philosophers, such as Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul, have taken this problem seriously and, in response to Putnam, have developed an alternative to the argument from ignorance: the piecemeal fashion strategy. I wish to defend, contra Brueckner and Altschul, the idea that some skeptical hypotheses remain untouched by content externalism, making the piecemeal fashion strategy obsolete

L’objectif du présent article est de traiter de la question du scepticisme quant à la véracité des jugements moraux lorsque nous acceptons le réalisme moral. Plus particulièrement, je prendrai comme point de départ l’article de Ralph Wedgwood The Moral Evil Demons afin de présenter les deux types d’arguments qui peuvent nourrir un scepticisme moral. Je tenterai alors de montrer que les réponses de Wedgwood sont loin d’être concluantes tout en soulignant l’importance pour le réaliste moral de répondre de façon satisfaisante au défi du sceptique moral.