Samuel Pedziwiatr

Language and Reasons. On Julian Nida-Rümelin’s Humanist Semantics. As Julian Nida-Rümelin has shown, the possibility of linguistic communication is inextricably linked to the practice of exchanging reasons within our human form of life. This essay aims to illuminate the systematic relationship between reasons and language by critically reexamining some key considerations on the theory of meaning from Nida-Rümelin’s OEuvre. The paper begins with a general outline of the theoretical foundations of the project of Humanist Semantics, with particular attention to Nida-Rümelin’s deontological modification of the basic Gricean framework of communication. In a second step, the theory of Humanist Semantics is further differentiated from traditional intentionalist semantics and defended against various objections that have been raised against the Gricean model. In a third step, Humanist Semantics is situated within the broader context of the epistemologically coherentist theory of structural rationality.

This paper critically examines Wittgenstein’s remarks on Cratylus in their Nachlass context. In the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein compares his conception of language with “what Socrates says” in the dialogue but provides only an indirect reference (434a). This presents an exegetical difficulty that is usually glossed over. What does Socrates say according to Wittgenstein? Based on a close study of MS 111, TS 211–213 and MS 114, I propose a literal interpretation of the remark. Wittgenstein uses Socrates’ mimetic theory of names to illustrate antithetical causal theories of meaning. He contrasts Plato’s essentialist picture of language with his own grammatical approach and draws subtle attention to the dialogue’s core passage. This challenges the common misperception that Wittgenstein’s reading of Plato was ahistoric.