Sandra Lehmann

Sandra Lehmann continues on the previous discussion of the ontological grounding of truth by comparing Desmond’s metaxology to the revival of metaphysics in the New Realism of Quentin Meillassoux. While noting the superficial similarities between these philosophical projects, Lehmann clarifies that metaxology provides a more robust alternative to the anti-metaphysical philosophies of finitude of the twentieth century. Particularly prominent in her argument is that Meillassoux’s discussion of the ground of being does not allow him to escape the shadow of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, which is something more ably accomplished by metaxology.

Benjamin’s essay Toward the Critique of Violence has often irritated readers. This is even more true of his concept of divine violence, which is defined as “law-annihilating” and goes against legally sanctioned state sovereignty. In this paper, I present a new reading of both Benjamin’s essay and divine violence. Against an apocalyptic tendency of Benjamin, I argue that divine violence can only be an instrument of justice if it is understood as violence suffered rather than perpetrated. This is especially the case where people suffer persecution – imprisonment, torture, death – as a result of nonviolent resistance to an oppressive political regime. Only where such resistant suffering occurs, can violence properly be called divine. Only then does it offer a perspective beyond the never-ending atrocities of human history.

This article seeks to explore "the mystery of the plurality of metaphysical concepts" (Patočka). Following a Heideggerian line of reasoning, I will argue that it is due to the non-representational character of being that metaphysics splits into a multitude of alternating approaches. However, unlike Heidegger and his successors, I will propose to understand the non-objectivity of being not as a radical negativity, but rather as an ultra-positive surplus, a hyperbolé. The first part of the article will thus show how metaphysical thought is kept in motion by this hyperbolic element. The second, systematic part will build on this. It will discuss the extent to which the history of metaphysics can be understood as a hyperbolic movement. Finally, the last part will explore ways of establishing a relationship between the hyperbolic dynamics of being and phenomenology.

Dieses Buch entwickelt die These vom hyperbolischen Charakter des Seins vor dem Hintergrund der Metaphysikkritik des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ein hyperbolischer Seinsbegriff eröffnet einen anderen Blick auf historische wie systematische Fragen. Er erlaubt es anzugeben, was die vielen, oft sehr unterschiedlichen Ansätze der Metaphysikgeschichte umtreibt. Er zeigt aber auch, wie sich metaphysisches Denken fortsetzen lässt. Der Schlüssel zu beidem ist eine hyperbolische Ontologie, die vom inneren Überschuss der Wirklichkeit handelt.

As Karl Löwith suggested, modern philosophy of history secularizes Christian Heilsgeschichte by turning the eschaton into an immanent telos of the historical process. This article agrees with Löwith that there is an essential relation between the modern understanding of history and the Christian model. Yet, in drawing on the philosophy of history of Jan Patočka, it shows that for modern philosophy of history, there is a second option of dealing with the eschaton. Just as the Christian eschaton constitutes history also in urging to make a decision for Christ here and now, modern history constantly calls for making a decision concerning its meaning. According to Patočka, however, the ultimate meaning of history cannot be specified. Rather, meaning realizes itself in the question of meaning. One might speak here of a “crossed-out eschatology” that stands in opposition to the idea of human self-redemption, even if it is thoroughly modern.

This essay follows the assumption that the first principle of classical metaphysics has its counterpart in political sovereignty as suprema potestas. Therefore, both can be equally described as arché. Their epitome is the God of so-called ontotheology, who thus proves to be what I call the Ur-Arché. In contrast to current post-metaphysical approaches, however, I suggest overcoming ontotheology through a different metaphysics, which emphasizes the self-transcending surplus character of being. I regard early Christian martyrdom as an eminent way in which the surplus of being is manifested. This has two interwoven aspects, one ontological and one political, both arising from the excessive idea of the Christ event, or the notion that there is life beyond life unto death. I will analyse the mechanism allowing early Christian martyrs to counteract Roman imperial sovereignty. Finally, I will relate this to contemporary life systems in which sovereignty has become anonymous biopower.