The key thesis of this dissertation is: There is no criterion of goodness for worlds. In saying that we cannot grade worlds in terms of goodness, I am not making the claim that our perspectives are too narrow, too confined, for us to judge the world. It is true that they are narrow: we see little of the past or the future of the world, or of its spatial vastness; and our intellectural powers, which must be exercised for investigation and judgment, are limited. But even were our perspectives and …
Read moreThe key thesis of this dissertation is: There is no criterion of goodness for worlds. In saying that we cannot grade worlds in terms of goodness, I am not making the claim that our perspectives are too narrow, too confined, for us to judge the world. It is true that they are narrow: we see little of the past or the future of the world, or of its spatial vastness; and our intellectural powers, which must be exercised for investigation and judgment, are limited. But even were our perspectives and capabilities broadened, we could not, I am contending, evaluate the world in terms of goodness: I think that, like rivers, for example, worlds are things of a sort without an associated criterion of goodness. If one says that the river up ahead is a good river, one's claim is made from some point of view: smelt-fisherman, dreamer, industrialist. But telling someone who knows what rivers are that a good river is ahead will not enable that person--assuming he lacks information about your point of view--to describe the river ahead. Rivers and jungles, minutes, pains, and numbers, are sorts of things that don't have associated with them criteria of goodness, standards that mark off the good things in the sort. There are other sorts of things that do have such criteria: knives, for instance, and violins, and human beings. I am claiming that there is no criterion of goodness for worlds, no criterion that determines which worlds are good, or ranks worlds in terms of goodness, no criterion that gives sense to the assertion that the world is good. ;A secondary thesis I argue for is: If there were a criterion of goodness for worlds, then God would have to create the best possible world. ;In part, I ask whether there is a criterion of goodness for worlds because I believe investigating the question can help solve the problem of evil, and related problems as well. The question is also inherently interesting: in transects and connects a variety of fascinating questions in ethics and metaphysics